Impact of automatic identification system (AIS) on safety of marine navigation by Mokhtari, A H
IMPACT OF AUTOMATIC 
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS) ON 
SAFETY OF MARINE NAVIGATION 
ABBAS HARATI MOKHTARI 
Ph. D. 
July 2007 
BEST COPY 
AVAILABLE 
Variable print quality 
IMPACT OF AUTOMATIC 
IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS) ON 
SAFETY OF MARINE NAVIGATION 
ABBAS HARATI MOKHTARI 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph. D. ) 
Marine Offshore and Transportation Research Group 
School of Engineering 
Liverpool John Moores University 
UK 
July 2007 
Abstract 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) was introduced with the overall aim to promote 
efficiency and safety of navigation, protection of environment, and safety of life at sea. 
Consequently, ship-borne AIS was implemented on a mandatory basis by IMO in 2000 and 
later amendments to chapter V of Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. Therefore 
SOLAS Convention vessels were required to carry AIS in a phased approach, from I" July 
2002 to end of December 2004. The intention is to provide more precise information and a 
clear traffic view in navigation operations, particularly in anti-collision operation. This 
mandatory implementation of AIS has raised a number of issues with respect to its success in 
fulfilment of the intended role. 
In order to improve the efficiency of the AIS in navigation operation, this research mainly 
focused on the accuracy of AIS information, and practical use of the technology on board the 
ships. The intentions were to assess reliability of data, level of human failure associated with 
AIS, and the degree of actual use of the technology by navigators. 
This research firstly provided impressions about AIS technology for anti-collision operation 
and other marine operation and, about a system's approach to the issue of human failure in 
marine risk management. Secondly, this research has assessed reliability of AIS data by 
examination of data collected through three AIS data studies. Thirdly, it has evaluated 
navigators' attitude and behaviour to AIS usage by analysing the data from navigators' 
feedback collected through the AIS questionnaire survey focused on their perceptions about 
different aspects of AIS related to its use. 
This research revealed that some aspects of the AIS technology and some features of its 
users need further attention and improvement, so as to achieve its intended objectives in 
navigation. 
This study finally contributed in proposing the AIS User Satisfaction Model as a suitable 
framework for evaluation of navigators' satisfaction and extent of the use of AIS. This model 
can probably be used as the basis for measuring navigators' attitude and behaviour about 
other similar maritime technologies. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Maritime transport is playing a vital role in worldwide trade and economics as 
approximately more than 90% of the world trade volume is carried through waterborne 
transport (Harati-Mokhtari, 2001; IMO Library Service, 2006; The Round Table of 
International Shipping Association, 2007). Maritime transport in comparison with air, 
rail, and road transport with regards to its carrying capacity can be a better and more 
effective alternative mode of transport due to ability of handling higher volume and 
weight of the trade requirements of the global society. Marine navigation is a key element 
of the maritime transport and shipping industry. Therefore, safety of marine navigation 
operation has always been of paramount importance and great concern to the international 
and national regulatory and supervisory authorities and all other stakeholders in respect of 
safety of ship, life, and marine environment. 
Cost reduction considerations strongly affect the marine industry as a whole and put the 
improvement of safety at risk in terms of manning (minimum and less expensive crews 
recruitment), training (crews with less education and training and level of competency 
recruitment), and equipment (minimum standard and less expensive equipment being 
installed on board ships). 
Many technological advances have been introduced to the shipping industry. These 
include facilities for provision of more useful information on board ships, new or more 
advanced electronic navigation aids on the bridge, semi and fully automated control 
systems, improved accident investigation facilities, and more precise vessel identification 
systems. These technological innovation and advances are affecting the operation ashore 
and navigation practices on board ship. 
According to the European Commission (EC) (2001 a), the contribution of human errors 
and other human related factors to maritime accidents is about 70%. Many research 
projects and concerted actions were commissioned by the European Commission to 
provide the marine industry with safe and efficient navigation operation. Research into 
the introduction of innovative designed technology, and working practices for safer ship 
operation is one of the five areas of EC research. Assessing safety risks related to 
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operational shortcomings, human failure and need for harmonised training and education, 
better use of simulators and modem training tools are some of the results highlighted by 
EC research projects (European Commission, 2001a). 
New technologies are introduced in all areas of the marine industry, especially to the 
ship's bridge, to support most of the ship's operations. The main purpose of introducing 
such technologies is to improve the efficiency and safety of marine navigation, and 
pollution prevention (Goulielmos, and Tzannatos, 1997). However, achievement of the 
goals from technology implementation are not always as expected, and may sometimes be 
associated with unpredicted impacts, such as the negative impact on the end-users. Such 
negative impacts on the user may. be due to human factors issues and new demands as a 
result of changes to working practices on board. 
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is a new technology implemented by the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) for ship-to-ship application, mainly for anti- 
collision operation and hence to improve the efficiency and safety of navigation. But its 
implementation has raised a number of issues that could influence its intended 
effectiveness (Leonard-Williams, 1999; Brown et at, 2001; Cobley, 2003; Bailey, 2005a; 
and Norris, 2006). Lack of understanding of human factors associated with the 
application of AIS technology may affect proper communication between navigators and 
technology on the ship's bridge, and therefore, it may cause improper or lack of use of the 
technology. Such problems may lead to, or even further assist in, accidents and incidents, 
similar to radar-assisted collisions in its early stages of introduction, such as the collision 
between Hyundai Dominion and Sky Hope, and the collision between Amenity and Tor 
Dania (Marine Accident Investigation (MAIB), 2005a, and 2005b). 
This research focuses on the impact of AIS application on board ships for navigation with 
an outlook to human factors aspects of AIS, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
The literature review in chapter 2 shows that there is a little published in-depth research 
into the impact of AIS on safety of navigation and this project attempts to remedy this 
deficiency. 
This chapter contains a brief introduction to this research, and covers the objectives and 
scope of the research in section 1.2. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 cover the methodology and 
structure of this thesis, respectively. 
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1.2 Aims and Objectives 
Since safety at sea, and especially safety of navigation, is directly related to human 
element, there is a need for the systematic application of ergonomics and human factors 
in the maritime industry, especially when new technology is being introduced. Because 
ergonomics mainly focus on human-system interface, lack of its application in marine 
system design will increase chances for human error and accidents. Karwowski, ed 
(2001) mentioned: 
"Ergonomics evolve from studying the Interactions between 
humans and their surrounding work environment (with 
environment defined broadly to include machines, tools, the 
ambient environment, tasks, etc. ). " 
NAC (2000 cited in Widdowson, 2002) defines the human factors as. 
"A professional discipline concerned with improving the integration 
of human issues into the analysis, design, development, 
implementation, and the operational use of work systems. " 
This research focuses on new AIS technology introduced into the shipping industry to 
enhance safety of navigation by improving navigators' efficiency in anti-collision and 
other navigation operation. 
Standardised Automatic Identification System (AIS) development is critically important 
to the marine industry in providing a similar information environment for navigational 
use in different localities. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), in cooperation 
with other organisations, has published operational and technical standards for AIS 
equipment (Transportation Research Board, 2003). AIS has the potential to provide many 
benefits to parties engaged in the marine industry, especially to navigators and shore- 
based authorities. IMO has endorsed mandatory carriage requirements of AIS technology 
for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention vessels in a revision made to the 
Convention (Graveson, 2003). 
The functions identified by IMO for use of AIS are: 
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a) To assist in navigation operation as a collision avoidance tool in ship-to-ship 
mode. 
b) To assist vessel surveillance and traffic management in ship-to-shore mode. 
As AIS has quickly received the endorsement for mandatory carriage by IMO, a number 
of issues were raised about the effectiveness of the technology for the intended purposes. 
These issues include accuracy of the AIS data transmitted, human factors implication, 
current system design, their capabilities and limitations, integration with existing 
navigational aids, etc. These problems associated with AIS application could affect its 
impact on intentions for promotion of efficiency and safety of marine navigation, and 
safety of maritime transport as a whole. Therefore, there is a requirement for research in 
these areas, in order to find remedial actions to reduce shortcomings and challenges in 
AIS implementation (Canadian Coast Guard, 1998; Glass, 2003; and IMO, 2001 a). 
In this research, with consideration of relevant human factors aspects associated with 
operating AIS technology, the accuracy of some of the AIS fields of information will be 
evaluated by conducting 3 AIS data studies, namely; 
" VTS-based data study. 
" Data-mining study. 
" Proactive data study. 
The research includes a thorough review of the literature and overview of the AIS. 
Further, harmony and standard of use of AIS by navigators, along with the impact of 
some of the demographic factors on navigators' attitude toward use of the A. IS will be 
assessed through a questionnaire survey. A prospective model to study navigators' 
satisfaction with AIS status will be adopted analysing the reliability and validity of the 
questionnaire survey, and probably, be used as a basis for evaluation of the AIS user 
satisfaction, or for any other similar technologies. 
1.2.1 Aim 
The main aim of this research is to evaluate the following hypothesis: 
"The Automatic Identification System (AIS) has a beneficial Impact on the Safety of 
Navigation". 
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Assessment of the impact of AIS on the safety of navigation will be carried out by 
examining the level of human failures, and the attitude of people performing navigation 
tasks on the ships bridge towards the use of ATS. 
1.2.2 Objectives 
This aim will be satisfied by achievement of the objectives listed below. 
" To examine how the AIS technology has been accepted by navigators as a tool to 
improve the safety of marine navigation. 
" To identify the ways in which the use of AIS can be improved and enhanced. 
" To present a detailed overview of AIS technology and its application in marine 
navigation to further expand the reader's prospective practical understanding of 
the AIS technology, and what it does. 
" To inspect the performance and accuracy of the information transmitted by AIS 
to identify the major issues associated with AIS application in navigation 
operation, especially for anti-collision activities. 
" To assess navigators' performance in AIS usage for anti-collision by identifying 
and validating end user problems and required improvement actions. 
" To adopt a suitable model for identifying a reliable and valid scale for the 
measurement of user satisfaction that can be used as a framework for examining 
end user performance and usage of AIS, and possibly other similar technologies 
in the future. 
1.3 Justification for the Study 
As already discussed, one of the main purposes of introducing AIS was to improve the 
efficiency and safety of marine navigation. The introduction of previous technologies 
such as Radar and ARPA onto the ship's bridge has shown that the risks related to 
operational shortcomings, human failures, and other human factor issues would affect the 
success in achieving the intended goals. The accelerated implementation of AIS for 
international security reasons has potentially led to a lack of in-depth pre-implementation 
research. This has raised a number of issues in its potential success as a useful aid to the 
navigator on the ship's bridge. 
Proper understanding of the human factor issues should improve the human-technology 
interaction by reducing unpredicted consequences. This research may be beneficial in 
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preventing AIS-assisted accidents perhaps similar to those in the early years of radar. 
This study will further be useful in enhancing safety of navigation by utilising the use of 
the technology in navigational tasks performed by navigators. 
AIS has been implemented on ships for a small number of years and there has been little 
or no work on the navigators' attitude and behaviour to this new technology. The research 
will gather and evaluate information on navigators' usage of AIS. This will provide 
useful information for technology manufacturers for improved designs, trainers for course 
design and regulators for design of future regulations. 
1.4 Methodology 
This section will discuss the methodology that is going to be used for investigations 
required in this thesis. Data required assessing the level of human failure associated with 
AIS performance would be collected by observation through three AIS data studies. Data 
collection includes: 
" Recording of data transmitted by AIS at a Liverpool Vessel Traffic Services 
(VTS) station 
" Use of data recorded from a number of AIS receivers located worldwide, and 
" Proactive data recorded at the university site. 
The methodology for these data collection will be explained, in more detail, in chapter 4. 
These data will be analysed and discussed with the aid of `Microsoft Excel 2000' 
computer software for individual AIS fields of information (i. e. type of the ship, 
navigational status, etc. ). 
To further validate the result of the analysis of the first set of data, a questionnaire survey 
will be conducted to collect another set of data required. The study sample for this set of 
data will be the navigators that are active in ship navigation at the time of data collection. 
Questionnaire data will be analysed with the aid of 'SPSS version 14' computer software, 
and the statistical technique that will be used for validity analysis of the questionnaire 
construct in chapter 7 will be multiple regression. Further details of methodology for the 
questionnaire survey will be given in chapters 5 and 7. 
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1.5 Structure of this Research 
The methodologies described and developed in this thesis are to examine the recent 
development in marine navigation technologies and how they affect performance and 
safety of marine navigation, especially application of an Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) for ship-to-ship use. 
The objectives set for this research were to explore the impact of AIS technology on 
safety of navigation centred at examinations of associated human failure in application 
and use, and behaviour of navigators in relation to satisfaction and usage of the AIS 
technology. 
Chapter 2 of this thesis is a comprehensive review of the literature, which examines the 
previous studies and research related to the subject areas of this project. 
Chapter 3 outlines the current use of Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology 
onboard ship and ashore and its objectives. It also gives a practical understanding of the 
principle, design, development, and implementation of shipboard AIS. It also discusses 
AIS information display types as well as the symbols used to present the information on 
board. The potential use of AIS for other purposes such as search and rescue, vessel 
surveillance and traffic management, and aids to navigation is also considered in this 
chapter. 
Chapter 4 describes human factors, different approaches to human error, and risk 
management in marine navigation as the basis for a system's approach to evaluation of 
error with AIS application for navigation. Further, this chapter examines accuracy of the 
AIS information in manually inputted data fields in order to discover the level of 
inaccuracies and failures, and remedial action to reduce the chances of such errors. As a 
result of this examination, a questionnaire is devised which relates to a user satisfaction 
model is considered in later chapters. This examination will be carried out by AIS data 
research studies, including VTS-based study, data-mining study, proactive study, and 
former related studies. Accuracy, and precision of information presented to the mariners 
by AIS on the bridge is crucial for collision avoidance and safe navigation. The way that 
AIS data is represented on the bridge can significantly affect interpretation by the 
navigators. Chapter 4 will also make suggestions to reduce ambiguities and improve the 
definition of information required on the bridge for anti-collision operation. 
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Chapter 5 assesses navigators' perceptions about some aspects of the AIS technology, 
which is highlighted during literature review and AIS studies, and impact of demographic 
factors on their responses. The assessment includes: 
" Perceived usefulness of AIS. 
" Perceived ease of use of AIS. 
" Perception of the AIS information display. 
" Training. 
" Perception about AIS and use of VHF. 
" Perception about some disadvantages of AIS. 
This chapter will carry out the assessment by analysing navigators' feedback collected 
through a questionnaire designed for this purpose. The data analysis will show the degree 
of AIS usage in anti-collision and other navigation operation. This chapter also evaluate 
the significance of factors such as training, type of training, certificate of competency, 
and experience of navigators, and type of AIS display on perception of the navigators 
about AIS characteristics, capabilities and limitations. 
Chapter 6 discusses some of the well-known and commonly used theories and models of 
human behaviour and attitudes in new technology acceptance. It also discusses 
technology implementation programmes and the application of technology acceptance 
models in both the voluntarily and mandatory environments in order to adopt a suitable 
model to be used as a basis for assessing navigators' satisfaction with AIS as a mandatory 
navigational aid. This chapter then discusses the adaptation of the AIS User Satisfaction 
Model based on the End User Satisfaction Model (EUS) introduced by Adamson and 
Shine (2003). This chapter further discusses its appropriateness for assessing the degree 
of use of AIS on the ship by navigators. 
Chapter 7 examines reliability and validity of measurement constructs used in the AIS 
questionnaire survey, using the AIS User Satisfaction Model adopted in chapter 6, to 
show the survey consistency, stability, and measurement ability. The analysis was carried 
out by statistical technique of multiple regression, using computer software of SPSS 
version 14. This chapter also discusses modifications required to the model in order to 
increase its aptness for measuring AIS user satisfaction or satisfaction of the user with 
similar new technology in future. 
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In chapter 8 the main findings will be summarised, conclusions drawn, and 
recommendations will be made. 
Appendix A shows the publications in the proceedings of conferences or journals arising 
from this research. Appendices B and C provide the extra information about this thesis 
such as the questionnaire sample, data, coding, and etc., which have been referred to in 
the body of thesis. 
1.6 Limitations of the Research 
This research has concentrated on the main AIS fields that are inputted manually and has 
not specifically considered information relayed automatically from other shipboard 
navigational equipments, such as speed, position, heading, rate of turn, etc. This was due 
to practical reasons such as no availability of facilities for exclusive research purpose, and 
to avoid interruption of normal VTS operation, where the study was carried out in port 
VTS station. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Safety of marine navigation has always been of great concern to the marine industry, and 
new technologies have always been introduced to improve and enhance safety. There is 
limited literature about the impact of AIS on the safety of navigation, which may be due 
to the short time interval between introduction and mandatory implementation of the 
technology. Perhaps, there has not been enough time available for real time experiments 
between AIS introduction and its mandatory carriage requirement to properly evaluate the 
system influence and contribution on enhancement of safety of navigation. Further, the 
limited number of experiments and case studies in this regard has been carried out in 
limited time scales. 
The aim of this chapter is to conceptualise the purpose and area of this research. This 
will be carried out through a thorough review of some of the available literatures 
concerning new technology specially AIS Technology, human factors aspects of new 
technology, and their relation to safety of navigation. Firstly the literatures on new 
technology are covered in section 2.2. Literatures on Automatic Identification System 
(AIS) are discussed in section 2.3. Safety of marine navigation and human factors aspect 
of new technology are covered in sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. Section 2.6 covers 
the discussion and conclusion for this chapter. 
2.2 Impact of New Technology 
The marine industry like many other industries such as air industry is in a constant state 
of change. Many aspects of the technologies have experienced a great deal of 
advancement. Machinery automation, propulsion systems, cargo handling equipment, 
navigation support equipment, communication related technologies, and information 
management systems have all undergone revolutionary changes. Similarly, new sources 
of navigational information and data have been invented and introduced to the bridges of 
these ships. More or less, these advanced and automated new technologies have been 
advantageous to the marine industry by improving navigational performance and 
enhancing safety. 
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New technology may bring many extra responsibilities to the user and may need the 
working practices and related regulations to be changed. Therefore, different skill levels 
may be required by the actual users and operators of the new technology to perform their 
duties in an efficient manner. Naturally, with all the new technologies some issues will 
arise after implementation and practical use in the actual work environment. Modem 
technology has changed the way in which a ship is operated. The aim of these 
technological changes is to increase overall quality in shipping in terms of efficiency, 
safety and prevention of pollution, and human factors are nearly implicated. Despite 
reduction of marine accidents, issues such as over-reliance, inadequate training, and 
deficiencies in design, implementation, and procedures for operation of the equipment 
have been causally linked to some of the accidents at sea, such as in the case of the 
grounding of the passenger ship Royal Majesty on Rose and Crown Shoal near 
Nantucket, Massachusetts (Accident Investigation Reports, 2003). There have been many 
such examples of problems caused by the introduction of new technologies to vessels 
since the introduction of radar over 60 years ago. Lack of attention to the human-system 
interface, in terms of the design, layout, and integration of systems, and training in their 
use, is the root cause of many accidents today. Increased use of electronic technology 
caused the mariner to be less `hands on' and driven more towards automation which in 
general results in less cross checking, and less teamwork (Middleton, 2003). I3onsall 
(2006) highlighted the march of technology in the marine industry and the necessity for 
involvement of maritime education and training organisations and institutions in any 
debate on any change. He further argued that it is not practicable to prevent technological 
change, and therefore, it should be covered in training programmes. Formal training 
before the implementation stage can make the use of new technology more effective. 
Some of the new equipment, which has been made for some special purposes, may find 
its way for use in some other areas, but may not properly match in its new area of 
application. When new technology is introduced in the marine industry, apart from good 
points highlighted by makers and suppliers, there needs to be a much closer consideration 
of potential shortcomings and weaknesses, which require researching. Possibly, with the 
use of today's modem research tools, such as simulators, we can discover capabilities, 
benefits, limitations and effectiveness of the new technology well before the 
implementation stages to prevent new technology assisted accidents (Holder, 2002; Hall, 
1998; Denham et al, 1993; Accident Investigation Reports, 2003; Marine Board, 
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, 1999). 
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Today technical advancements in new technologies have revolutionised the way in which 
the marine industry is being operated. The ships being built today are larger. faster, have 
higher carrying capacity, and have more specialised missions. Ports are being built with 
smaller margins of safety due to economical considerations. More efficient machineries 
and new navigational equipment have been installed on board ships. Examples of these 
technological advances being introduced to the shipping industry and waterborne 
transport are, new electronic navigational aids on the bridge, automatic control systems, 
improved accident investigation, and more precise vessel identification facilities. 
New technology has been described as (European Commission, 2000): 
"A technology that has already been implemented on board 
ships/harbour and/or is expected to be implemented to a large extent in 
the near future, " and five main categories of new technology that have 
been defined are: 
a. Ship design related new technologies 
b. Cargo related new technologies 
c. Navigation support related technologies 
d. Communication and management support related new technologies 
e. Machinery related new technologies 
The introduction of new technology in all areas of the marine industry, especially to the 
ship's bridge to support most of the ship's operations, is inevitable, Sometimes the 
introduced technology may not assist the mariners due to its impact on the user. They 
may require changes to working practices to overcome the potential for overload by too 
much information from many individual types of equipment. Such problems may be 
deepening in adverse weather conditions and unexpected navigation situations, especially 
in areas of dense traffic, where there is limited time for action. 
At present the emerging technological changes are to improve overall quality in shipping, 
which is expressed in terms of improvements in (Goulielmos, and Tzannatos, 1997): 
" Efficiency. 
" Safety. 
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Pollution prevention. 
Some of the new technologies have been implemented by the international and national 
regulations through responsible and monitoring authorities to improve safety and working 
conditions. Some others are also being used on a voluntary basis by ship-owners for cost 
effectiveness. It was pointed out by the European Commission (2000a) that the 
implementation of new technology in the marine industry could be due to the following 
motivations: 
1. Safety considerations: contributing to disaster and pollution 
prevention. 
2. Regulatory requirements: a minimum level of technological 
equipment is required by regulatory institutions. 
3. Cost-effectiveness (cost push): the intense global competition 
stimulates the use of new technology as a contribution to the 
reduction of operational costs. 
4. Customer demands: some technological concepts are developed to 
(better) fulfil customer needs such as faster or more environmentally 
friendly transport. 
S. Technological innovation (technology-pull): new design fresh from 
the drawing table may create their own demand. 
6. Improvement of working conditions and quality of life on board 
ships: in order to attract appropriate personnel, ship owners may 
want to invest in technology applications, which provide for instance 
better ergonomics or workload reductions. 
Technology is often introduced to the ship's bridge to reduce human error and improve 
safety and performance in navigational operation and environment. In safety-critical 
systems, such as the navigation systems, human and technology are jointly executing 
different tasks and monitoring operations. Therefore, human-technology interaction 
seems to be a very important research area, which could minimise mismatch between the 
human and the technology, and therefore reduce chances of error. Human performance, to 
a great extent, is affected by his/her interaction with technology. Poor design of controls, 
displays, procedures, etc., could complicate the operation of new technology and 
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equipment. Additional tasks demanded by new technology can sometimes increase the 
navigator's workload, which may result in information overload and may contribute to 
disasters. Today, the tasks of the navigating officers on the bridge of the ship cover a very 
wide area consisting of many planning and navigation control, main and auxiliary engines 
monitoring and control, communications, administration, and more other tasks. 
Assimilation and incorporating a large body of knowledge from a number of new 
technologies might exceed information capacity of the operator, which could affect their 
decision making on the bridge (Grabowski, and Sanborn, 2003); Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2002). 
Another reason for developing new technologies to be used onboard ships could be to 
improve and optimise the efficiency of the human element to cope with industrial 
challenges. This could change the role of the human involved in the operations due to an 
alteration in the amount and type of duties performed. The new technology sometimes 
creates new pathways to error, shift consequences of error into the future and delays 
opportunities for error detection and recovery. Problems may persist and even deepen if 
communications between human and machines, and assessment of the situations are poor, 
which may contribute to accidents and incidents. The human element forms the interface 
between different parts of the maritime system. Any incompatibility between parts of the 
system may cause failure due to increased disorientation and cognitive load on the human 
element. Sometimes, development of technology will improve the quality of different 
hardware in the system but less attention is paid to human as the interface between 
different parts of the hardware in the system (Goulielmos, and Tzannatos, 1997; 
Mazzarino, and Maggi, 2000; Lotzhoft, and Dekker, 2002; Co et al, 1998). 
Technological innovation and advancement are affecting the operational practices on 
board ships and ashore in many ways. The European Commission (2000a) stated that the 
introduction of new technologies would bring about changes in the organisation and 
people in such organisation. It will increase the technical complexity of the system under 
consideration while reducing the amount of the operator's routine tasks. This causes the 
skill level of the operator to be changed and technically be retrained to cope with 
increased technical complexity of the job (Squire, 2003). 
The trend of development in design and operation of ships will continue due to the 
introduction of new technologies and other changes in the marine industry (Harre, 2002). 
Rapid technological advancement and innovation causes major changes in the state of the 
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marine industry. The new generation of ships needs to run more efficiently with fewer 
personnel (Harding, 2000). 
The introduction of new technologies affects safe navigation and manoeuvring of the 
ship. Independent onboard systems with different interfaces offering too much 
information to the operators may increase chances for confusion and information 
overload for the mariners. There may be a demand for new training on the basic operation 
of such technologies. In navigational operation, over-reliance of the officer of the watch 
(OOW) on new technologies together with inadequate training, improperly designed 
technology and implementation programme, and poor ergonomics, might have a negative 
response on the effectiveness of new technologies for safe navigational operations 
(Squire, 2003). 
The application of new technologies has changed the state of marine navigation in many 
ways. Kopacz et at (2004) mentioned that marine navigation has been changed and the 
navigation process has gone towards the safe and efficient operation of ships at sea. These 
changes will have new consequences in the marine industry. Stalberg (2006) argued that 
the effect of extensive adoption of new anti-collision technology on the high frequency of 
collision has not been very significant. The use of more advanced technologies, such as 
integrated bridge systems equipped with a number of tools create a new category of 
incidents. He believed that bridge teams might take greater risks in avoiding potential 
collisions, such as temptation to accept narrow margins with no room for error, because 
of having a more complete picture of the situation. 
The acceptance and conventional use of new technology in a professional manner is an 
important issue that should be properly investigated in implementation stages of 
technology. Human factors issues may affect implementation success, which could be 
different between voluntary and mandatory implementation. A number of theoretical 
models have been introduced to study human attitude and behaviour with technology. In 
order, to select a suitable framework for measuring technology usage behaviour in 
navigation, some of the well-known models that have dealt with technology usage 
behaviour will be discussed, later in this research. The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991), 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis, 1986), and Extended Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM2) (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000) are some of the commonly 
applied theories and models for prediction of user attitude and behaviour, which will be 
discussed in chapter 6. 
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2.3 Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
Requirements for ships to install Automatic Identification System (AIS) are an example 
of the mandatory application of new technology in the marine industry. Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) is one of the newest technologies introduced to the marine 
industry to be used onboard the ship and ashore. A full description of the AIS is given in 
chapter 3. The original aim for application of this technology was improving vessel 
identification, traffic management, and security in port and coastal waterways. However, 
without any commitment on ports and coastal states, the idea was developed and AIS was 
implemented as an anti-collision aid for SOLAS convention vessels. 
AIS is mainly intended for ship-to-ship application for collision and disaster avoidance 
and its main ability is in its strength for information exchange between ships at sea 
(Kurin, 2002). AIS may be applied in different sectors of marine industry on a mandatory 
or voluntarily basis. The degrees of application and its usefulness may vary according to 
the nature and type of activities in different fields of application. It can be applied (Fisher, 
2003; Kenyon, 2003): 
" To ships for ship-to-ship anti collision operation at sea all around the world. 
" To shore station for traffic monitoring and management. 
" To ports for their VTS. 
Kenyon (2003) believed that AIS could be applied for security reasons by providing 
useful information about ships and their cargoes. However, Fisher (2003) highlighted that 
its use for security is limited due to problems of spoofing and switching off by target 
vessels. According to Moore (2001) the main reasons for introduction of AIS are: 
(a) Mariners interests to obtain identity of the other vessels automatically 
in a more effective and reliable manner. 
(b) Interests of coastal states that are responsible for prevention of 
marine pollution, traffic management, and security to identify and 
monitor vessels activities to replace the physical identification. 
(c) Commercial interests, including port authorities, pilots, and ship 
operators through provision of fast information to mariners. 
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2.3.1 AIS Studies and Research 
As the AIS technology in the maritime industry is still in its development stage proper 
research is required to evaluate its functions and use. AIS technology, like any other new 
equipment, may have some good and some bad points but the actual effectiveness of this 
new technology should be examined by practical experiments and research. 
An example of such research is the AIS pilot project conducted jointly by the Canadian 
Coast Guard and the marine industry between March 1996 and December 1996 on the St. 
Lawrence River before its mandatory carriage requirement (Canadian Coast Guard, 
1998). It is important to highlight the fact that there was no internationally agreed radio 
band for use and only a single radio channel was used for this study. Further, because 
only a small number of vessels with AIS transponders installed onboard participated in 
this pilot study, the available shipping traffic was limited and evaluation of a full-scale 
traffic scenario was not taken into account. Another study, designed to evaluate AIS 
application in a joint planning partnership project (California Department of Fish and 
Game, 2001), was carried out by a number of representatives from the maritime industry. 
This included ferryboat operators, tug/escort companies, barge operators, container and 
dry cargo vessels, pilot, and government agencies. Some of the limitations of this study 
were the very short time gap in which this test was carried out (about 2 months), the AlS 
was in its introductory stages, and much of its potentials yet to be discovered. 
In an AIS evaluation test (Western Marine Community, 2002), bridge teams of three 
modern cruise ships have mentioned that displaying AIS targets on electronic chart or 
radar can improve the safety of navigation by assisting in better identification of SOLAS 
Convention ships, and providing an additional source of information for collision 
prevention. However, special attention should be paid to large amounts of information 
that may cause confusion to the navigators. AIS reliability and usefulness in detecting 
targets in radar blind sectors has been emphasised, but it was also found occasionally that 
AIS detection ranges are very limited. It is also recommended that non-SOLAS ships 
carry a class `B' transponder (the descriptions of the class `B' AIS is given in section 
3.2.7.2 of chapter 3. The European Union (1999), in a practical study on the use of AIS, 
concluded that AIS reduces manual workload and risks of misinterpretations. It improves 
situation awareness in shipping traffic, and decreases inaccuracies in navigation and 
traffic surveillance. 
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2.3.2 AIS as a Navigational Aid 
The position of AIS on the bridge is very important, especially when it interacts with 
other navigational equipment such as radar and ECDIS. AIS provides a lot of 
information, but navigators use only some of the AIS information for anti-collision 
operation. Other authorities will use the rest of the information ashore for other purposes 
such as shipping surveillance, traffic management, etc. Substantial risk of possible 
information overload due to introduction of AIS on board is one of the main concerns 
(Leonard-Williams, 1999; Edwards and Pietrazewski, 2000; Squire, 2003; Holder, 2002; 
Cobley, 2003; Creech, 2003) that can affect its real effectiveness as a navigational aid. 
The way in which AIS data is presented to navigators, along with information from other 
navigational aids, can affect their degree of situation awareness on the ship's bridge. 
2.3.3 AIS Pros and Cons 
The introduction of AIS technology, same as any other new technology, in the marine 
industry is associated with different arguments. Different points of view have highlighted 
positive and negative outcomes that may be derived from the use of AIS in navigation 
and other related marine operations. Sometimes many things have to be done in order to 
achieve the highest positive results from a new technology. Therefore, reviewing positive 
and negative opinion on AIS technology might be helpful in this respect. 
Early users of AIS, especially in the development and implementation stages, may see 
themselves exposed to higher risk than later users. In an AIS study conducted by the 
Canadian Coast Guard (1998) it was expected that: 
In the long term, with an ideal system (where everyone is equipped), we 
believe that the AIS is a tool that can make a great contribution to the 
effectiveness of marine navigation because of the very precise positioning 
of each vessel, the coverage area and the rebroadcast possibilities. 
However, an IMO standard will have to be developed to make certain it 
is used. 
As it has been mentioned above, this even long-term success of AIS is not straightforward 
and it depends upon certain conditions to be fulfilled. The requirement for all vessels to 
carry AIS and amendment to the regulation for its actual use onboard may be examples of 
such conditions. 
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The study conducted jointly by a number of representatives from the maritime industry 
(California Department of Fish and Game, 2001) showed some positive impacts of AIS. It 
confirmed improvement of efficiency and safety of navigation, providing valuable 
information to the whole marine industry, improving environmental protection, and 
advancement to port and shipping management. However, it also indicated that the 
available personal pilot unit (PPU) technology is not safe to be used for regular ship 
navigation operation, as it does not provide enough features to improve such operation. 
2.3.4 AIS a Complementary to Radar Technology 
AIS technology is being regarded as a good complement to radar and ARPA but not a 
replacement of it. If AIS technology is used properly, as a complementary navigational 
aid to radar and ARPA, for anti-collision purposes, it can simplify the identification of 
ships and assist in decision making if it becomes more reliable and all vessels carry AIS 
equipment (Harre, 2000; and Western Marine Community, 2002). According to the 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (1998) in radar coverage areas, AIS accuracy is not less 
than radar. However, the equipment available at the time was unable to provide the true 
bearing of the targets, which is essential navigation information. Pettersson (2002) also 
emphasised the importance of the radar, as the main collision avoidance tool on the 
bridge. He believed that the AIS technology, as a navigational aid, has the capability of 
rectifying some of the limitations of the radar in the future as a complement to radar. For 
example, with path prediction ability of the AIS in meeting situations, ships could be able 
to see exactly the way in which other ships are manoeuvring. 
An alteration of course and/or speed by vessels that could be readily apparent to others is 
an important factor in collision avoidance. Fukuto (2002) argued that time of detection of 
an alteration of speed and course is an important factor that affects the action taken to 
avoid collision and it will affect the safety of navigation. This delay in detection of an 
alteration after an abrupt alteration has improved from 100 seconds for radar to 20 
seconds for AIS. This makes the AIS technology more effective than radar in this respect. 
Further, Kurin (2002) pointed out that Coastal states can also make use of the benefits of 
the AIS technology as a complement to radar coast station by enabling them to get more 
precise ship information and other required parameters from AIS equipped vessels 
through their AIS network ashore. He also believed that, unlike radar, AIS technology 
provides real time heading information. Therefore, it is more useful in avoiding collision 
at sea by better detection of targets in traditional radar shadow areas and improving radio 
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communications efficiency. Pot (2002) mentioned the following five major advantages 
for AIS, which improves radar detection abilities: 
" Helps radar to detect targets around a bend. 
" Gives detailed information of a radar detected echo including ship's name useful 
for calling them on VHF. 
" Provide better target path prediction with the ability of measuring Rate of Turn 
(ROT). 
" Provide larger detection range than radar. 
" Reduces confusion about target's intentions. 
He also pointed out some risks associated with AIS and radar integration. GPS 
information of AIS due to different reasons may not be correct, position of AIS target and 
position of radar echo may not coincide with each other on the radar screen, and corrected 
Time of Closest Point of Approach (TCPA) taking into account ROT may be 
complicated. 
Table 2.1 shows a comparison of AIS and radar positive and negative features, which has 
been produced by Harre (2000). 
Table 2.1 Comparative advantages and disadvantages of Radar and AIS (adapted 
from Harre, 2000) 
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According to Harre (2002) AIS automatically identifies targets and it improves vessel 
tracking by providing more accurate positioning and dynamic information of ships. 
Unlike radar, it needs cooperation of the vessels to have their AIS, and other equipment 
such as GPS receiver, functional. In addition unlike radar, there is a possibility of not 
detecting unlawful operations and non-SOLAS vessels. He further believed that another 
disadvantage of AIS in comparison with radar is the lack of any facility to check the 
integrity of the map presentation due to not showing coastlines. 
2.3.5 AIS Display Issue 
The way in which AIS information is displayed is an important issue affecting the success 
of AlS technology in marine navigation operation. The technical and operational 
standards for AIS published by IMO have only included Minimum Keyboard and Display 
type and do not include other types of onboard displays (Patraiko, 2002). Squire (2003) 
also highlighted that the MKD system set out by the organisations is not a user-friendly 
system for displaying AIS information. Therefore, it cannot be very effective for the 
safety of navigation unless the display problem is resolved. More effort is needed to 
further develop a user-friendly interface for the new AIS technology in order to reduce 
operator workload (Edwards and Pietrazewski, 2000). 
The AIS displays importance, for improvement of the safety of navigational operation 
and marine traffic management is also highlighted by the Transport Research Board 
(2003). The suitability of MKD for display of AIS information is under question due to 
its restrictions on data presentation (Cobley, 2003; Fisher, 2003). The shortcoming of the 
graphical display system of AIS and symbology used in the system may create problems 
for navigators. Further, navigators need to cope with visual differences in the presentation 
of data and information from different equipment on the bridge for safe navigation of 
their ships that increases chances of human error due to information overload (Creech, 
2003). 
Current MKD of AIS technology as the minimum requirement by IMO appears to be 
inappropriate because of the difficulty in interpreting its data (Beatty, 2003). Data from 
the MKD system is in a text format, which needs to be plotted on the chart and 
interpreted by ATS users. MKD, as the most elementary AIS display, transmits the 
graphical images that are considered not to have enough information density and only 
allow the operator to read the information with limited input and control of the display 
device. This is because the display is limited to three lines of alphanumeric information. 
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This type of display would require the user to carry out manual plotting to translate 
targets to a geographic reference, which negates the real time nature of the information 
(Bronaugh, 2005). 
Stand-alone graphical display, integration of AIS display with radar/ARPA or Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS)/ Electronic Chart System (ECS) are 
other alternatives for displaying AIS information. The display of AIS information in a 
stand-alone graphical display will overcome most of the shortcomings of MKD type, but 
does not show coastlines (Harre, 2000). AIS display integrated with other navigational 
aids is useful in reducing the number of independent stand-alone equipment on the 
bridge. Therefore, the OOW would need less time to check different data from different 
information sources (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 1998; Harre, 2002). It was mentioned, 
in a pre-implementation programme by the Western Marine Community (2002), that 
displaying AIS targets on electronic chart or radar could improve safety of navigation. 
Advantages of integration of AIS with ECDIS was also emphasised by Motz et al (2003). 
2.3.6 AIS and VHF Communication 
The impact of AIS on VHF use is of particular concern to the marine industry. The 
impact can be negative if it causes unsuccessful and confusing VIIF communication 
(Holder, 2002). Harre (2002) believed that AIS reduces voice communication, and 
exchanges safety-related information, which will give more time to navigators for their 
situation assessment and decision-making. Pot (2000) argued that, by the introduction of 
AIS, the amount of time spent on verbal communication could be halved. Hadnett (2003) 
concluded that AIS would clear tots of ambiguities in VHF communication, which in the 
past have contributed to some collisions and near misses. Extra knowledge gained from 
AIS could optimise voice communication on VHF (Heaps and Nock, 2003). Further, 
proper utilisation of AIS technology will optimise radio communication by reducing 
information exchange between vessels and coast stations but it cannot totally replace 
VHF communications (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 1998). According to Leonard- 
Williams (1999), the application of AIS in VTS will improve ship safety and will relieve 
the OOW from making many VHF calls to the shore station. 
Although Kurin's (2002) belief that the AIS system is more useful in avoiding collision 
by radio communications efficiency. Hadnett (2003) and Bailey (2005a) stated that there 
is a risk of regular use of VHF agreements for collision avoidance, which may be an 
excuse not to comply with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
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(IRPCS). Further, Bailey (2005a) also pointed out that access to a vessel name 
encourages the use of VHF to establish contact with other vessels. This may cause 
increased VHF traffic, and specially, increased negotiation of collision avoidance as 
indirect consequences of AIS technology. In addition, this increased use of VHF for 
collision avoidance negotiation may further delay decision making, cause confusion due 
to ambiguous or imprecise use of language. 
2.3.7 AIS In Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) 
Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) can also take advantage of AIS to optimise monitoring, 
control, and management of marine traffic. AIS has potential for improvement of VTS 
operation in ports (Harre, 2000; and Fisher, 2003). It is argued (Leonard-Williams, 1999) 
that ship-shore application of AIS in vessel traffic services (VTS) will improve ship 
safety and will relieve the OOW from the task of reporting to a VTS station. AIS assists 
in a better identification of vessels, and improved traffic safety for shore based vessel 
traffic services (Holder, 2002). Oltmann and Bober (1999) also mentioned AIS as a 
valuable piece of equipment because with the use of AIS technology there is no need for 
ships polling, and it results in VTS stations having a very good traffic image of all AIS 
equipped ships in their coverage area. He emphasised the benefits of application of AIS to 
VTS, especially, in areas with low or without radar coverage such as inland waterways, 
canals, and estuaries. 
AIS expands VTS radar station coverage outside current coverage areas, which increases 
the controlling ability of the coastal state authorities. Further, ATS has got the ability to 
handle considerably more shipping traffic with the same amount of staff engaged in 
present VTS stations (Pot, 2000). He also argued that it has a significant impact on the 
time required for voice communication by VTS operators (the amount of time spent on 
verbal communication could be halved). Edwards and Pietrazewski (2000) also concluded 
that mariners and VTS operators would have a better navigational situation around them 
with AlS. Even though some researchers highlighted many important shortcomings of the 
AIS system, Heaps and Nock (2003) believe that AIS has many benefits in VTS 
operations. For example, additional information obtained from this equipment improves 
quality of advice and guidance given to different port users. They also thought that it 
possibly reduces costs by better organisation and management of pilots, berth occupancy, 
and other similar services. Extra knowledge and navigational information from AIS could 
enhance safety and increase data reliability. AIS cost effectiveness was also pointed out 
by Kurin (2002) who believed that AIS enables VTS stations to obtain required ship 
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information from AIS equipped vessels automatically, which in a larger area of coastal 
waters, reduces cost of VTS operation in comparison with radar VTS. 
2.3.8 AIS and Non-SOLAS Vessels 
Non-SOLAS vessels, such as small ships of under 300 GRT, pleasure crafts, etc., are 
exempted by IMO. Carriage of AIS equipment for such vessels is voluntary. Some of the 
main reasons for exempting such vessels from carrying AIS are technical impracticality 
(power requirement, antenna installation, space, etc. ), and the possibility of overload of 
the VHF radio bands used by AIS for transmission and reception of information. 
Advantages of the use of AlS by SOLAS-exempted vessels have been identified by a 
number of researchers. Brown et al (2001) mentioned a number of identified advantages 
such as the development of safety of navigation; improvement in being detected by other 
AIS equipped vessels, which decreases the risk of collision, and enhances other marine 
operations. They also emphasised the usefulness of AIS for small craft to make 
themselves visible to larger vessels during bad weather conditions with poor visibility, 
especially, when radar ability to detect such vessels is reduced due to rain or sea clutter, 
fog, and the nature of their construction. Creech (2003) also pointed out that the 
operational situation display of AIS is always associated with the danger of missing some 
targets due to the fact that not all vessels are required to be equipped with AIS. The 
present cost of AIS technology for non-SOLAS vessels is not reasonable and on this 
basis, the marine industry will not be able to make use of full potential of safety 
improvements as a result of AIS introduction. On the other hand, fitting AIS on large 
numbers of small vessels could cause system overload, which in some areas could make it 
unusable (Pike, 2003). 
According to Norris (2006), Class B AIS designed for vessel, not covered by mandatory 
requirements under SOLAS Regulations, with reduced specification will decrease the cost 
of the technology from that of class A, perhaps to £500 for basic equipment types. Many 
government states have already shown interest in mandating Class B AIS for smaller 
vessels due to security reasons. As a result, Software Radio Technology, UK has invested 
£1.5M to design a Class B AIS for a price of under $500 (Digital Ship, 2005). 
An international standard published by the International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) (2006) pointed out that Class B AIS is working on Carrier-Sense Time Division 
Multiple Access (CSTDMA) principle, is compatible with International 
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Telecommunication Union Recommendation (ITU-R Recommendation M. 1371-1), and 
the main purpose of Class B AIS is for fitted vessels to be visible and take part in the AIS 
network. The following statement is directly quoted from JEC (2006) standard: 
The new technology, hereinafter referred to as "Carrier-Sense TDMA 
(CSTDMA) ", requires that the Class B"CS"AIS listens to the AIS 
network to determine if the network is free of activity and, only if the 
network is free, can it transmit its information. This Class B AIS is also 
required to listen for reservations from base stations and comply with 
these reservations. This polite operation ensures that this Class B AIS 
minimises the probability of interference with Class A, Base Station or A 
to N (Aids to Navigation) AIS operations. 
2.3.9 AIS and Training 
The application of AIS to the bridge requires a proper integration with other navigational 
aids in order to improve navigation and collision avoidance alertness. As is the case with 
many other navigation technologies, appropriate knowledge and skill on capabilities and 
limitations, and sources of data of the AIS is very important for the navigators. This 
demands a proper training programme. Apparently, the level of knowledge and 
understanding of AIS is generally low (Brown et al, 2001), which could increase chances 
of confusion, navigator's workload, and lack of understanding of real benefits that AIS 
can bring to operators. Edwards and Pietrazewski (2000) argued that proper training of 
the AIS operators could reduce the amount of stress in carrying out their navigational 
tasks. For the AIS to be a useful navigational aid, an impression about the total AIS and 
introductory training on its normal operation along with understanding the basics and use 
of the technology prior to actual on board use of it is necessary and vital (Koehler, 
2003). 
According to Woods (2003), for AIS to be a useful navigational tool for navigation and 
anti-collision operations, training requirement for this new technology should be 
identified as a proper training course. A training course for AIS should become 
compulsory, as are many other STCW mandatory courses. Ile further emphasised that, 
because of the capability of a simulator in showing all elements of navigation from very 
simple to full scale scenarios, the use of a training simulator for AIS training could be 
helpful. Winbow (2003) also underlined the importance of a mandatory training course 
for navigators in order to improve effectiveness of the AIS on board ship. He further 
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believed that the training for AIS should include the basic operation of the equipment, 
setting up, data input and manipulation, changing screens, and extracting necessary 
information. The use of data and their correlation with information from other 
navigational equipment should also be included in any training agenda. Further, he 
mentioned that, by adopting proper trainings, the OOW should have enough skills to 
select suitable source(s) of information for navigational decision-makings. According to 
Bronaugh (2005), understanding the sources of the AIS data is extremely important for 
AIS operators, because knowledge of where information is coming from will enable them 
to detect errors early. The AIS operator must also be acquainted with different symbols 
and graphical presentation, and interpretation of AIS information. The objectives of an 
AIS training course for the mariners are (Bronaugh, 2005) to: 
0 Understand the principles of AIS data and their presentation. 
0 Operate the AIS function of the equipment. 
0 Be aware of potential errors. 
Norris (2006) believed that a large number of the AIS problems would have been 
prevented with proper training in the use of AIS, including necessity of regular checking 
of the data transmitted by own ship. He further mentioned about the hidden complexity of 
AIS, especially for enhancing situation awareness, which is also underlined in the IMO 
Model Course for AIS. The aim of the recommended IMO Model Course is to assist 
nautical colleges in setting up suitable training courses with emphasis on the 
shortcomings of MKD and the benefits of AIS display integrated with radar. It is 
unfortunate that the AIS Model Course is only becoming available after 5 years from the 
starting date of AIS implementation (Norris, 2006). Bailey (2005b) believed that during 
the fast implementation of AIS, the requirement for training was overlooked, because 
more attention has been given to the technical issues than to operator training. Further, 
transmission of erroneous critical navigational information by ships ATS may suggest that 
the navigators were not sufficiently competent in operational use of AIS technology. 
2.3.10 Other Viewpoints About AIS Technology 
There are other different viewpoints about the AIS technology. For example, Leonard- 
Williams (1999) believed that AIS improves collision regulation compliance by the 
navigators. Nevertheless, Squire (2003) had doubt about AIS application as a useful 
navigational aid for anti-collision purposes. He further pointed out that it is not a proper 
system to be applied for the safety of navigation. It is also of less use in the short term. In 
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this section some other viewpoints about AIS are discussed. AIS may be the most 
advanced tool for safety of navigation since introduction of radar and its real benefits are 
in the important information it sends and receives (English, 2003). 
Holder (2002) argued that, on board ships, AIS would assist the OOW to identify other 
ships much better than radar. The impact of AIS on reducing the number of collisions 
could be positive if it improves mutual detection of ships and application of anti-collision 
rules. It has potential to enhance mariners' ability in performing their duties efficiently 
and safely. Apart from improvement of marine safety it can be a valuable tool to other 
sections of the marine community by providing useful information. Nevertheless, as a 
tool for pilots, it is not enhancing the navigation and operation of ships in pilotage 
activities (California Department of Fisheries, 2001). Harre (2000) believed that AIS 
capability to acquire data automatically and information (heading, sailing directions 
ahead, or astern, and navigating status of the other traffic participants that is not possible 
by use of radar alone) improves mariners' abilities in performing their navigation tasks. 
This is very important and useful in preventing collisions. Harre (2002) also pointed out 
some of the advantages of AIS technology as it automatically identifies targets. It will 
improve vessel tracking by providing more accurate positioning and dynamic information 
of ships. 
Harding (2002) considered that AIS where installed will improve identification of ships 
and remove ambiguities. Vessels can come to agreements to avoid collision in 
compliance with rules. Therefore it enhances the confidence of the mariners in ships' 
manoeuvring. (Holder, 2002) believed that the impact can be negative if it causes 
violation of International Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea (IRPCS). 
Nevertheless, Leonard-Williams (1999) highlighted improvement of ship safety in ship- 
shore application of AIS, and improved compliance of navigators with the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (IRPCS) due to the possibility of being 
monitored from shore stations. Oltmann and Bober (1999) argued that AIS would be very 
valuable equipment for collision avoidance with lower cost compared with radar. AIS 
technology is a system with great potential. Stability and precision of vessels' tracking, 
advantages over radar, autonomous mode of large data exchange at high update rates with 
improvement in efficiency of ship reporting system made it is an excellent new 
technology, It can enhance the safety of navigation, but limitation of its dependence on 
other ships' cooperation and omission of small crafts causes the system not to be a perfect 
and ideal system (Davidson, 2002). 
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According to Hadnett (2003), AIS will enhance the situational awareness of the bridge 
watch keepers by its detailed information. Therefore, it will play an effective role in 
safety of navigation and avoiding collision, especially in areas with high traffic density 
associated with higher risks to navigation. He also argued that with AIS, navigators could 
make earlier assessment of the risk of collision than with radar. Therefore, they will have 
more time to take early action to avoid collision. It does not have some of the limitations 
of the radar, which in the past has resulted in numbers of collisions and near misses. AIS 
technology enhances safety in different visibility conditions and improves mariners' 
efficiency (Edwards and Pietrazewski, 2000). AIS also provides new improvement to 
safety at sea, and if all vessels are fitted with AIS the risk of collision should reduce 
(Pike, 2003). Bronaugh's (2004) opinion was that the AIS automatic transmission and 
reception of safety information gives a clear traffic situation. AIS, as a new advanced 
technology, will minimise distraction in ship's bridge team operation. Therefore, it 
enhances safety of navigation. As the cost of marine accidents is very high, from different 
aspects, use of AIS as a complement to ECDIS is necessary to boost safety at sea in 
confined and restricted waters. 
On the other hand, effectiveness of new technologies on the safety of navigation in early 
stages of introduction has some limitations. Oltmann and Bober (1999) emphasised the 
abilities and application of radar for detecting all crafts at sea in comparison with the 
ability of AIS, which only detects targets if they carry AIS and is operational. Leonard- 
Williams (1999) pointed out that different AIS issues in ship-to-ship mode of application 
such as training in operational use of AIS and understanding of information presented by 
AIS for anti-collision purposes need further investigation. He also added that there are 
some other aspects of AIS such as not all vessels carrying transponders onboard, not 
providing target's relative motion information of AIS, incorrect data input to the AIS 
equipment, possibility of being misused by criminals, and information overload affecting 
its success. Squire (2003) was also not sure about AIS application as a useful navigational 
aid for anti-collision purposes in the short term. He argued that AIS might be a valuable 
tool in the long term if its negative issues especially in respect to human factors are 
resolved. 
In research by the California Department of Fisheries (2001) it was stated that there is 
still a long way to go to make the AIS technology a reliable system with full ability to the 
mariners. Harding (2002) also argued that situation for confusion will exist, as most of 
the ships are not required to carry an AIS system. Leonard-Williams (1999) also 
highlighted the necessity of further study to identify AIS operational problems and human 
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factors aspects of AIS, especially in ship-to-ship application. He thought that with further 
investigation and research it might be possible to answer questions such as AIS's 
capability to offer a solution to anti-collision operations, its ability to assist in collision 
avoidance while it does not directly gives relative information, its threats of 
misunderstanding of erroneous and invalid data input, and information overload. He 
believed that some of AIS problems could have been identified and resolved if it was 
studied carefully in advance. Interfacing and integration of AIS with existing systems 
such as gyrocompass, rate of turn (ROT) indicators, radars, etc, on board older ships are 
difficult and sometime not possible due to technical reasons. GPS vulnerability, and own 
ship's data input (as the main problem of AIS) are some other issues (Beatty 2003). Motz 
et al (2003) also mentioned lack of practical experimentation on the usefulness of AIS 
with a special emphasise on the use of simulation to test the integration of AIS with other 
onboard navigational aids. 
Another negative point of AIS is that it can be a very useful tool for pirates and terrorists, 
as it will make marine surveillance easier for them (Creech, 2003). Cobley (2003) 
highlighted the problem of dealing with lots of different types of navigational information 
by mariners, and the way they are presented on the bridge. He believed that there is a 
substantial risk of information overload, and further, present radars due to their 
limitations cannot handle the amount of data generated by AIS. 
The real effectiveness of AIS in aiding the safety of marine navigation could be 
established with further suitable research. For example, how best the AIS information 
(e. g., symbols and icons) should be displayed to be useful and unambiguous to the 
mariners is an important issue, which requires further research (Cobley, 2003). Fisher 
(2003) also mentioned that AIS might bring new dangers into navigation. Some other 
issues that need further study are application for collision avoidance, and security. More 
practical researching on how AIS will interact with the existing anti-collision regulations 
is necessary. It is mentioned that AIS, as with many other pieces of navigational 
equipment, is intended to facilitate mariners to conduct their tasks in compliance with 
compulsory rules and regulations. It might cause distraction and could negatively affect 
mariners in maintenance of an appropriate visual lookout (Stitt, 2003). Proper practical 
evaluation tests of the system can reassure the agreed advantages and improvement of 
navigation safety (Transport Research Board, 2003). Harre (2002) also mentioned the 
need for careful consideration of AIS practical experiences to find out its operational 
benefits and limitations. Leonard-Williams (1999) suggested that preferable use of 
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simulators, rather than the real ship's bridge, would help to improve safety and achieve 
economical benefits in the early stages of evaluation. 
2.4 Safety of Marine Navigation 
Safety of maritime transport and particularly safety of navigation has always been of 
supreme importance to the marine industry. The impacts of maritime accidents on the 
safety of life and environment are considerable and always have been major issues. 
European Commission (2001b) has stated that: 
Safety implies freedom from danger. The ultimate level of safety desired 
by human beings is to be in a situation without any risk of personal 
accident, injury, or material damage. In reality, this is impossible 
because a widespread set of dangers cannot be avoided completely. So 
safety generally refers to the level of danger that is socially acceptable in 
a real-life situation. 
The overall safety at sea consists of different components, but the most important part of 
safety at sea is the safety of navigation, which has been defined as (Kopacz et al, 2001): 
Safety of navigation can be considered as `such conditions of conducting 
the ships at sea which ensure that ships are not endangered by collisions, 
stranding or storm damage. Such safety is achieved by the proper 
navigation processes, as well as by ensuring the proper environmental 
and operational conditions for the realisation of these processes. 
The main elements contributing to safety of navigation are as follows (see figure 2.1): 
Ships and navigational technology, they mainly consist of ships navigational properties, 
its dynamical stability, and navigational equipment. 
Navigational information and environment, the environment consists of ambient 
environment (sea and weather condition, day and night) and density of ships traffic. 
Availability of safety related information services, vessel identification and traffic 
services, aids to navigation, and etc. are also very important. 
Regulations and procedures, they include laws, regulations and requirements by national 
and international maritime organisations regarding navigational technologies and their 
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operational aspects, and navigation process and emergency procedures, which will affect 
safety of navigation. 
Human element, it includes the ships crew that will affect safety of navigation through 
their social, physiological, and psychological characteristics. These characteristics include 
a level of navigational competence, proficiencies, knowledge and experience, fitness for 
assigned tasks, language communication, teamwork, etc. One of the main tasks of the 
human element is coordination and management of the other elements of the navigation 
safety system. 
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Figure 2.1 Main elements of the safety of marine navigation 
Interaction between different elements of the safety of navigation is very important. 
Therefore, any changes in each element or sub-elements should take place with 
considerations of the other sections. For example, introducing a new technology to 
improve safety should take into account the effects on the human elements (i. e., proper 
training is needed to operate or monitor the new equipment well before its mandatory use 
on board). Failure to consider human factors issues associated with new technology may 
sometimes not promote safety but actually put it more at risk. 
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IMO, as one of the United Nation (UN) agencies, in close co-operation with other 
international organisations such as International Association of Lighthouse and Aids to 
Navigation Authorities (IALA), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
International Maritime Satellite Organisation (INMARSAT), etc, is responsible for the 
safety of navigation. They provide rules and regulations through international 
conventions, circulars, notices, etc. IMO has also taken many steps towards safer 
navigation by implementation of new regulations and technologies. Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS)-1974 Convention, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 
(IRPCS)-1972, and Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping ihr Seafarers 
(STCW)-1978 are examples of these conventions. It is understandable that. with rapid 
technological changes taking place in the maritime industry, safety regulations and 
procedures set by the organisation should also be updated accordingly to improve 
standards of safety at sea. Investigation after major accidents and incidents at sea is 
another source for updating regulations to promote safety at sea. The revised Chapter V 
of the SOLAS Convention dealing with safety of navigation is taking into account the 
new technological changes. 
National authorities of the maritime states such as maritime administrations & ports 
organisations and classification societies play an important role in implementation of 
safety of navigation by enforcing the observance of good practice of the safety of 
navigation's regulation and requirements (Kopacz et al, 2001). Alderton (2004) believed 
that the major problem of maritime safety is the enforcement of legislation as not all 
states are willing or have the skilled personnel to implement the official safety 
requirements. The extension of enforcement of legal safety requirements to port states by 
1978 SOLAS Convention and its later amendments is to overcome this implementation 
problem. 
2.5 Human Factors Aspects of New Technology 
Accidents and incidents in maritime operations are to a great extent dependant on human 
and organisational factors. Therefore, better integration of human factors into maritime 
operations can improve the overall safety of navigation. The interaction of humans with 
technology and technical systems, or the human-system interface, is very important in 
safety performance not only in the marine industry but also in all other industries. In the 
marine navigation system, human-system interface has a strong role due to the different 
and nearly exceptional nature of the working environment and conditions with adverse 
working conditions. Adverse working conditions can reduce human performance and 
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affect efficiency of navigation and therefore reduce safety. Today's tasks of navigating 
officers on the bridge consist of many activities in different conditions of weather, 
visibility, and traffic, which are physiologically and psychologically very much different 
from tasks ashore. 
The study of the impact of new intelligent technologies in complex, safety-critical 
systems on the performance of the system and operator is very important. The 
technology affects the system performance and the human is responsible for performing 
different duties, and supervising safety to improve performance of operation in the 
system. The amount of reliance of the operator on technology in safety-critical systems is 
a significant measure towards improving safety and performance, and therefore, it must 
be studied carefully. Impact of the use of technology in different stress and time 
dependant conditions is also very important to be understood (Grabowski and Sanborn, 
2003). They also argued that level of familiarisation, confidence, and satisfaction of the 
operator would affect the amount of impact of technology on the system performance. In 
a qualitative analysis of some accidents by Johnson (2004) it is argued that many have 
developed when unexpected changes have occurred in operational requirements and 
needed fast programming in complex, safety critical systems. He believed that better and 
more effective training is needed for new technology users to be familiar with new 
programmable systems, to understand the limitation of such systems, and to improve their 
performance in teamwork operation. New technologies on board ships in the marine 
industry, the same as in any other industry, will bring about some changes and new 
requirement such as the demand for new operational quality and competence levels for 
mariners. 
The introduction and development of new technologies on board ships has affected 
maritime education and training, which demands a new quality standard. In order to cope 
with new technologies on board appropriate utilisation of new training technologies such 
as simulators, computers, workshops and laboratories should be made. Important human 
factors issues, which must be improved to cope with rapid technological changes, involve 
factors related to incentive and motivation, management and command, mental workload, 
skill and competency level, and other factors related to physical and mental abilities of 
the human element (Mazzarino and Maggi, 2000). According to the American Bureau of 
Shipping (2003), systematic application of human factors engineering is very important in 
improving safety and efficiency. Many documents, circulars, and guidelines issued by the 
IMO and other organisations emphasised different aspects of ergonomics (interaction of 
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human with technology in working environment). However, there is still a lack of 
efficient application of ergonomics in the maritime industry. 
The introduction of advanced technologies often places new requirements on both the 
human element in the organisation and the organisation itself. New advanced 
technologies may relieve the operators from some of their usual daily tasks but they 
might increase the technical complication of the profession. This demands new levels of 
skill to operate new systems safely. Therefore, technical training requirement will change 
(Co et al, 1998). Further, automated technologies will affect the confidence and 
performance of the operators. Introduction of new advanced technologies, change in 
manning scale, and structural changes in the marine industry has changed the operation of 
ships and this trend will continue in the future as well. Therefore, the management of the 
human element in the marine industry is very important in ensuring an acceptable level of 
marine safety (Pomeroy, 2002). Both the human and technical factors are contributing to 
marine safety, and in safety assessment or accident investigation they should be examined 
separately as well as jointly. Pomeroy (2002) also pointed out that training and education 
ought to be updated and applied in order to take the development of new systems into 
account. He identified the case of the grounding of the Royal Majesty passenger ship and 
cited the lack of proper training of the crew in operation and management of new 
technologies on the bridge as one of the main aspects of the accident. 
The majority of marine accidents involve some sort of human contribution and 75 - 96% 
of marine casualties have been due to human error, which makes the avoidance of human 
error an extremely important subject (Rothblum, 2000). Alderton (2004) believed that 
shipping casualties are seldom caused by one simple error and they often occur due to 
coincidence of several doubtful practices and actions together in one situation. He further 
thought that the causes of marine mishaps based on: 
" Failure in communications. 
" Imbalance between rapid speed of technological advances and awareness of 
potential hazardous consequences. 
" Imbalance between rapid speed of technological advances and the ability of 
operators to efficiently use their new technologies. 
According to Thompson (2003), human factors are affecting marine safety, and many 
existing accidents at sea directly result from human failure. Enhanced crew training, 
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using the latest training technologies such as simulator and computer will result in a 
better understanding of human factors that affect safety and management at sea. Study of 
human factors such as communication effectiveness, human performance and intellectual 
capabilities and restrictions, human attitude and behaviours, workload and stresses can be 
very effective in improving safety. According to Rothblum (2000) some of the human 
errors at sea are not due to the direct fault of people and the errors are due to shortcoming 
and limitation of technologies and working environment. He further argued that 
inadequate involvement of human factors in design processes might cause poor 
interaction between operator and technology. Alderton (2005) argued that ship safety is 
mostly related to ports and most of the safety related problems arise in the port 
environment or in the port approaches. He further mentioned that only 19% of the safety 
problems take place in open water. 
The fast technological modernisation and development, with economical forces, resulted 
in big changes in marine industry and the ways in which ships are being operated. These 
changes will demand better understanding of human factors and requirements of the users 
of new technologies on board ships. Marine simulators can be used for these purposes. As 
the use of simulators for training purposes has been accepted in STCW 95, simulators can 
be used to improve the mariners' abilities in ships' operation. Simulators can be used to 
study the efficiency of different actions taken by the mariners without any consequences 
of taking an incorrect action or decision in a complicated situation that is not possible in 
real working conditions. It can also be used to practice all other navigational activities on 
the bridge such as bridge procedures, team work, and passage planning by navigators in 
different stages of their sea services (Mantel, 2000). 
Safety has largely been improved due to new technological and engineering changes in 
recent years. However, sometimes there has been an unintentional safety reduction caused 
by unexpected impacts of new technologies on the human or other organisation factors. It 
has been claimed (Baker and McCafferty 2005; Steber, 2005) that human error is the 
cause of the majority of accidents at sea. Human factors such as fatigue, negligence, 
inadequate training, poor communication and teamwork, equipment design problems, etc. 
are sometimes responsible for such errors. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the 
human element in marine systems. Different parts of the system are consistent and 
changes in one part of the system may influence the other components, and therefore, 
may affect the overall safety of the system (National Research Council, 1997). Proper 
research and improvement in human and organisational aspects are essential for 
preventing human errors and improvement of the safety of marine systems. Proper 
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research should be carried out on the different human factors aspects of new technology 
such as interface design to properly evaluate performance, decide on requirements, and 
set principles and standards. 
Proper human factor research and application of principles of human factors to new 
technologies on board can improve design and new systems operations, and therefore, 
will improve safety (Transportation Research Board, 2003). 
Pomeroy (2000) highlighted that new technologies can result in more complex human 
interfaces. Sometimes the complexity of the interface may introduce problems for 
operator performance that will increase the possibilities of accidents in the marine 
industry. He believed that the standards, regulations, and specifications have not been 
promoted in accordance with the increase in technological complexity of the system. He 
also mentioned that involvement of human element in operation of advanced and 
complex systems on board ships is different with old traditional systems. With new 
complex technologies, integration of the operator and system will increase. Therefore, 
new standards and measures in the marine industry are needed in order to integrate the 
human element into system design, and development of marine systems. He concluded 
that, as the marine systems are hybrid human-technical structures, human factors should 
be considered more actively for better improvement of marine safety. 
Today, many different classes and types of ships are built for different missions to 
perform a wide range of tasks. Therefore, control and navigation of these wide varieties 
of specialised ships will include many functions, such as planning, and operation in an 
ever-changing surrounding environment with different mission and threats. The officers 
in charge of the navigational watch on the bridge have to undertake many duties and 
activities such as: navigation, collision avoidance, communication, monitoring different 
systems and operations, and management. They should also do the planning for additional 
tasks such as cargo operation, ship maintenance, etc. Application of new technologies and 
equipment on board, due to requirement by regulations, or willingly, might impose 
additional workload on the OOW and demand further requirements and needs. Alderton 
(2004) pointed out that the growing number of specialised ships and trades alo, ig with the 
increased amount of complicated technologies requires some improvements in training of 
seafarers. He further added that navigation safety and capability could be improved by 
standard education and training of the seafarers in accordance with STCW (Standards of 
Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping) Convention. 
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Some of the most important aspects of the use of AIS are to understand proper process 
and operation of the equipment itself, its integration with other equipment, and 
management of the information provided for navigation and the collision avoidance 
function. Simulators could be used, as modern training and research tools, to evaluate 
new technologies prior to technology implementation so that corrective action can be 
taken. Simulation provides cheap, safe, and fast means for research and training. 
Simulators can present situations and circumstances that are rare and infrequently happen 
on the actual job. 
The shipping industry with great diversity of navigational challenges and severe changes 
in weather condition, visibility, and wind has a critical nature. Therefore, any new 
technology should only be introduced with a high degree of concern and care. 
2.6 Discussion'and Conclusion 
The result of the literature review on new technology in the marine industry showed that 
many aspects of the technologies have experienced advances and new sources of 
navigational information have been introduced to the ships' bridge. Despite a number of 
advantages of the advanced and automated technology in improvement of performance 
and safety of navigation, there have been some unforeseen impacts of such technologies, 
which may have negative impacts on human elements. Examples of the negative impacts 
could be over-reliance, reduction in competency level, deficiencies due to improper 
implementation, inadequate regulation and procedures, etc. Improper consideration of 
human factors in technology implementation could result in errors that may lead to 
catastrophic events. The nature of the marine environment with diverse conditions may 
intensify the problems at sea. Research on interaction between human and technology is 
of paramount importance in avoiding chances of error due to human-technology 
mismatch. 
Although the AIS is a very new navigational aid on board ships, it has attracted much 
attention and its use has been under observation by a number of researchers. There have 
been few in-depth ATS studies before and after its implementation. However, the 
introduction of AIS technology in marine navigation has been associated with a number 
of debates and disputes on the use of AIS as a navigational aid for anti-collision purposes. 
Proper standards on the use of AIS, accuracy of the AIS information, its impact on the 
other navigational aids such as radar, its display issue, its impacts on VHF 
communication, its impacts on VTS, AIS concern related to non-SOLAS vessels, and 
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some human factor aspects of the AIS such as navigators training on the basic operations, 
capabilities, and limitation of AIS were some of the most important issues observed 
during literature review. The need for further research was also highlighted in the 
literature reviewed. 
The importance of the safety of marine navigation due to considerable impacts of marine 
accidents on the safety of life, property, and environment was emphasised in a number of 
studies. It was concluded that 4 main elements of safety of navigation are the ship and its 
navigational technologies, navigational information and environment, regulations and 
procedures, and human element. Introduction of new technology should be with 
consideration of all the elements contributing to safety of navigation. with special 
emphasis on the human element as the most flexible and managing part. It was pointed 
out in the literature that the majority of marine accidents are caused by some sort of 
human contribution and errors. Some of the causes of the marine accidents are the 
imbalance between pace of technological changes and awareness of their consequences 
and imbalance between the rapid speed of technological changes and the training of the 
operators. Proper consideration of human factors in introducing new technology on board 
could improve safety in marine navigation operation. Changes in ship operation due to 
technological development require proper understanding of the requirements of the 
frontline operators. This could be achieved through human factor consideration during 
different stages of technology implementation. 
Proper operation, data integrity and maintenance, utilisation in navigational operations, 
and information management of the AIS should be properly investigated as they could 
affect technological success. In the case of radar technology, it took about 20 years from 
the date of its introduction in the British Merchant Navy for the navigators to use radar 
technology competently. Many radar-assisted collisions occurred during this time 
(Alderton, 2004) and training was only instigated after. AIS research could resolve the 
associated AIS problems such as issue related to its quick mandatory implementation, and 
further could reveal its practical advantages and disadvantages on promotion of safety of 
navigation. Therefore, this research will first study aspects of the accuracy of AIS 
information. Secondly, it assesses the navigators' AIS satisfaction with the help of a 
questionnaire survey in order to discover the extent of use of AIS on board ships. Finally, 
it reviews some of the common theoretical models of human attitude and behaviour in 
order to identify a suitable model for measuring user satisfaction with AIS and other 
similar technologies. 
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2.7 Summary 
This chapter has carried out a re-examination of the available literature on introduction of 
new technologies in the marine industry, especially the introduction of AIS for navigation 
on the ships bridges. Different reasons for the application of new technologies and 
incentive for AIS application were also discussed. Some of the possible impacts of new 
technologies, and AIS in particular, on navigational operation were investigated. Some of 
the AIS issues highlighted in the literature were reviewed in order to set up the scene and 
basis for this research. Different views about the importance of the safety of navigation, 
main constituting elements of the safety, and impact of new technology on the safety 
were discussed. 
Human factors' aspects of implementing new technology, the role of human element in 
marine navigation, and human contribution to marine accidents were reviewed. It was 
concluded that, due to different navigational challenges and the diversity of the marine 
environment in the shipping industry, new technology should only be introduced with 
particular concern and care. Further, AIS research is needed to investigate about different 
issues affecting AIS usefulness as a navigational aid. 
Further literature on AIS will be reviewed and discussed in chapter 3, which is an 
overview of AIS technology. Some other literature on human factors and human error 
will also be discussed in chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
3.1 Introduction 
Wireless digital communication is the basis for many high technology systems of today. 
With the latest VHF (Very High Frequency) digital modulation, communication of data 
on the radio frequency bands is faster and more reliable. Satellite navigation technology 
allows accurate and reliable automatic positioning for all kind of vessels. The differential 
Global Positioning System (DGPS) with increased accuracy in positioning and rapid 
exchange of other data has provided feasible means for automatic transponders. 
Improvement of satellite navigation and digital data communication systems are the basis 
for integration of navigation and communication systems. With transmitting and 
receiving of digital data containing navigational information to and from other ships by 
means of VHF radio transmission used in AIS (Automatic Identification System) the 
precise and accurate identification of ships is available. Application of the principle of 
automatic reporting of information, including collision avoidance and situational 
awareness, can improve safety of navigation and marine environment (European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL), 2002). 
Development of AIS technology initially was for use in Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) but 
a transponder system with automatic operation using VHF radio band for ship-to-ship and 
ship-to-shore use was suggested by some of the Scandinavian states to IMO. 
Consequently a system called ship-borne Automatic Identification System (AIS) was 
adopted by IMO. The performance standard of ship-borne AIS was recommended by an 
IMO sub-committee on safety of navigation (NAV) in 1997 and upon approval of the 
IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) in 1998 was introduced under resolution 
MSC. 74 (69). On a request by IMO in 1997, the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) allocated two radio channels as: AIS1 (161.975MHz) and AIS2 (162.025MHz) to 
be used worldwide on the high seas, for the automatic ship identification and surveillance 
system. Under the initiative of the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation 
and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) a draft of the technical characteristics of AIS was 
prepared and submitted to the ITU Radio-communication Study Group. Then the 
technical characteristics for a ship-borne AIS using Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA) in the maritime mobile band were formally approved by ITU in November 1998 
(ITU-RM. 1371-1). Following the adoption of the IMO performance standards and the 
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ITU technical characteristics, the standard for operational and performance requirement, 
and testing requirements to be used by administrations for approval of the type of AIS 
equipment to be fitted on SOLAS convention ships, was adopted in 2001 (SAAB 
Transponder Tech AB, 2004; and IALA, 2002a). 
This chapter covers an overview of the AIS technology in order to provide the reader with 
a comprehensive explanation and understanding of the technology, Firstly, mobile AIS 
stations will be covered in section 3.2. Secondly, this chapter covers fixed AIS stations in 
section 3.3. AIS accuracy and security issues will be covered in section 3.4. Finally, 
section 3.5 contains the conclusion of this chapter. 
3.2 Mobile AIS Stations 
According to the recommendation ITU-R M. 1371-1, AIS stations are subdivided into 
"mobile" and "fixed" stations, which are based on the capability and intended purpose of 
the AIS stations. It is the capabilities of the station to control the AIS VDL rather than the 
physical degree of mobility that determine whether it is mobile or fixed (IALA, 2002b). 
Mobile stations are not able to control the VDL and are to be used by mobile AIS 
members, such as ships, SAR aircrafts, and floating aids to navigation (A to N). Mobile 
AIS stations include (IALA, 2002b): 
" Ship borne Class A, B, and A derivatives stations. 
" SAR airborne stations. 
"A to N stations. 
3.2.1 Ship borne Mobile AIS 
Shipborn mobile AIS must fully comply with the VDL principles. They are required to 
recognise different types of messages, but the way in which they process the messages, 
their interfaces to external display systems, and sensor system may be different between 
different types of AIS stations (IALA, 2002b). 
3.2.2 IMO Carriage Requirement 
In 2000, IMO (International Maritime Organisation), to ensure safe navigation, adopted a 
new requirement for ships to carry Automatic Identification Systems through amendment 
to chapter V of SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) Convention. Mandatory carriage of AIS 
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by SOLAS vessels was in a phase approach, from Is` July 2002 to July 2008, but later 
there were some modifications at IMO Conference of Contracting Governments to the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974,9-13 December 2002. 
According to the latest modifications to regulation 19 of chapter V (Safety of Navigation) 
of the Convention, AIS should be fitted aboard ships as shown in table 3.1 (IALA, 
2002a): 
Table 3.1 AIS carriage requirement (source: IALA, 2002a) 
As the IMO carriage requirement only applies to SOLAS Convention ships, there are no 
international regulations that can oblige non-SOLAS ships such as ships navigating in 
inland waterways, small fishing vessels, and pleasure craft to carry the AIS equipment on 
board such vessels. It is left to discretion and judgement of national state administrations 
and operators to provide their own implementation plan for use or not to use AIS, by non- 
SOLAS Convention vessels, to improve the safety of marine navigation and consequently 
safety of life at sea. It is evident that small crafts do not need all data, which is 
transmitted by AIS equipment for SOLAS ships, but what is important for them is their 
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identification by large ships and traffic control stations. Further, the current price of the 
Class `A' ATS for small vessels does not appear to be sensible. Therefore, another class of 
AIS with less data, which will be cheaper, may be used for non-SOLAS ships (see section 
3.2.7.2). 
3.2.3 General Description of AIS 
The AIS technology initially called ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore transponder. later known 
as "universal ship-borne Automatic Identification System (AIS)" is introduced with the 
overall aim to promote the efficiency of navigation and enhance safety of navigation, 
protection of marine environment, and safety of life at sea. It is intended to provide a 
clear traffic view to ships and shore stations with fitted and operational receiver. 
It is a system operating on VHF maritime mobile radio band and broadcasting required 
information in a continuous and autonomous mode. It exchanges data regarding 
navigational and voyage related information of ships and other related messages with 
other ships and shore stations. It can handle multiple reports at very high update rates 
depending upon navigational conditions and speed of ships. 
AIS transponder uses Self-Organising Time Division Multiple Access (SOTDMA) VHF 
Digital Link (VDL) for its reliable operation. VDL is self-synchronising and unlike other 
modes does not rely on a ground station to provide the channel synchronising signal for 
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and therefore, permits ship-to-ship 
communication in absence of a ground station. The Global System for Mobile 
communications (GSM) is an example of TDMA system. 
3.2.4 Principle of Operation 
Two VHF frequencies in the maritime mobile band have been allocated for AIS use, VHF 
channel 87B (161.975 MHz) for AISI, and channel 88B (162.025MHz) for AIS2. These 
channels will be used for worldwide automatic identification and surveillance of ships. 
All the data transmitted will be framed in one-minute frames by an AIS terminal. One 
minute of each AIS channel has been divided into 2,250 slots. Each time slot will have 
duration of 
( 60 sec. 
l 2250 slots 
26.7 m. sec.. Therefore, there will be a total of 2,250 x2= J 
4,500 slots of 26.7 milliseconds together available in AISI and AIS2 channels. This 
process of dividing up a channel into time slots is called Time Division Multiple Access 
(TDMA), (see figure 3.1). 
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Every ship will use these radio frequencies to transmit and receive predefined ship related 
information and messages with collected data through sensors from other ship's 
equipment such as gyrocompass, GPS, speed log, etc. This transmission and reception of 
information is in a Self-Organising Time Division Multiple Access mode at rapid update 
rates to and from all vessels and other stations within the coverage range, which is 20 to 
40 nautical miles. The coverage range depends mainly on the height of antenna above sea 
level, which is related to size of the ship, and other environmental conditions for VHF 
radio frequency. 
The information transmitted from AIS will be in time slots of 26.7 milliseconds duration 
with 256 bits of data at a rate of 9600 bits per second. In figure 3.1, when ship I transmits 
its message on one time slot the next time slot will be simultaneously assigned for its next 
message. As these time slots have been assigned by ship 1, ships 2,3, and other ships will 
send their messages in another time slot but in the same way as ship 1. If some ships are 
out of VI-IF range from each other, or if there are limited available slots, there is a 
possiblity of the same time slot being used by two or more ships which are out of VHF 
range of each other (see figure 3.2 as an example), but there may be other users in 
between that are in their radio range, and therefore, experience slot contention . To reduce 
chances of data packet collision, SOTDMA employs a procedure whereby user can 
change its current and reserved time slots if it notices other users competeing for its 
reservation. Further there is an additional AIS protocol that only allows the closest ship to 
be heard. Because of these abilities of AIS which resolves the access problem without 
user concern and involvment it is called Self-Organising Time Division Multiple Access 
(SOTDMA). By formation of a cellular system with every ship at its own centre, the 
problem of system overload has been prevented and this has made the AIS system a very 
secure and reliable identification system (Pettersson, 2002). Other modes of operation of 
AIS are: 
" RATDMA (Random Access Time Division Multiple Access), used for random 
slot allocation and higher update rates initiation. 
" FATDMA (Fixed Access Time Division Multiple Access), used by shore stations 
for high level of throughput, different update rates and non-frequent 
transmissions. 
" CSTDMA (Carrier-Sense Time Division Multiple Access), used by Class `B' 
AIS that cannot pre-assign time slots, and transmits only when a slot is free. 
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ITDMA (Incremental Time Division Multiple Access), used for slot allocation in 
the next time fram for achieving faster update rates. 
Figure 3.1 Self-organising time division multiple access principle used in AIS 
(adopted from: Bole et al, 2005; IMO, 2002a) 
Vessel "B" 
(receives from 
both Wand "C") 
Vessel' A" 
(receives from 'B" 
but not from 'C') 
Vessel "CTM 
(receives from OB" 
but not from TMK) 
Figure 3.2 Potential Information collision at vessel "B" In SOTDMA 
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3.2.5 Types of AIS Messages 
The AIS messages contain different types of information and are classified as static data, 
dynamic data, and voyage related data. Transmission of messages with the more 
important data such as voyage related data are prioritised over the other messages. 
Static data is entered into the AIS on installation and needs to be changed if the ship type 
changes by a major conversion or if her name or ownership changes, voyage related data 
is entered manually during each voyage, and Dynamic data will automatically be updated 
through the AIS connected ship sensors (Callsen-Bracker, n. d.; Nauticast, n. d. ). The 
following information is included in the AIS messages (IALA, 2002a): 
3.2.5.1 Static Information 
IMO and Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers 
Call sign and name 
Type of vessel (cargo, passenger, tanker, etc. ) 
Length and beam 
Location of position fixing antenna such as GPS/DGPS (aft of bow, port or starboard of 
C/L) 
3.2.5.2 Dynamic Information 
Ship's position with accuracy indication (for better or worse than 10m) and integrity 
status 
Time in UTC (Coordinated Universal Time) 
Course over ground 
Speed over ground 
Heading 
Navigational status (e. g., not under command, constrained by draught, etc. ) 
Rate of turn (where available) 
Angle of heel (optional) 
Angle of pitch and roll (optional) 
3.2.5.3 Voyage Related Information 
Ship's draught 
Type of cargo 
Destination and estimated time of arrival (at master discretion) 
Route plan-waypoints (optional) 
Number of persons on board (on request) 
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3.2.5.4 Short Safety Messaging 
Short text messages with important navigational safety related information are shown in 
an extra window. 
3.2.6 AIS Components 
Figure 3.3 shows the principle components of ship borne mobile AIS station. These 
components are (IMO, 2002; and IALA, 2002b): 
" D/GPS (Differential / Global Positioning System) receiver input: GPS or 
DGPS is providing for back up of ship's information such as position, course 
over ground (COG), and speed over ground (SOG). 
" DSC (Digital Selective Calling) VHF receiver: This receiver is fixed on channel 
70 (156.525 MHz) for channel managements and DSC polling. 
" VHF transceiver: This part is equipped with one transmitter and two receivers 
for TDMA operation. 
" Controller: this controller will manage functions of different parts of the AIS. It 
is the controller unit that will process all the input and output signals. 
" Internal GPS (Global Positioning System) receiver: internal GPS is providing 
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) for synchronising transmissions for 
preventing transmission overlaps. It is also providing ship's position information, 
-course and speed over the ground. 
" Power supply: the equipment should be connected to an emergency power 
source in addition to the main supply. 
9 Gyro compass: providing Heading and rate of turn. In some ships the ROT 
indicator may not be available (it is optional), which in that case turn direction 
will be derived from Gyro compass that provide heading information. 
0 Speed input: is connected to ships speed log. 
" Alarm output: must be connected to an audible alarm device or ships alarm 
system. 
" Display system: present the AIS information consisting of data and graphics on 
internal and external equipment. 
Internal display System: is a built in MKD (Minimum Keyboard and Display) system 
which is the minimum requirement by the IMO. 
External display systems: can be a remote stand-alone graphical display unit or 
integrated with other navigational equipment if capable of processing and displaying 
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AIS information such as: Radar/ARPA, and ECDIS via the AIS presentation interface 
(input/output). 
Pilot plug: plug connected to the ship's AIS system to be used by the pilot for 
interfacing with his personal equipment while engaged on pilotage duty for input and 
output of data. 
Figure 3.3 AIS Block diagram showing different components (source: IALA, 2002b) 
3.2.7 Types of Ship borne AIS 
There are three types of AIS mobile equipment for vessels. All of them should transmit 
and receive required information via VDL (VHF digital Link) to and from other stations 
within the radio range, as described above. 
3.2.7.1 Class `A' AIS 
Class `A' is any AIS, which is in full accordance with IMO carriage requirements. It 
should comply with ITU, IEC, and IMO performance standards. All SOLAS Convention 
ships should use this class of equipment. 
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3.2.7.2 Class `B' AIS 
Class `B' AIS, with fewer features and reduced cost, provides information not necessarily 
in full accordance with IMO carriage requirements as required by Class 'A' AIS. It 
should function on VDL principles. The standard for Class `B' equipment as proposed 
by Technical Committee 80 Of the International Electrotechnical Committee (Royal 
Institute of Navigation, 2005). The Class `B' AIS is nearly identical to the Class "A' but it 
is different in the following features (Dziewicki, 2006): 
" Has a lower rate of information update than a Class W. 
" Does not transmit IMO number or call sign, ETA or destination. navigational 
status, rate of turn information, and draught. 
0 Requirement for text safety messages and binary messages is only to receive, and 
not to transmit. 
The result of a study by Working Group 8a of the Technical Committee 80 of the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (Royal Institute of Navigation, 2005) has 
proposed a design using Carrier-Sense Time Division Multiple Access (CSTDMA). 
There is no difference in reception of information from other ships and safety messages 
between Class "A" and proposed Class "B" AIS. The difference is in the transmission 
procedures where Class "B" cannot pre-assign time slots and transmits only when a slot is 
free. Since the transmitted message for Class "B" AIS is limited to a single slot therefore 
it can transmit a position report of the vessel same as Class "A", but safety messages and' 
other ship's information such as name, call sign, etc. cannot be transmitted. To reduce 
costs, standard for Class "B" AIS specifies a transmitter power of I Watt for a range of 
about 3 miles, requirement for built in GPS and no need of external GPS, no requirement 
for any other sensors from navigational equipment as required for the Class "A". The 
update rate of transmission of 30 seconds, and means to switch it off by shore based 
competent authorities through added special message will overcome possible overloading 
of the AIS channels. 
3.2.7.3 Class `A-Derivatives' 
Any other varieties of AIS equipment not yet defined which will be used for professional 
applications by ships not falling in SOLAS categories (i. e., ships navigating on inland 
waterways) are called Class A-Derivatives. This type functions the same as Class "A" 
AIS (IALA, 2002a; IALA, 2002b). 
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3.2.8 Rate of Information Update 
For the AIS to provide almost real-time information maximum of 2000 reports per 
minutes has been selected in autonomous mode, with update rates given in tables 3.2 and 
3.3, (IALA, 2002a; IMO, 2002). When ships are altering their course and speed update 
rate for some data will vary to get more accurate rate of turn prediction. This increased 
update rate depends up on the required position accuracy. 
Table 3.2 Update rates for Class "A" ship-borne AIS (source: IALA, 2002a) 
Table 3.3 Rate of update for Class "B" ship borne AIS (source: IALA, 2002a) 
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3.2.9 Types of on Board AIS Display 
The ways of displaying AIS information are very important because the system displays 
are means of converting AIS data into useful information and representing them to the 
users. As the operating environment and condition in which AIS information should be 
introduced to mariners are diverse, the design of the AIS display as an interface between 
technology and humans has got a significant impact on the usefulness and effectiveness 
of the system for safety of navigation. The display systems should be designed in such a 
way to deliver direct and clear information to prevent increase in bridge team workload. 
As the display system in AIS technology is the most important interface between 
technology and human element, the efficiency of information exchange between AIS 
stations, up to a great extent, depend upon the display system. The present available types 
of AIS displays are as follow (IALA, 2002a; Transportation Research Board, 2003): 
3.2.9.1 MKD (Minimum Keyboard and Display) 
MKD is the basic display means of the AIS system that is required by the IMO regulation 
for SOLAS vessels with minimum of three lines of 16 characters alphanumeric 
information to obtain target vessels data on a LCD (Liquid Crystal Display) screen and a 
simple keyboard for data input and control of the equipment by the navigating officers on 
the bridge. The data shown on MKD include position, bearing, range, and name of 
particular target ship. Vertical scrolling of data will show other AIS detected targets and 
horizontal scrolling will provide additional data of the selected ship. MKD is the lowest 
possible cost system, which can be installed on the bridge. The problem with this display 
system on the bridge is that it may not provide adequate information for the OOW and 
causes distraction due to requirement for getting further detailed information from other 
navigational equipment such as radar/ARPA and ECDIS, or plotting the targets positions 
on the chart. This could be disadvantageous to the safety of navigation and therefore, 
minimum requirement for AIS display may need to be changed. Figure 3.4 is an example 
of MKG equipment. 
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Figure 3.4 MKD AIS (source: SIMRAD Yachting, 2006) 
3.2.9.2 Stand-Alone Graphical Display 
Stand-alone graphical display can be a sophisticated personal computer (PC) graphical 
display similar to radar. However, in a stand-alone graphical display only AIS targets will 
be displayed and their information will be shown. It is a full colour and high-resolution 
screen. A full keyboard can be included for data input. With AIS information of the 
targets given on the screen, such as range and bearing, they can be recognized on the 
radar screen. 
Another type of stand-alone graphical display is a less sophisticated simple display screen 
with low-resolution monochrome, which shows the graphical marine traffic environment 
and AIS targets using simple icons. The AIS information, such as position, bearing, 
range, course, speed, and etc., is displayed for each target vessel. 
Certain target types with particular symbols for displaying in a stand-alone AIS graphical 
display have been recommended by IMO sub-committee on safety of navigation (NAV) 
at its 47th session on July 2001. The following types of target have been recommended 
(IALA, 2002a): 
Sleeping target indicates only the location of AIS equipped vessel. Additional 
information of such vessels will not be shown until the operator acquires it. That can be 
useful for preventing information overload on the bridge. 
Activated target is a particular vessel (sleeping target) activated by the operator to get 
some dynamic information such as COG, SOG, and heading about that vessel. 
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Selected target is a vessel (sleeping or activated) selected by the operator to get its 
detailed information including special navigation status, closest point of approach (CPA), 
and time to closest point of approach (TCPA). 
Dangerous target is a target that getting closer than predefined limits for CPA and 
TCPA, and therefore, is being regarded as a dangerous vessel. Display of this type of 
target will be associated with an alarm. 
Lost target is a target previously displayed on the AIS but currently its signal is not 
received. The lost target symbols will be displayed with an alarm. 
Table 3.4 shows IMO recommendation on AIS symbols for different targets (IALA, 
2002a). 
The amount and speed of information supplied to the OOW by stand-alone type of 
display is more than MKD. 
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Table 3.4 Recommended AIS targets symbols by IMO (source: IALA, 2002a) 
3.2.9.3 Integrated Display 
AIS has the capability to be integrated with some other navigational aids available on the 
bridge, and AIS graphical information can be shown on graphical display of the particular 
navigational equipment. This integration can increase benefits of AlS use. Most common 
navigational facilities for integration are radar/ARPA and electronic chart display and 
information system (ECDIS). The integration of AIS information with radar/ARPA and 
ECDIS will probably increase the degree of sophistication. Some of today's radar/ARPA 
and ECDIS that are being installed on ships bridges have the capability to present AIS 
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information on their graphical displays but display of AIS information on old 
radar/ARPA and ECDIS may not be possible. Currently, there is not a regulatory 
requirement for ECDIS to be carried on board ships. Therefore, requirements for 
integration of AIS information with ECDIS may not be very effective in resolving 
problems associated with the ATS display of information. The adoption of the revised 
performance standards for radar equipment, by IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 
in 2004, set out new requirements for marine radars (Bole et at, 2005). The integration 
and display of AIS information should be provided in radar equipment. mandated by 
SOLAS Convention, on or after is` July 2008 (see table 3.5). 
Table 3.5 New radar's performance requirements for various SOLAS Convention 
vessels (source: IMO, 2004) 
According to information given on display of radar/ARPA integrated with AIS, the OOW 
will be able to differentiate which targets are equipped with AIS and which ones are not. 
Of the important issues in AIS integration with radar/ARPA to consider are the 
possibility of screen overload with danger of information overload for the OOW, and 
correlation and fusion of radar/ARPA and AIS data (SWAN Consortium, 2001). Figure 
3.5 shows an AIS display integrated with ECDIS, and figure 3.6 is an example of its 
screenshot. An example of a screenshot of AIS display integrated with radar is shown in 
figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.5 Display of AIS integrated with ECDIS (source: SIMRAI) Yachting, 2006) 
Figure 3.6 A screenshot of AIS Integrated with ECDIS (source: SIMRAD Yachting, 
2006) 
56 
Figure 3.7 A screenshot of AIS integrated with Radar/ARPA (source: Buffalo 
Computer Graphics (BCG) Inc., 2007) 
3.2.10 SAR Airborne AIS Station 
The search and rescue (SAR) aircraft station is an AIS system certified for installation on 
aircraft used in SAR operations. Using SAR aircraft AIS station, ships, aircrafts, and 
operation co-ordinator will be able to know each other identity and position, and 
communicate with each other via text or binary messages. The transmission rate of update 
for SAR aircraft position is ten seconds. A SAR aircraft AIS station could be used to 
relay ship information over a wide geographical area to a rescue co-ordination centre 
(RCC) with the help of a separate communication link (IALA, 2002b). 
3.2.11 Aids to Navigation AIS Station 
Both the floating and fixed aids to navigation may be equipped with AIS capable of 
transmitting AIS messages in more than one format. Application of AIS to Aids to 
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Navigation is to promote and enhance safety and efficiency of navigation by one or more 
of the following (IALA, 2002b): 
" Providing means for positive identifying an aids to navigation on A[S display in 
all weather conditions. 
9 Complementing existing signals from aids to navigation. 
" Broadcasting position of floating aids to navigation more accurately (by 
DGNSS). 
" Monitoring, indicating and tracking of possible off station and drifting of aids to 
navigation. 
" Establishing reference points for radar. 
"A possible replacement of, or complement to, racons. 
" Providing data on weather, tide and sea state. 
" Identification of vessels involved in collisions with aids to navigation. 
" Gathering real-time information for condition monitoring. 
" Remotely controlling changes in parameters of A to N. 
Implementing AIS on aids to navigation may be in the following ways (IALA, 2002b): 
" By an actual AIS mobile unit of real A to N. 
9 By a synthetic AIS A to N. 
" By a virtual AIS. 
3.3 Fixed AIS Stations 
Apart from AIS application to vessels for ship-to-ship communication of information, 
installation of AIS ashore was also considered for exchange of information between shore 
station and ship to further enhance the safety of marine navigation. Fixed stations have 
much superior control on the VDL than mobile AIS stations, and are to be used by the 
shore based competent authorities when setting up their AIS service, such as a base 
station. A fixed station could be mounted on a mobile device such as a light vessel. A 
fixed AIS shore station is a physical AIS unit, which exists on its own. Components of a 
fixed AIS shore station include (IALA, 2002b): 
" AIS base stations or AIS repeaters (simplex or duplex). 
" VHF/RF equipment. 
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" Power supply. 
" Resource for data transfer to and from the base station (controller). 
0 Shelter against environmental damage (physical protection facilities). 
3.3.1 The AIS Base Station 
The base stations are the most essential part of the fixed AIS station ashore. They are 
interfacing AIS equipped vessels with any complex ashore within their radio coverage 
area through the defined VDL protocol. Transmission of information from ships to shore 
services and relay of messages from shore to ships will be done through base stations. 
3.3.2 The AIS Repeater Station 
The AIS repeater station is used to increase the AIS base station coverage, or to resolve 
the radio broadcast problem in coverage area by relaying all the received AIS traffic. It 
should be used with caution, as the load of VHF Data Link will be doubled for AIS 
mobile stations. 
3.3.3 The AIS Network 
The AIS networks ashore will connect shipside and shore side AIS systems. These 
networks will enable the authorities of coastal states to exchange real time information 
and, data between shore stations, between shore and ships, and between ships, which are 
out of VHF range of each other. Indeed, management of AIS communication between all 
different parties will be done by network system, which includes collecting, storing, 
processing, and broadcasting of data. The AIS network can handle safety related 
information, weather information, aids to navigation, and any other necessary 
information. It will send the messages to the visible participants and queue the messages 
for the vessels, which are out of reach until they are within coverage range of the 
network. The levels of users' communication capability and access to the system 
information can be limited to their needs and requirements by filtering function but the 
system administrator has the unrestricted access to the system. Layout, size and number 
of component of the network system depend on different requirements such as the area to 
be covered and AIS traffic. The basic AIS network elements, which are required in all 
different circumstances, consist of the following (IALA, 2002a; IALA, 2002b; Baltic 
Marine Environment Protection Commission, 2002): 
" Base station. 
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" Controller or interconnection network. 
9 AIS network application. 
It is import to mention that functionality of AIS network ashore does not affect the ship- 
to-shore communication function in any way. 
AIS network is an integrated system consists of a set of infrastructure with interconnected 
base stations and shore facilities that can be used for routing of information in following 
cases: 
" From base station to shore . facility (for routing of vessel and AIS position reports 
within certain VTS coverage area to correct shore facility). 
" From shore facility to a mobile AIS (for routing of traffic management and 
information messages to the base station which the vessel that the message has 
been addressed is within its coverage area). 
" From one mobile AIS to another mobile AIS (for routing of messages between 
mobile AIS units which are outside of coverage area of each other but within the 
network coverage area). 
The AIS network systems can be on a national or regional level using Local Area 
Network (LAN) connection, or on international level using devoted line or connection to 
the Internet. 
3.4 AIS Accuracy and Security Issues 
AIS can improve identification of targets when visual identification is difficult, especially 
at night or in reduced visibility by automatic and transparent data exchange between 
ships. This could improve situational awareness for navigators by providing clear 
identification of all other AIS-equipped vessels. For the AIS to best serve its users and to 
improve operational efficiency and marine safety, it is necessary to have a good 
understanding of its operational issues and level of accuracy. The following are some of 
the AIS operational and accuracy issues (MCA, 2002; Ramsvik, n. d): 
" Some of the AIS information being entered manually (by navigators or equipment 
installers) may be associated with error. 
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" The accuracy of position, COG, and SOG is fully dependent upon GPS/DGPS. 
Any failure in GPS is giving no position and thus incorrect or no position 
transmission by AIS. 
" There is less than 100% of world coverage of GPS and in these areas AlS would 
not work. 
0 It is possible that AIS data be used by unauthorised people, or set up "ghost AIS" 
to send false data. 
" AIS may be used as a screening tool for pirates, terrorists, and all others with a 
simple AIS receiver. 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
AIS technology was initially intended for use in VTS ashore but it was implemented for 
ships use by IMO, prior to its adoption by VTS stations. The overall aim was to promote 
the efficiency and safety of navigation, protection of marine environment, and safety of 
life at sea. The main organisations that were engaged in setting the AIS technical 
characteristics and standards, and regulations for AIS carriage are IMO, IALA, ITU, and 
IEC. The AIS stations are subdivided into mobile and fixed stations according to their 
capability in controlling the AIS VDL and purpose of use. 
Two VHF channels (87B and 88B) are allocated for AIS use. The principle of operation 
of AIS is based on Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), which divides one minute of 
each channel into 2,250 time slots of 26.7 milliseconds duration each. In order to reduce 
chances of data packet collision between stations using Class `A' AIS, access to time 
slots is carried out automatically by AIS, without involvement of users that is called Self 
Organising Time Division Multiple Access (SOTDMA). However, AIS could also 
operate in other modes, such as RATDMA, ITDMA, FATDMA, and CSTDMA. Class 
V AIS is proposed to operate in CSTDMA mode, which differs with Class `A' AIS only 
in the transmission procedures and rate of update. 
AIS information could be displayed via internal or external means of display, but the 
internal MKD is the minimum requirement by IMO regulations. Apparently, the amount 
of information displayed by MKD is less than that of other types of AIS display, and 
requires more time for interpretation. The rate of information update depends upon the 
type of information, ship's status and speed. AIS, apart from navigation, can be used for 
search and rescue operation, aids to navigation, and traffic surveillance and management. 
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Despite the AIS apparent abilities in improving target identification, data exchange at 
night or in restricted visibility, and situational awareness, some issues are believed to 
possibly limit such abilities. These issues include the possibility of error due to manual 
data input, inaccurate position, COG, and SOG due to GPS failure or its less than 100% 
worldwide coverage, and security issues due to the possibility of data being used by 
unauthorised people such as pirates and terrorists and sending false data by ghost AIS. 
3.6 Summary 
Following the literature review in chapter 2, this chapter has provided a general idea of 
the AIS technology to the readers. The first section of the chapter is descriptions of the 
mobile AIS stations, which include carriage requirement, general description, and 
principle of operation, types, different messages, displays and some other characteristics 
of the AIS. The second section described fixed AIS stations, which includes the AIS base 
station, repeater station, and AIS network. The third section discussed some of the 
accuracy and security issues of AIS that might affect its reliability of use in marine 
navigation operation. 
The next chapter discusses the human factors issues associated with AIS, and it further 
examines the AIS information accuracy, and level of human failures in AIS application 
for ship's use. 
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Chapter 4 
Human Error and Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
4.1 Introduction 
Humans and machines are both essential parts of many complex systems in the maritime 
industry. Because the operation of human and machine in a system depends up on each 
other, any changes in one of them will affect the other. Despite improvement in 
efficiency, reliability, and safety brought about by automated technology, the systems are 
getting more complex with a higher degree of integration. These complicated facilities 
have imposed new costs to the systems, and created new types of failures and errors. The 
instructions under which the automated technology operates rely on the human part of the 
system. However, human ability to process so much information is limited and he/she is 
naturally prone to make an error. One problem of automation is their limited capabilities 
and their weakness in cases of uncertainty due to limited recognition of the true world. 
Another problem is the complexity, which creates difficulty for the human to predict 
automation behaviour in different conditions (Billings, 1996; Steber, 2005). The'safe and 
efficient performances' of joint systems, is heavily dependent upon how functions are 
allocated between the human and the machine (Hollnagel, 2005). A key problem is that 
new technological equipment is sometimes 'bolted on' to an existing system without prior 
investigation of its potential impact on the functioning of the joint human-machine 
collaboration. This chapter examines the introduction of the Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) to the ship's bridge and its potential impact on the safety of marine 
navigation. 
In a majority of cases, the problem of new technology is not paying sufficient attention to 
human needs and capabilities by the designers of technological systems, which make the 
use of technology difficult. The increased pace of technological changes has added to the 
intensity of these problems. Negligence of human factors in technological design will add 
to the occurrence rate of human error due to his/her isolation from, and possible 
dissatisfaction with, the new technology. The consequences of human error in safety- 
critical systems such as maritime navigation and aviation can be a serious threat. 
Focusing mainly on technology without proper engagement of human science in system 
design will not take into account the human capabilities and limitations. Inclusion of 
physical, psychological, and organisational factors affecting human performance can lead 
to a better human-technology interaction and integration. The way in which system 
63 
designer presents information to the human operator through system displays is a very 
important issue, which should match the human characteristics in order to optimise the 
human-technology interaction (Vincente, K. J., 2002). 
Technology-driven advances have sometimes resulted in the design and introduction of 
complex systems with less user-centred interfaces that can increase the chances of human 
error due to information overload or misunderstanding. New technology, with higher 
degrees of automation and reliability, reduces the opportunity for on the job training and 
therefore requires well-planned training programmes. It is argued (Dekker, 2002a) that 
automation presents new chances for error and pathways to system failure due to the 
changing work and role of the human in the system and sets up new limitations to the 
human operators due to lack of practice and decrease in vigilance, and changes teamwork 
operational practices. Furthermore, automation introduces qualitative changes in 
operational workload. 
New technology and automation are introduced on board ships for many different 
reasons, such as economics, to enhance safety, to fulfil commitments under new 
regulation, etc. Automated new technology has been applied in all maritime work 
domains including navigation, propulsion, cargo handling, maintenance, ship 
management, and communication. Installation and use of Integrated Bridge System (IBS), 
Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), Voyage Data Recorder 
(VDR), Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS), and Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) are some examples of recent new technologies on ships' bridges to improve 
the safety of marine navigation. New technology added to ships can sometimes have 
adverse effects on human elements due to their complexity or the changes they impose on 
working practices. Some of these undesirable effects on the human element could result 
from lack of knowledge and skills required by the operators. New technology can 
sometimes negatively affect safety of navigation due to their unforeseen impacts on the 
mariners. Where possible, systems should be developed to ensure compatibility with 
human expectations (Sanders and McCormick, 1993). It is the human who should always 
control and coordinate the different parts of a system; therefore integration of humans 
with the technology is a very important issue. Lutzhoft (2005) believed that human- 
technology integration has not received enough attention and yet, in some cases, work 
improvement strategies for the bridge have suggested an increase in automation and now 
technology. Trying to solve the problem of human-technology integration by introducing 
more technology may reduce the role of the human operator even further with a resultant 
reduction in his/her situational awareness. 
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This chapter evaluates accuracy of the AIS information by focusing on the AIS 
contemporary human factors issues on the ship's bridge. The AlS information will be 
examined by 3 AIS studies carried out during this research, Also in this chapter, the 
"Swiss Cheese" accident model will be used to define different layers acting as 
safeguards against errors in AIS application. Firstly, it covers accident and human 
element in section 4.2. Secondly, it covers marine navigation risk management in section 
4.3. Human factors in marine navigation will be discussed in section 4.4. AIS and human 
error is discussed in section 4.5. Sections 4.6, and 4.7 cover analysis and conclusion, 
respectively. 
4.2 Accident and Human Element 
One of the advantages of accident investigation is identification of the causes of human 
error in maritime accidents and near misses. The results of such investigations are very 
useful for the enhancement of safety of marine navigation in adopting preventative steps 
and strategies for similar future cases. They are also very useful for training mariners to 
improve their skills and emergency preparedness. Baker and McCafferty (2005) 
compared a number of the accident databases and argued that deficiencies in management 
practices, lack of situation awareness, and risk takingtrisk tolerance contributed in 
accident causation. It was stated that 80 to 85% of all recorded maritime accidents are 
directly due to human error or are associated with human error (Baker and McCafferty 
2005; Steber, 2005). Figure 4.1 (Baker and Seah, 2004) indicates that the contribution of 
human error to maritime accidents has increased over a ten-year period from 1991 to 
2001. Most of the accidents are the result of senseless and avoidable human errors. 
Figure 4.1- Ten-year trend in maritime accidents categorised as attributable to 
human error (adapted from Baker and Seah, 2004) 
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Baker and McCafferty (2005) found that common areas, which need further attention, are 
compliance with the anti-collision regulations, bridge resource management, and bridge 
automation. The concern about human factors is growing as human error is significantly 
implicated in so many marine accidents. Pomeroy and Tomlinson (2000) stated that many 
of the incidents attributed to machinery faults and failures are actually the result of errors 
(i. e. latent failures) that have been designed and constructed into highly complex systems. 
This is more evident in system integration and interfacing. 
4.3 Marine Navigation Risk Management 
Safety is an important element of marine navigation as a complex system and many 
people at different levels, including navigators, are involved in its control and 
management by different means. Laws, rules and regulations, procedures, and other 
instructions are official means of controlling systems operations. Senior officers, shipping 
managers, designers, classification societies, and national and international regulators are 
also contributing to the safety of marine navigation. The main focus is to enhance safety 
of mariners' performance through motivation, education and training, system design, and 
procedures and rules. Figure 4.2 shows the various elements at different levels 
contributing to safety of system and risk management in marine navigation adapted from 
Rasmussen's (1997,2000) framework for risk management in socio-technical complex 
systems. This structural hierarchy describes the individuals and organisations involved in 
marine navigation systems. The behaviours associated with the navigation process are at 
the lowest level. The second level includes the activities of individual mariners directly 
engaged in the navigation operation. The third level describes the activities of senior 
officers that supervise the junior officers. Next level up includes the activities of the 
shipping companies. The fifth level describes the activities of the designers responsible 
for designing the equipment, and their interface and operation procedures. Maritime 
associations and organisations (i. e. classification societies) are in the sixth level, which 
are responsible for setting industrial and professional rules and regulations. The seventh 
level includes Activities of national regulators. They are monitoring navigation, enforcing 
maritime regulation, and setting up local rules and regulations. The international 
organizations responsible for setting laws are at the highest level of the hierarchy. The 
way in which decisions of top levels influence activities of lower levels, and the feedback 
from the lower levels to top levels, will be very important determinants of safety in 
marine navigation. In addition, some external dynamic forces will put pressure on the 
system and change the structure of the system over the time by introducing new 
requirements for mariners that will change work practices on board ship. Consequently, 
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these may affect responsibilities, and workload of the mariners on board ships. 
Penetrations through different defence levels of the system, due to departure from 
accepted procedures and regulations as a result of financial and psychological pressures 
of external dynamic forces could increase chances of error (Rasmussen, 1997,1999, 
2000; Vincente, 2002). 
Figure 4.2- The socio-technical system involved in safety and risk management in 
marine navigation system (adapted from generic model of Rasmussen, 1997,2000) 
4.4 Human Factors in Marine Navigation 
The increasing use of new technology improves navigational capability, but the marine 
accident's risk factor also increases due to the related technical complexity of such 
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modern technology. Erroneous actions of humans have been a contributing factor in many 
collisions and accidents in complex navigational systems. Better understanding of human 
factors of navigators operating modern technology could reduce marine accidents and 
enhance the safety of navigation. Generating a system to reveal and express the factor 
related to knowledge and attitude of navigators and interactions between navigators and 
the surrounding environment could help in understanding human factors, and therefore, 
narrow the gap between the navigators' cognition and actual navigational risk (Itoh et al, 
2004). 
The human element, being the most flexible and adaptable part, is the most important 
element of the marine navigation system, but also as the most vulnerable part, the system 
influences and pressures could unfavourably affect its performance. The role of 
navigators in the complex operational environment, which involves different aspects of 
their performance and behaviour, could be optimised with a proper human factors study 
concerned with an understanding of their practical capabilities and limitations in a real 
world (Civil Aviation Authority, 2002). 
4.4.1 Human Factors Model 
A conceptual model of human factor, named the SHEL model, was first introduced by 
Edwards in 1972 and later modified by Hawkins in 1984 to assist the understanding of 
human factors in civil aviation (Civil Aviation Authority, 2002). It is now formally 
introduced as a human factor framework by IMO (Itoh et al, 2004). The model 
represented different components of human factors in block shapes that aim to show the 
interactions between various system components and the frontline operator. Itoh et al 
(2004) have produced a variation of the SHEL model called the m-SHEL model. It is 
originally adopted, by Kawano (2002 cited in Itoh et al, 2004) for the navigation 
operation to analyse the human factors that contribute to marine accidents and incidents. 
Figure 4.3 is the representation of m-SIEL model adapted from Kawano (2002). The 
model includes four blocks representing: Liveware (L), Software (S), Hardware (H), and 
Environment (E). Liveware is the human, the most flexible but the most critical part in 
the system. Software includes policies, rules and regulation, codes of practices, 
procedures, manuals, symbology, etc. Hardware comprises physical non-human elements 
of the system, such as equipment, machines, and tools. Environment includes physical 
factors and the situation in which the Liveware, Hardware, and Software of the system 
must function, such as the economical, political, and social environment as well as the 
physical environment. The letter "m" was added to the model to represent the 
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management of the whole system's control. The edges of the blocks are not simple and 
straight to show that the particular attention is to paid to the interfaces to properly match 
the liveware to the other system components in order to avoid stress and system failure. 
In marine navigation, the important interactions exist in interfaces between navigators 
and elements adjacent to them. These elements include physical and non-physical parts 
and factors such as navigational equipment and devices, regulations, ambient 
environmental conditions, and other Lifeware involved in the marine operation. 
Figure 4.3- The m-SIIEL Model (adapted from Civil Aviation Authority, 2002; and 
Kawano, 2002) 
All the components of the m-SHEL model must be adapted and matched to the Liveware, 
which is at the centre of the model. The interfaces between human and other system parts 
in the human factor model consist of following 5 main interfaces (Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2002; and Itoh et al, 2004): 
Liveware-Liveware (L-L) 
This interface encompasses relationships between people within the bridge, their basic 
and technical capabilities and limitations. Proper matching of this interface could improve 
the navigation teamwork. 
69 
Liveware-Hardware (L-H) 
This considers human-machine integration, and it is related to human and physical 
aspects of the system. This interface includes different aspects of the equipment design 
such as displays, controls, location, and other physical characteristics to match different 
characteristics of the user. Quality, performance, equipment reliability, and role sharing 
between human and machine are also considered in this interface. 
Liveware-Software (L-S) 
This interface is related to human and non-physical aspects of the system such as rules 
and regulations, procedures, manuals, computer programmes and symbols to resolve 
misinterpretation and application. 
Liveware-Environment (L-E) 
This interface encompasses interaction between human and economical, political, social, 
and ambient environment in which the system components interact. 
Liveware-management (L-m) 
This interface considers the relationship between staff and management in controlling the 
whole system. Proper staff/management relationship could decreases the human workload 
and enhance the technical capabilities. 
4.4.2 Need for Human Factors Research 
In spite of its longer history, the maritime industry has generated far less human factors 
research than the aviation industry. Human factors research in aviation has resulted in a 
reduced accident rate and the enhancement of safety to a point where, now, commercial 
flights are safer than other modes of transport (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000). One 
reason for this difference might be that the main focus of aviation is on the transport of 
passengers in contrast to the marine industry, which has focused more heavily on cargo 
transport. 
Today, the maritime industry has been exposed to a number of significant advances. 
However, there have been a number of limitations, imposed due to economic pressures 
and organisational restrictions, which have changed the role of the human element in 
navigation systems. The scale of damage suffered, taken together with the implication of 
human error as a major cause for the accidents, has led to the highlighting of safety within 
the marine community and internationally. Therefore, human factors studies aiming to 
reduce human error are now an important area of concern. 
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Research on human factors and the lessons learned from investigations of accidents and 
near misses will be useful in reducing accidents and minimising their consequences. 
Information gained from studying human errors can also be applied to design processes 
and management systems, which can reduce chances of future disasters (Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology, 2001). 
The root causes of some of the human error in performance may be poor equipment or 
procedures design or inadequate training or operating instructions. Therefore, knowledge 
achieved from human factors research, centrally aiming at human performance 
capabilities and limitations, is useful in optimising human performance in order to 
minimise, both human and financial losses. Human factors technology in marine 
navigation will improve efficiency and safety of the system, and performance efficiency 
of the crew (Civil Aviation Authority, 2002). 
4.4.3 Human Error 
The European Commission (2000b) pointed out that following five main functions could 
be identified in marine transportation: 
1. Navigation (includes passage planning, track keeping, and collision avoidance). 
2. Propulsion (the responsibility for the integrity of the ships propulsion system and 
associated auxiliaries). 
3. Cargo handling (Loading, discharging, and keeping the cargo and passengers in 
good condition). 
4. Platform maintenance (keeping the ship, its equipment, and the crew in 
operational condition). 
5. Ship management (task allocations, control and supervision and 
communication). 
The work environment and nature of the sea and their impact on mariners and ships are 
likely to increase the possibility of error on board ship. Factors such as changes in 
working practice, information overload, information and equipment over-reliance, 
inadequate training, and fatigue have influenced some accidents at sea, for example, the 
collision between Norwegian Dream and Ever Decent (Bell, 2000 cited in Pomeroy and 
Tomlinson, 2000), and the grounding of passenger ship Royal Majesty (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 1997). 
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The immediate responses required in any working situation often depend upon proper 
initial calculations being made using accurately retrieved mental knowledge and 
information. This significant human ability to deal with complex informational tasks is 
one of the important advantages of humans over machines. Therefore, for the human to 
select and retrieve correct knowledge for his/her response, situational awareness, and 
situational assessment are very important. Lack of situational awareness may lead to an 
incorrect assessment of the system state and hence to an inappropriate decision. Training 
and practical experience are both important in this regard since the allocation of 
sophisticated tasks to junior, inexperienced or inadequately trained people may be linked 
with error. 
4.4.3.1 Definition of Human Error 
Mismatch in interfaces between different components of the m-SHEL model could induce 
an error and control of such human error depends upon understanding the nature of error. 
Errors can be of different origins, such as negligence, incorrect assessment and decision, 
and/or as a result of poor equipment design. These errors could have different 
consequences in different circumstances and situations. 
There are various definitions of the human error, which have been assigned in different 
contexts to serve distinct purposes. Some of the definitions for the human error by 
different researchers are given below. 
Karwowski (2001) defines the human error as the deviation of human performance from 
some intended, desired, or ideal standards. 
Reason (1990) defined human error as a generic term that includes all those instances in 
which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve its intended 
result, when these failures cannot be attributed to the involvement of some chance 
agency. 
Swain and Guttman (1983) defined an error as an action with a performance not within 
the limits of tolerable performance defined by the system (deviation from expected 
performance). 
According to Rollangel (1993) an erroneous action is the one, which fails to produce, the 
expected result and/or which produces an unwanted consequence. 
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Senders and Moray (1991) defined error "as a human action that fails to meet an implicit 
or explicit standard, or in terms of the results of behaviour, an error would be a single 
malfunction leading to a complete failure of the task with no recovery possible". 
Whittingham (2004) provides the following recent definition of human error, which 
incorporates aspects of some of the previous definitions (i. e., Karwowski, 2001; Reason, 
1990; Swain and Guttman, 1983; Hollangel, 1993; Senders and Moray, 1991): 
"An unintended failure of a purposeful action, either singly or as part of a 
planned sequence of action, to achieve an intended outcome within set limits 
of tolerability pertaining to. either the action or the outcome ". 
The probability of human error is strongly related to the individuals performing the task, 
task complexity, the time required to complete the task, and the individual's competency 
level (Pillay and Wang, 2003). 
Reason (1990) argued that human error could only be applied to intentional actions 
because only two kinds of failure lead to error. 
a) When the actions fail to go as intended (execution failures or slips and 
lapses). 
b) b) When intended actions fail to achieve their desired consequences 
(planning failures or mistakes). 
Figure 4.4 shows intentional actions leading to error adapted from Reason's (1990) 
algorithm for distinguishing the varieties of intentional behaviour (non-intentional 
behaviour, unintentional behaviour, and intentional but mistaken behaviour). 
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Figure 4.4- Intentional behaviours leading to errors (adapted from Reason, 1990) 
4.4.3.2 Human Error and Accidents 
Human contributions to accidents can be investigated by looking back on the sequence of 
actions and measures that appear to have caused them. However, this may not be of much 
help for accident prevention. According to Dekker (2002b), there are different approaches 
to investigating human error and to determining the human role in accidents. He 
distinguishes between the Old View of human error, which views human error as a cause 
of failure and New View of human error, which views human error as a symptom, rather 
than a cause, of failure. In the New View of human error the investigation looks for 
problems deep in the system of which human errors are only warning signs. Safety 
creation and system improvement is mainly dependent upon understanding and 
controlling connections between features of people, tools, tasks, and operating 
environments. The emphasis in the New View is on latent factors such as long-standing 
organisational deficiencies, design and implementation problems, and procedural 
shortcomings (Dekker, 2002b). 
Table 4.1 shows the issues of concern in Old View and New View of human error 
according to Dekker (2002b). 
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Table 4.1- Outlooks of "Old View" and "New View" on human error (adapted from 
Dekker, 2002b) 
Reason (1990) also considers that there are two approaches to the problem of human 
fallibility: the Person Approach and the System Approach. The person approach focuses 
on the unsafe acts-errors (arising from unusual mental processes) and procedural 
violation-of people. Main countermeasures for such errors are reducing unwanted 
variability in human behaviour. The system approach concentrates on the recurrent error 
traps in the workplace or organisational processes (arising from penetration in system 
defences). Main countermeasures for such errors are changing the conditions under which 
human works. 
The main difference between the two approaches is that in case of an accident, the issue 
for person approach will be "who" but in system approach will be "how" and "why". The 
system approach to human error will look into unsafe acts out of their system context. 
4.4.4 Latent and Active Failures 
Two kinds of human failures (errors) are important in accident development in complex 
technological systems: active and latent errors. Active errors are produced immediately 
before or at the time of accidents or incidents. They are usually failures within the actions 
carried out by frontline operators, for example, ship's officers. 
Latent errors are resident failures already existent in systems and may remain inactive, 
hidden, and undetected for a long time, becoming apparent in time of their effect (when in 
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combination with other factors being triggered and break the system's defences). Latent 
errors are generally associated with actions and decisions of those who are remote and 
indirectly connected with the control of the system, such as high-level decision makers, 
designers, rules and procedures makers, and maintenance workers (Wang and Trbojevic, 
2007; Reason, 1990; Noyes, 2001; Wittingham, 2004). Latent errors are potential causes 
of accidents in technological systems that need a trigger to become active. Significant 
latent errors can be seen in the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in 1987 in which 189 
out of 459 people lost their lives due to system error, management error, and design error 
(Reason, 1990). 
4.4.5 Classification of Human Error 
To understand and examine underlying causes of accidents or further define the problems 
in human contributed accidents, it is important to investigate what really constitutes 
human errors. Understanding the factors causing accidents is also very important for 
preventing similar accidents in future. Classifying human error by taking into account the 
local contextual factors is very important for finding relationships between influencing 
error tendency and task features. 
Sanders and McCormick (1993) mentioned that an effective classification of errors could 
provide useful data and information on human errors, the way in which they are caused, 
and how they might be prevented. 
Maritime operations today have become safer, but under increased pressure. These 
pressures come from increased traffic, particularly in certain navigation areas, and from 
fierce commercial competition, which sometimes causes balance of economy against 
safety. Therefore, a framework for analysis and classification of human error in maritime 
operations would be a significant safety enhancement. However, there is no available 
maritime- specific human error framework (European Commission, 2002). In this section 
some of the familiar methods of analysis and classification of human error, which have 
been developed for domains other than maritime domains, are described. 
There are many different classifications of human error in the literature. Different human 
factors researchers use them to specify and measure original casual factors. The examples 
of such classifications are: Rasmussen's skill-rule-knowledge based classification of 
human performance, Reason's unsafe acts model, Hollnagel's phenotypes and genotypes 
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classification, Endsley's situation awareness classification, Wickens & Flach's 
information processing model, and Shappell & Wieg wann's classification. 
Reason (1990) believed that classification of human error might be according to the 
following features. 
Behavioural level - errors may be classified according to features of erroneous 
behaviour 
that include formal characteristics of the error or its results and outcome. The behavioural 
level classification may not properly describe the categories of cognitive failures. 
Contextual level - errors may be classified with reference to contextual triggering 
features for anticipation and prevention where many slips form at this level. The main 
point of attention in this classification is to the interaction between local triggers and 
underlying error tendencies, which is a complex phenomenon. This classification 
describes the critical relationship between character of the task or situation and type of 
error. 
Conceptual level - errors are classified based on the cognitive mechanism 
leading to an 
error. This classification is based mainly upon theoretical inferences. The conceptual 
level of classification has potential for finding underlying causes of errors. 
Senders and Moray (1991) (cited in Redmill, F. and Rajan, J. (ed), 1997) mentioned that 
classification of human error could be of the following three broad categories: 
Phenomenological - errors are described according to conditions that lead to observable 
events. Distinctive error types include omission, substitution, and repetition. This 
classification describes what led to an incident or accident. It is normally used in 
assessments of human reliability. 
Cognitive mechanism - errors are categorised in relation to stages of human information 
processing. Usual errors are perceptual error, memory lapse, and attentional error. This 
classification explains how an incident or accident happened. It is useful in investigations 
after an incident or accident. 
Revealed biases or deep-rooted tendencies - errors of this category are defined according 
to the root factors leading to events. The aim of this classification is to answer why 
incident or accident happened. 
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A widely used error model in most of the research on human error is the generic error 
modelling system (GEMS) presented by Reason (1990). This classification is based on 
the skill, rule, and knowledge performance model of Rasmussen in 1974. It looks at the 
origin of the basic type of human error at different cognitive stages (Whittingham, 2004: 
Trepess, 2003). Figure 4.5 shows Reason's (1990) error classification. Whittingham also 
believed that detailed examination of the types of error applicable to the task is possible 
through GEMS classification. 
Figure 4.5- Classification of human error according to unsafe acts and performance 
levels (adapted from Reason, 1990) 
4.4.6 Error Types 
Some of the basic types of human error widely referred to in human research are 
described below. 
4.4.6.1 Slip 
Slip is an error due to failure in cognitive execution of an action sequence with correct 
intention. It is unintended deviation, omission of action from what is planned, and it 
involves inappropriate level of attention to the monitoring of actions or perceptions. Slips 
are associated with skill-base performances and they normally occur in low-level actions 
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in routine and familiar tasks and situations. Slips are easily observable by others 
(Whittingham, 2004; Karwowski, 2001; Reason, 1990). 
4.4.6.2 Lapse 
A lapse is an error due to cognitive storage of task information where the intention is 
correct. It largely involves memory failure and is known as mental slip or omission to 
execute an action. Lapses are also associated with skill-based behaviour and may be only 
evident to the person who experiences them. They include forgetting or the inability to 
recall some known items in memory. Lapses are not recognizable by others as they are 
private events (Karwowski, 2001; Reason, 1990; Whittingham, 2004). 
4.4.6.3 Mistake 
Safe, productive, and efficient human behaviour in hazardous systems is governed by 
plans of action, which are guided and controlled by rules, regulation and procedures, 
generally known as rules. Some of these controlling rules are prescribed externally and 
some of them are acquired through training and experience. A mistake is an error due to 
failure in cognitive planning of an action sequence. It can be due to judgement failure or 
deficiency in formulating intentions or selection of the means to achieve an objective. It is 
selection of inappropriate or incorrect plan for an action to achieve a desired outcome. 
Mistakes are often hard to detect and recover, and can be unnoticed for a long period. 
Mistakes are more complex than slips. Mistakes are further subdivided into two types, 
rule-based and knowledge-based (Reason, 1990; Whittingham, 2004; Karwowski, 2001). 
" Rule-based Mistake 
Rule-based mistakes occur in stage of selection of a plan to achieve a desired outcome. It 
is either due to misapplication of good rules or due to the application of bad or inadequate 
rules. It is associated with the wrong application of familiar rules and procedures. Reason 
(1990) referred to rule-based mistake as "the failure of expertise". 
" Knowledge-based Mistake 
Knowledge-based mistake occurs in stage of generation of a new experiential plan in 
unique situations for which no predefined control plan exists. It is due to incomplete 
knowledge about the situation or incompleteness of a mental model. Reason (1990) 
referred to knowledge based mistake as "the lack of expertise". 
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4.4.6 .4 Violation 
There is a distinction between violation and other types of error. Violation is when 
inappropriate actions are being carried out intentionally and contrary to safe working 
practices, where other errors are unintentional failures of planned actions to achieve 
desired goals. 
4.4.6.5 Error of Omission 
Error of omission is failing to act as required. It is a failure to carry out the appropriate 
action, for example, forgetting to shut off a valve (Sanders and McCormick, 1993). 
4.4.6.6 Error of Commission 
Error of commission is a failure to perform the appropriate action correctly, for example, 
further opening of a valve instead of shutting it off. This type of error also includes 
actions that have been carried out correctly but out of sequence (sometimes known as 
sequence or substitution error) and actions that have been carried out not within the 
particular time (sometimes known as timing error) (Sanders and McCormick, 1993). 
4.4.7 Human Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) 
Despite its ubiquity, Hollnagel (2005) suggested that we should use the term 'human 
error' sparingly since it tends to focus on the outcome without acknowledging that the 
"human performance (as well as the performance of technological systems) is always 
variable". He highlighted that it might be more appropriate to find better ways to detect 
and control undesirable variability in human performance, which may sometimes lead to 
"unexpected and unwanted consequences". 
Wang and Trbojevic (2007) referred to Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs), which are 
associated with any system, as factors that can influence human performance positively or 
negatively, thus decreasing or increasing the likelihood of human errors respectively. 
Performance-shaping factors are classified as internal PSFs, which are internal factors 
related to the operators, their characteristics and differences such as skill, experience, task 
familiarity, etc. or external PSFs, which are factors external to the operators such as 
equipment design and installation, task complexity, work environment, organisational 
factors, operating procedures, etc. Generally external PSFs make a greater contribution to 
human error configuration than internal PSFs. The optimal design of systems, involving 
human-machine interactions, would involve the reduction of task complexity or difficulty 
thus leading to improved human performance and reliability. A proper balance between 
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the capability of the human operator and the difficulty of the task would decrease the 
likelihood of human error (Noyes, 2001; Whittingham, 2004). 
Generally the influence of external PSFs in contributing to human errors are more than 
internal PSFs and therefore, proper design of systems to optimise human machine 
interactions is vital in reducing opportunities for making errors (Noyes, 2001). According 
to Whittingham (2004) task complexity or difficulty is one of the most obvious factors 
affecting human performance and hence his/her reliability. He also believed that task 
complexity needs to be looked at from two aspects: the difficulty of the task and 
capability of the person carrying the complex task. A proper balance between the 
capability of the human operator and the difficulty of the task will decrease the likelihood 
of human error. Table 4.2 is a typical scheme for grouping PSFs introduced by 
Whittingham (2004). 
Table 4.2- Typical Performance Shaping Factors (Source: Whittingham, 2004) 
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4.5 AIS and Human Error 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) (2001b) objectives for implementation of 
AIS are to enhance safety and efficiency of navigation, safety of life at sea, and maritime 
environmental protection through better identification of vessels, assisted target tracking, 
and improved situational awareness and assessment through simplified and additional 
information. AIS can also improve the quality of vessel traffic surveillance (VTS) and 
waterway. The motivation for adoption of AIS was its autonomous ability to identify 
other AIS fitted vessels and to provide extra precise information about target ships that 
can be used in collision avoidance. It has the ability, due to its operation on VHF radio 
frequency, to detect other equipped targets in situations where the radar detection is 
limited such as around bends, behind hills, and in conditions of restricted visibility by 
fog, rain, etc. It exchanges data regarding navigational and voyage related information of 
ships and other related messages with other ships and shore stations. It can handle 
multiple reports at different update rates, which vary according to speed and status of the 
ships. The information can be received by anyone equipped with a relatively low cost 
receiver. The AIS information consists of different types of data classified as static, 
dynamic, voyage related information, and short safety messages. Static data are entered 
into the AIS on installation and need to be changed only if the ship type changes by a 
major conversion or if her name or call sign changes. Most of the dynamic data will 
automatically be updated through the AIS-connected ship sensors, and Voyage related 
data is entered manually during each voyage. As was stated in chapter 3, the following 
information is included in the AIS messages (IALA, 2002): 
0 Static information 
- IMO and Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number 
- Call sign and name 
- Type of vessel (passenger, tanker, etc. ) 
- Length and beam 
- Location of position fixing antenna such as GPS/DGPS (aft of bow, port 
or starboard of C/L) 
" Dynamic information 
- Ship's position with accuracy indication (for better or worse than 10m) 
and integrity status 
- Time in UTC (coordinated universal time) 
- Course over ground (COG) 
Speed over ground (SOG) 
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- Heading 
- Navigational status (e. g., not under command, constrained by draught, 
etc. ) 
- Rate of turn (where available) 
- Angle of heel (optional) 
- Pitch and roll (optional) 
" Voyage related information 
- Ship's draught 
- Type of cargo 
- Destination and estimated time of arrival (at master discretion) 
- Route Plan-waypoints (optional) 
- Number of persons on board (on request) 
" Short safety messaging 
- Short text messages with important navigational safety related 
information are shown in an extra window. 
For AIS to be successful in achieving these goals, proper research needs to be carried out 
on different aspects of AIS design, installation, capabilities and limitations, regulation, 
integration, operators' training, integrity of data transmitted, etc. 
Fast mandatory implementation of AIS equipment for SOLAS ships, without adequate 
earlier research on its use, may be having a negative impact on its success and hence 
endanger safety of marine navigation. The collision between Hyundai Dominion and Sky 
Hope (Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), 2005a) is an example of an AIS- 
assisted collision in which the Hyundai Dominion's OOW used the AIS text facility to 
communicate to the Sky Hope. This action critically reduced the time available for taking 
relevant action to avoid collision. Further, Sky Hope OOW did not notice the AIS 
message sent by Hyundai Dominion due to the absence of an audible alarm system for 
received messages in the AIS equipment. 
Poor performance and transmission of erroneous information by AIS are vital issues on 
the use of AIS equipment for anti-collision operations at sea. These issues have also been 
raised in the 16'h session of IALA AIS Committee (Sandford, 2005). The next sections 
investigate the issue of human error on the accuracy of the AIS data transmitted and its 
impact on the ships bridge. 
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4.5.1 AIS Data Studies 
This section consists of 3 separate studies of AIS data, each able to assess different AIS 
fields. However, even then not all AIS fields have been evaluated. The section then 
discusses the results by individual A. IS field. 
4.5.1.1 YTS-based AIS Study 
This study was conducted over about one month, during September- October 2005 at the 
Liverpool Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) station. The study was conducted on vessels 
leaving and approaching Liverpool Bay, and also vessels at anchor or alongside in port 
(Figures 4.6 & 4.7). 
Figure 4.6- Liverpool Bay ATS chart (source: AISLIve. com - Live Ship Info) 
Figure 4.7- Mersey and Dee Approaches AIS chart (source: AISLIve. com - Live 
Ship Info) 
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The data collection was carried out for about 6 hours a day (3 hours morning and 3 hours 
afternoon), at high tides when ships movements were at a high level on the Mersey. A set 
of ships information was recorded from AIS and they were compared with the same items 
of information from the database available in the port VTS station. The data collected 
from AIS consisted of MMSI number, vessel type, ship's name and call sign, length, and 
beam. Additionally, the AIS ships navigational status was checked against its radar plot. 
During this period, a total number of 94 different AIS equipped vessels (V/L) were 
investigated. In some cases, the ship was contacted through VHF, however this was not 
routinely done because of the possibility of interfering with safe navigation in a pilotage 
area. Many discrepancies found were in the fields of vessel's status with 30% 
inconsistencies found, vessel beam with 18%, vessel length with 47%, and vessel type 
with 74% (see figure 4.8). In many cases the inconsistencies may be considered minor, as 
will be shown in the discussion later. 
Type and percentage of AIS inconsistent data ob served 
Beam 8% 
Length 47 % 
Nav. Status 30% 
C 0 
Call Sign 0% 
,2 Name 0% c 
Vessel Type 74% 
MMSI NO. 0% 
0 % 10% 20% 30% 40% 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 
Percentage 
Figure 4.8- Percentage of ships observed with inconsistent AIS information in the 
VTS-based AIS study 
4.5.1.2 Data-mining AIS Study 
This is a study conducted earlier (first reported in Harati-Mokhtari et al. 2005) for data 
recorded by AISLive Company of Lloyds Register-Fairplay Ltd. The data consisted of 
400,059 AIS reports from I" March to I7`h March 2005, collected from a number of AIS 
receivers located in a worldwide geographical area. The initial data was collected by 
AISLive for a limited number of detectable errors of MMSI number, IMO number, 
8% 
t47 % 
30% 
0% 
0% 
74% 
0% ý_ 1 
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position, course over ground (COG), and speed over ground (SOG). The initial data 
examination showed that 30,946 reports were associated with at least one error of above- 
mentioned types. The error rate of about 8% detected means that 1 in every 14 AIS 
transmissions in the sample is associated with at least one piece of erroneous data of the 
above-mentioned types. In addition, the above 30,946 AIS transmissions were analysed at 
Liverpool John Moores University for additional detectable problems such as errors in 
name, call sign, ship type, ship dimensions, etc. 
4.5.1.3 Proactive AIS Study 
Data was also collected through the services of AlSweb of Dolphin Maritime Software 
Ltd, UK. The main focus of this study was to look specifically for duplicate MMSI 
numbers and behaviours of some AIS stations with incorrect MMSI number in a wide 
geographical area mainly in European waterways from 23rd November 2005 to 2°d May 
2006. Four incorrect MMSI numbers of 0,1,1193046, and 999999999 were kept under 
surveillance. The data for these AIS stations were recorded at ad-hoc times and dates; 
there was not continuous monitoring of the network. 
4.5.2 Findings 
The findings of the AIS studies are summarised below, organised by individual AIS 
fields. 
4.5.2.1 MMSI Number 
The maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) number is a unique number given to every 
vessel for AIS identification. It is a data field that should be manually entered at the time 
of installation of AIS on the bridge. It is the sole means of discrimination between 
different AIS transmitting stations. A particular problem that could have negative impact 
on the safe use of AIS is when the MMSI number is not correctly entered. Broadcasting 
of the same MMSI number by more than one station creates discrepancies such as target 
swap in information received by other AIS stations. This problem was particularly noted 
with many vessels transmitting the incorrect default MMSI of 1193046 (The Nautical 
Institute, 2005a). This may be the default MMSI for a specific model of an AIS 
transponder and due to not entering the MMSI number in accordance with installation 
procedure or a specific equipment fault, which means that it defaults back to this number. 
Whatever the cause, more than one ship concurrently has been using this MMSI number. 
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In our Proactive AIS study observations were made on an ad-hoc basis from 23'd 
November 2005 to 2°d May 2006. There were up to 25 vessels transmitting the incorrect 
MMSI number of 1193046 using the AlSweb database. On all these occasions, the MMSI 
number was associated with a different ship with different particulars. The only common 
particulars between these observed stations were MMSI and IMO numbers. In some cases 
even the IMO numbers are also changed into a different figure. Table 4.3 below 
illustrates three particular examples. 
Date of 
Observation 
23/11/2005 at 15: 01 24/01/2006 at 12: 13 25/01/2006 at 11: 35 
Vessel Name **** ****** *******". s**$**** ** **** 
MMSI 1193046 1193046 1193046 
IMO No. 303174162 303174162 303174162 
Call Sign A**** D***** +*** 
Latitude 51° 54.249 N 42° 17.983 N 42° 18.612 N 
Longitude 1° 40.903 E 8° 36.220 E 80 34.562 L"' 
Fixing Device GPS GPS GPS 
Type Cargo ships Pilot Vessel Tugs 
Dimensions Length: 275m Width: 40m 
Length: 220m Width: 
Length: 35m Width: 10m 
Destination FELIXSTOWE SHEERNESS SAVONA 
ETA 
23 November - 02: 00 
UTC 
23 January - 20: 30 UTC 23 January - 08: 00 UTC 
i he author has blanked names & call signs out. 
Table 4.3- The same MMSI number with 3 different ships' particulars transmitted 
on AIS 
Three more MMSI numbers appearing on multiple stations were also detected in the 
Proactive AIS study, as shown in table 4.4. 
MMSI number Number of different ships 
0 5 
1 3 
1193046 25 
999999999 3 
Table 4.4- MMSI numbers detected on multiple AIS stations 
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This phenomenon is a serious issue. The navigating officers on the bridge should check 
their AIS transmission data regularly to make sure that their AIS equipment is free of 
such faults and transmitting correct information. 
In another probable observation of this problem, The Nautical Institute (2005b) reported 
that there was MMSI number of a vessel at anchor and a passing ferry which swapped 
over and remained thus so for a certain period of time until the passing vessel was some 
distance away from anchored vessel. In another Nautical Institute (2005c) report an AIS 
target swap showed as a sudden and unexpected change of data from a container vessel 
into a vessel engaged in fishing. The destination changed from Genoa into Casablanca 
with a 28.5m draught. She showed this false information for about 15 minutes, until the 
data reverted to indicate the correct status. In another instance, a harbour service vessel 
operating in a UK port changed its transmission to a vessel of 220m lengths, heading for 
Casablanca and this continued for 4 days until the vessel was informed about the error. 
While we do not know the exact reasons for errors of this type, they are more likely due 
to faults in programming, installation, or equipment design. Further research and 
monitoring of the equipment (possibly from shore) is required to check for errors of this 
type. 
In the "Data-mining AIS study", 2% of the erroneous static information identified was in 
the field containing MMSI numbers. The errors identified were only those incorrect 
MMSI entries with figures incorporating less than 9 digits. It is possible that, even with 
the correct field length, some of the digits showing are wrong when compared with an 
accurate MMSI database. The errors of this type could be due to omissions or mistakes by 
technicians responsible for installing the equipment on board ships. In a small number of 
cases it could be test equipment. 
4.5.2.2 Vessel Type 
This information is nominally part of the static data and this infers that it is inputted to the 
AIS by the equipment installers. Vessel type must be selected from a default list 
predefined in the factory by the particular AIS equipment manufacturers. In the "VTS- 
based AIS study", out of 94 ships under investigation, 6% of vessels had no vessel type 
available and 3% were defined as "vessel". Altogether, the researchers and VTS operators 
were unhappy with 74% of the observed ship types and in the "Data-mining AIS study" 
the equivalent figure was 56%. The problems of this category include vague or 
misleading vessel types. Commonly, the general ship type "Cargo" or "Vessel", rather 
than an informative ship type is entered into the AIS equipment, but other peculiarities 
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exist. Table 4.5 shows examples from our "VTS-based AIS study" where similar vessels 
were broadcasting different ship types under AIS. In some cases the problem is 
unnecessary vagueness, as for example the use of "Cargo" for a vessel, when "tanker" 
could have been correctly used. In other cases, the most important and appropriate 
descriptor may be difficult to assess, unless more guidance is provided to navigators and 
installers. For example, a high-speed Ro-Ro passenger ferry can legitimately be defined 
as a "High Speed Craft" or "Passenger" or "Cargo" under AIS. All three types were 
observed separately on three sister vessels servicing the same port. 
Vessel type (according to Lloyds 
Register database) 
AIS ship type observed on different 
vessels during "VTS-based AIS study" 
Tanker "Cargo", "Tanker" 
Dredger "Dredger", "Vessel" 
High-speed ro-ro passenger "Cargo", "I ISC", "Passenger" 
Supply vessel "Tug", "Vessel" 
Table 4.5- Examples of similar ships showing different AIS "ship type" descriptors 
from the "VTS-based AIS study" 
Part of the problem is that there is currently not enough categories defined to cover all 
ships types and it is not feasible to have every potential ship-type. However, some very 
common and distinctive categories of vessels, such as container, car carrier and bulk 
carrier, are not separately identified in the AIS specification and would be identified as 
"cargo". Such differentiation would be helpful for visual identification at sea, as well as 
for VTS operators. Similarly "Tanker" applies to the different categories of chemical 
tanker, petroleum tankers and gas carriers. However, incorporating more ship types 
would require time-consuming regulation and system changes that are not feasible in 
short-term. 
Within the current system, it would increase confidence in the system if navigators see 
more accurate descriptions with fewer variations between similar vessels. This can only 
be enforced in the first instance, by better guidance to installers and navigators. 
A more minor problem is that the AIS text descriptors of ship type number codes 
available for selection vary slightly from one manufacturer to another. The actual list of 
options for ship type available is limited and is transmitted as a 2-digit number in the AIS 
message. Standardisation, across all AIS manufacturers, of the text descriptors would be a 
good feature of the equipment, in order that as navigators move to different ships they get 
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familiar and accustomed to the information displayed. For example, on one model, the 
ship type number 32 is "Vessel-Tow>200m, Breadth>25m" while on another model the 
same number is displayed as "Towing (large tow)". 
Additionally, this so-called static field showing "vessel type" is altered for some vessel 
types according to their navigational status on voyage. There is also potential ambiguity 
between a vessel type and vessel status as in the ship type "Vessel-sailing" used in some 
models. These aspects are discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
4.5.2.3 Ship's Name and Call sign 
Although in the limited "VTS-based AIS study" there were not any incorrect name or call 
signs identified, in the wider "Data-mining AIS study", problems noticed were that fields 
were left blank. No name or call sign were given in 6% of the filtered static information 
sample. This represents 0.5% of the total unfiltered AIS messages recorded. Another 
problem noticed during this study is that abbreviations were used in the field of ship 
name. In many cases, but not all, this was because an insufficient number of characters 
were available which limits this field to 20 characters in the AIS equipment. The errors in 
these two categories are either, due to omission by installing technicians or due to the 
regulatory design, which does not allow ship's names in full if they are longer than 20 
characters. These limitations mean that there can be confusion about the ship's name, 
when a prime purpose of AIS was to clarify this problem. It is still a common practise to 
use a ship's name in voice communications even though the alternatives of using MMSI 
number (via Digital Selective Calling) or call sign are also available. Alternative 
suggestions would be for the IMO to pass a regulation limiting ships names to 20 
characters or to increase the minimum number of characters available for ships names in 
AIS equipment, or to train navigators to avoid using the ship name for communications. 
4.5.2.4 Vessel Navigational Status 
Ship status is dynamic information that has to be manually entered by the officer of the 
watch (OOW) and changed or updated as necessary by the navigation officer during a 
passage. In current AIS receivers, the equipment does not incorporate automatic 
crosschecking of information received and transmitted. In the "VTS-based AIS study", 
30% of ships were detected as displaying incorrect status information and there were 
probably more examples undetected by the research. Four percent of them were 
displaying an incorrect status for power driven vessels underway using their engines by 
showing their status as underway sailing, an option that should be used only by sailing 
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vessels under sail. Other examples detected by the research include a ship underway at 10 
knots shown as moored and ships alongside or at anchor shown as underway or sailing. 
Navigational status is very important information in situational awareness and anti- 
collision, particularly as it can decide when a ship would be the "stand-on" or "give way" 
vessel. Rather confusingly, the AIS data programming shows that navigational status for 
some vessel categories is given in the field of ship type as well the navigational status 
field. For example, the navigational status of tugs or dredgers is basically shown in the 
field of ship type and not just in field of navigational status as shown in table 4.6. 
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In table 4.6 some examples of ship types, their different status according to IRPCS and 
the corresponding data are shown, which would be shown by the AIS. The examples have 
been selected to show how the philosophy of AIS data is different bemcen different 
vessel types, In some categories the system has kept ship type according. to stated 
philosophy of the static AIS data so, for example, a fishing vessel remains aI fishing vessel 
throughout its voyage and life. Similarly in table 4.6, a sailing vessel would change only 
navigational status and not ship type. The voyage related field of navigational status 
would vary on voyage depending on whether it is engaged in fishing or not. Conversely, 
in table 4.6, a tug would be shown as the static field of vessel type of "tug- when not 
involved with towing. When the tug picks up a tow, the so called static I field of vessel 
type is changed from "tug" to "towing or "towing and length of tow exceeds 200 in or 
breadth exceeds 25 m" as applicable (that is the word "tug" actually means a "tug" not 
towing). The reason for this peculiar decision by AIS regulators is undoubtedly because 
the navigational status field can then be used by tug to show when it is additionally 
"restricted in her ability to manoeuvre" or not. Similarly a dredger would alter its ship 
type throughout its voyage. It is not clear if a pilot vessel should or should not change its 
vessel type when it is not engaged in pilotage duties. 
This aspect of AIS data on "anti-collision" status is compounded by at least one 
manufacturer by providing a user manual that does not tell the navigator how to change 
any of the static data. This includes the vessel type field, which we have shown in some 
vessel types need to be changed on a voyage basis and not just by the installer. 
It is important for the navigators to be aware and prepared for such ambiguities by 
specific AIS training both from the programming and from the interpretation 
perspectives, as indeed they are currently made aware for the intricacies of lights and 
shapes. Modification could be theoretically made to the number of AIS fields to improve 
the communications and the information provided, but this is not an option at this stage of 
implementation. The AIS fields do however convey the required information provided the 
navigators receive adequate training in the programming and interpretation of the AIS 
equivalent to that already provided for lights and shapes. 
4.5.2.5 Length and Beam 
Forty seven percent (47%) of the ships in the "VTS-based AIS study" displayed incorrect 
length and 18% of them displayed incorrect beam in their AIS information when 
compared with the VTS database or with the information reported on VHF. The vessels 
reporting incorrect lengths included: 
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" 6.4% that showed 0 for their length. 
" 36.3% with an error of between 1 metre and 5 metres. 
" 4.3% with an error of more than 5 metres. 
The vessels reporting beam inaccurately included: 
" 6.3% showing 0 for their beam. 
" 8.5% indicating an inaccuracy between 1 metre and 5 metres. 
" 3.2% indicating an inaccuracy of more than 5 metres. 
" Another 67% of observed vessels indicated an error of less than 1 metre in beam, 
which has not been included in our inaccuracy figures for the beam. Although, no 
doubt, some discrepancies are due to rounding, the majority of cases had an 
inaccurate non-zero decimal figure (e. g. 23.7 instead of 23.3). 
Some of these ships were contacted on the VHF to confirm their correct dimensions and 
the results confirmed that data shown by the AIS was not correct. In the "Data-mining 
AIS study", apart from non-availability of the length and beam, the errors identified were 
limited to an incorrect correlation between length and beam, such as beam being greater 
than length. Length and beam are static information on AIS and should be inputted to the 
equipment at the time of installation. This information would only need to be changed if 
structural modifications were to be made to the ship. This is an error of wrong data input 
by those who installed the AIS equipment on board ships. 
4.5.2.6 Position 
Full evaluation of the AIS positional information was not practical in the present studies. 
However in the "Data-mining AIS study" it was found that 1% had shown latitude of 
more than 90° and longitude of more than 180° or the position 0°N/S, 0°E/W. This could 
be because the position fixing system is not working or is improperly connected to the 
AIS equipment. Proper comparison of the position data from AIS with data from other 
means of positioning can further be investigated in the future to assess practical accuracy 
of the AIS position information. 
In MARS report 200552 (The Nautical Institute, 2005c) which highlighted the 
discrepancies of AIS, such as the vessels transmitting AIS position 00°N 000°W, it has 
been strongly recommended that AIS should only be used as a situational awareness tool 
and not for collision avoidance. 
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4.5.2.7 Draught 
An obvious discrepancy in 17% of AIS draught entries observed in the "Data-mining AIS 
study" is its non-availability or reporting of Om draught. It was also observed that in 14% 
of the AIS entries draught is greater than length of the ship. Since the ship's draught is 
voyage related information it must be entered by OOW and must be updated before and 
possibly during the ship's voyage. Any inaccuracy in this field of AIS information could 
be OOW omission to enter or update the draught or his/her error of commission by 
entering incorrect figures. Further research is required to quantify the errors in draught 
and the frequency of update by the navigator, as the present study has not explored to a 
proper extent the errors in this field. 
4.5.2.8 Destination and Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) 
The destination and ETA were not investigated during the "VTS-based AIS study" but 
they were investigated within the limitations of the "Data-mining AIS study". In the 
sample of 30946 AIS transmissions, 49% showed obvious errors in the fields of 
destination and ETA. Some of the vague or incorrect AIS entries for destination found 
were; a number instead of destination, a country name instead of port name, an 
abbreviated name difficult to interpret, the words "not available" or not defined" or 
"null", mischievous input (e. g. "to hell") or a blank field. It should be appreciated that the 
study was only able to identify inconsistencies and many erroneous entries would be 
undetected. Conversely the vague entries for ETA and destination may actually be the 
vessel's best knowledge in a small number of cases. Accurate knowledge of the correct 
destination of other vessels on the AIS can be very useful in areas of high traffic 
congestion and in port approaches or at the entrance to inland waterways. Destination 
identification can improve navigation safety through enhanced planning for 
manoeuvrings with early prediction of other traffic's manoeuvrings such as alterations of 
course and/or speed. It was observed that ETA is also not updated in a number of AIS 
transmissions. Inaccuracies noticed in the ETA field were dates in the past or ETAs in the 
very distant future. Although these fields are optional, if it is to be of use, ships should 
maintain it accurately and regularly. 
4.5.2.9 Heading, Course Over Ground (COG), and Speed Over Ground (SOG) 
Unfortunately during this research it was not possible to investigate heading, COG, and 
SOG. Further research on accuracy of such fundamental AIS information is very 
important if AIS is going to be used for anti-collision purposes and allow successful data 
fusion with radar information. Some problems have been reported in this regard. 
According to one report (The Nautical Institute, 2006), a heading offset of 90 degrees or 
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more was noticed in a vessel in a traffic separation scheme on a passage to Longview, 
Washington. The AIS inaccuracy in this case could be the result of a compass input 
problem or AIS equipment calibration, test, and maintenance not conforming with related 
directions and regulations. 
4.5.2.10 Other AIS-Related Problems 
Correct installation of AIS and its integration with other navigational equipment, 
accuracy of manual data being inputted to the system, and ability of the mariners to 
correctly interpret received information are great concerns if AIS is to be used to enhance 
decision making on the ship's bridge. Bailey (2005a) claims that 80% of AIS messages 
contain some error or inaccuracies. Installation of AIS and mariners training in the use of 
equipment are important issues that affect AIS operations, which have not been 
prioritised in the implementation of AIS. It has been argued (The Nautical Institute, 
2005c) that AIS has the potential to be a useful navigational aid if correctly used, due to 
its high updating rates on the changes made by other ships. However, at present, the 
reality is that in many cases, information, which is being provided, is directly misleading. 
This is especially dangerous if the AIS information must be relied upon at critical times 
such as when visibility is restricted and when radar detection ability is limited. 
Additionally, insufficient use of AIS is another identified problem in the literature, which 
was noticed in the case of the collision between Amenity and Tor Dania (MAIB, 2005b). 
The investigation concluded that, if the master of Amenity had referred to the existing AIS 
information, he would have been able to identify heading, direction and rate of turn of the 
other ship. This information, which has a2 second update rate, could have corrected the 
wrong visual impression about the aspect of Tor Dania. 
In the case of the accident between Hyundai Dominion and Sky Hope (Marine Accident 
Investigation Board (MAID), 2005a) a safety text message was used to send a collision 
warning that was not identified by the addressed vessel. It is not clear whether text 
messages should be used for such purposes by the mariners. If they are to be used, both 
auditory and visual warning signals, with adjustable individual response parameters, 
could be incorporated to facilitate better and more appropriate responses (Iiellier and 
Edworthy, 1999). Warnings can have an influential effect in reducing risk in dangerous 
situations (Baldwin and May, 2005). The warning signal could be in the form of a buzzer 
associated with a text message that could appear on the screen to inform the mariners 
about any incompatibility of the navigational status with speed. Graham (1999) pointed 
out that warning signals with iconic features that pass on information about different 
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events in an everyday manner may be understood quicker and easier than unusual 
artificial sounds. 
The investigation of the collision between Cepheus J and Jleksa (MAIB, 2005c) also 
found poor use of the AIS when the OOW on Cepheus J failed to notice the presence of 
Ileksa ahead of him. Solving negative aspects of AIS can increase its reliability and its 
users' trust level. If the regulatory authorities ever insisted that AIS is employed as an 
anti-collision aid then it is essential for correct information to be transmitted. 
Contrary to intention, there is some evidence that AIS technology actually increases VHF 
calls between ships for the purpose of collision avoidance. Bailey (2005a) claims that 
about 90% of 245 cases of VHF calls recorded at Dover Coastguard Channel Navigation 
Information Service (CNIS) were concerned with collision avoidance. Precise identity 
(i. e. name, call sign, etc. ) of target ships available via AIS will perhaps stimulate further 
use of VHF on board the ship. Consequently, this may cause more violations of the anti- 
collision regulations and reduce the ability of the OOW to take appropriate actions in 
ample time as required by anti-collision regulation. Thus, it could be a factor augmenting 
the risk of collision in some instances. Increased VHF calls can cause distraction and take 
the attention of navigators away from engaging in more urgent actions needed to avoid 
collision. In addition, they can cause confusion between two ships if they do not agree on 
specific actions required (Swift, 2004). The increased potential for local arrangements 
between ships over VHF may cause more confusion and breach of the rules of the road 
(ROR) (Farmer, 2004). In The Nautical Institute (2005a) there is an example of a request 
for an agreement in opposition to rule 15 of the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (IRPCS) where a naval ship (give way vessel) navigating in 
international waters asked another approaching ship (stand on vessel) to alter her course 
20 degrees to starboard. The IRPCS does not mention that VIIF should be used for anti- 
collision purposes but it has been a routine practice by some navigators. This matter 
needs urgent clarification by the regulatory authorities. 
4.6 Analysis 
Using a system's approach, based on an application of a well-known model of system 
failure, failures at different levels of the AIS system are summarised. Table 4.7 shows 
failures observed in an AIS system. Suggestions for remedial action to reduce the 
likelihood of such errors and thus minimise accident opportunities are also shown. This 
study indicates that for the AIS to be successful in its proposed aims and objectives, 
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further steps need to be taken by various stakeholders, including the regulatory 
organisations. 
Level of Failures AIS Problem Remedial Action 
Frontline operator failures. 
Mainly simple forgetting and -Failures to update or change -A compulsory check list to be 
inattention or omission of action information. filled before, during and at the 
by ship's navigating officers. -Observed in dynamics and/or end of each voyage by navigating 
voyage related information of officers would be helpful. 
AIS such as length, beam, 
draught, destination, ETA, etc. 
-Incorrect information has been 
entered. 
Installation failures. 
Error associated with action of -Error in static information set at -Installation of AIS equipment by 
technicians installing the the time of installation of the AIS. certified competent technicians. 
equipment. -Proper calibration. and test of the 
equipment after installation. 
Design failures or omissions. 
They result from the actions or -Errors due to over simplification -An interlink mechanism between 
inactions of equipment designers. of predefined options available speed and navigational status. 
for some data fields, such as -Interlink between other AIS and 
default categorisation of ship type other navigational equipment. 
or navigational status in the -Use of internationally 
system. standardised maritime 
professional terms and phrases 
according to IRI'CS for menu- 
based fields of information. 
Training and management 
failures. Lack of knowledge by -Lack of competency of mariners -Proper theory and practical 
navigators about the equipment to use the equipment properly. training for mariners and 
and lack of management by operators ashore. 
masters to properly supervise the -Regulations for requirement of 
integrity of data. the AIS user certificate. 
-Proper supervision from senior 
officers on board for integrity of 
AIS data. 
-More responsibilities by shipping 
companies for not sending 
navigator to sea without proper 
AIS training. 
Regulatory failures. 
Lack of standardisation for -Wrong application of rules to -Definition of specific unified 
equipment design. define default list of options. standards for equipment design. 
Inadequate regulation on training -Following of agreed standards by 
of navigators in AIS operations. different AIS designers and 
Lack of supervision on the proper manufactures. 
use and data accuracy of the -Proper regulation for compulsory 
equipment by local authorities. training should make by 
international regulatory 
organisations. 
-Proper supervision on AIS 
operation on board ships by Local 
authorities. 
-Penalties for knowingly 
displaying incorrect information 
should be imposed consistently 
by regulatory authorities. 
Violations. 
-Lack of supervision by local -Observed in AIS field of -International regulations are 
authorities on the accuracy of destination. Poor design could needed in this regard to authorise 
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Level of Failures AIS Problem Remedial Action 
information transmitted by AIS. also lead to inaccurate entries. and engage local government 
agencies such as port state control 
(PSC) in inspection and 
examination of the accuracy of 
AIS data in their territorial 
waters. 
Table 4.7- Summaries of the human failures associated with AIS equipment 
4.6.1 The "Swiss Cheese" Model of Accident for AIS 
The original "Swiss Cheese" model of system failure was proposed by Reason (1990 & 
1997). It shows how failures at various stages of a system may allow a problem to pass 
through gaps and weaknesses in 'various layers of that system's defences, but may be 
stopped by subsequent defence layers. However, in certain circumstances, the problem 
may have a clear trajectory through all of the system defences, which may result in 
accidents with potentially serious consequences. In figure 4.9, the "Swiss Cheese" model 
is modified for the AIS system. It shows a possible accident trajectory that may occur. In 
this model, two kinds of failure, active and latent, are important in accident development 
in an AIS system. Active failures usually involve unsafe acts of frontline operators in 
direct contact with the system, for example, ship's officers or pilots, whose effects are 
immediate. However, in the immediate operating context of the system, these acts might 
appear to be wholly appropriate to the operator. Latent failures, on the other hand, are 
generally associated with actions and decisions of those who are remote and indirectly 
connected with the control of the system, such as high-level decision makers, designers, 
rules and procedures makers, and maintenance workers (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007; 
Reason, 1990; Noyes, 2001; Wittingham, 2004). Significant latent errors can be seen in 
the case of the "Herald of Free Enterprise" disaster in 1987 in which 189 out of 459 
people lost their lives due to system error, management error, and design error (Reason, 
1990). Defence penetration could be due to a combination of both types of failure in the 
system. 
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Figure 4.9- The "Swiss Cheese" model of human error In AIS system, contributing 
to accident (adapted from the generic model of Reason, 1990,1997) 
4.7 Conclusion 
The findings of the present studies, and previous research show that the data provided by 
AIS are not reliable in many cases and therefore mariners cannot wholly trust the 
equipment. This could lead to further deterioration in AIS usage and data quality. 
The list of options available should be standardised according to different types and 
navigational statuses of the ship (as defined in the International Regulation for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea) such as in the IALA (2002) guidelines on AIS. This will overcome the 
current differences in number and phraseology of options available in AIS equipment 
made by different manufacturers. 
There is an assumption by some navigators and accident investigators that the AIS is an 
aid to safe navigation by providing additional information for anti-collision purposes. The 
use of AIS fields to show anti-collision status has some peculiarities for some vessel 
categories not dissimilar to some of those in the use of lights and shapes. Understanding 
the use of lights and shapes is a familiar part of navigator training and similar AIS 
training needs to be introduced. This training would also encourage the use of the narrow 
definition of the word "sailing" in the context of the AIS message and in the IRPCS. 
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It is not clear whether the safety text messaging, available in AIS equipment, could or 
should be used for anti-collision conversations between vessels. IMO needs to clarify the 
regulations about this. Should this method of collision avoidance be approved, the 
existence of an effective audio-visual warning signal to notify the receipt of safety text 
messages would also help. Further training for navigators is also needed on these matters. 
It was noticed during this research that many of the input errors in the field of ship's 
navigational status are due to memory slips or omission to execute an action. The AIS 
equipment could easily have self-checking mechanisms and links to other equipment to 
detect obvious inconsistencies. For example, an interlink mechanism between speed and 
navigational status would be helpful. In cases where the speed of the ship, which is 
automatically being inputted to the system from GPS or from a speed log, exceeds a 
certain level a warning signal could prevent the navigational status from showing 
conditions such as moored or at anchor. The existence of a warning signal would alert 
navigators, of erroneous conditions in early stages of development. Use of warning 
signals could also be extended to include a link with the ship's navigational light system 
in such a way that a signal could warn the navigator in case of any conflict between the 
actual navigational status of the ship and status shown in AIS data. Indeed, the logical 
step is to have one button for both tasks. 
The automation of AIS is mainly related to the transmission and reception of data and the 
integrity of the system are dependent on many manual inputs. The current unreliability of 
AIS data is a critical issue mitigating against the use of AIS as a trustworthy navigational 
aid in collision prevention activities. Proper supervision, surveillance of accuracy, and 
enforcement of quality of AIS data by competent maritime authorities would enhance its 
efficacy in all navigation operations. 
Proper training of navigators and operators ashore on the use of AIS, its capabilities, and 
limitations is an important issue as demonstrated in the Hyundai Dominion and Sky Hope 
(Marine Accident Investigation Board (MAIB), 2005a). Lack of familiarity of the 
navigators with AIS equipment is likely to reduce the confidence of navigators in using it 
in their normal anti-collision activities. An international mandatory training course 
including theory and practice of AIS equipment would improve its use at sea. 
It is apparent that some optional fields of AIS information, such as destination and ETA, 
are not considered important by the mariners as in most cases they are not updated. 
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Navigators need more encouragement to maintain the data showing on their equipment. It 
will also give them more confidence in AIS data broadcasted from other ships. 
This study has concentrated on the main AIS fields that are inputted manually and has not 
specifically considered information relayed automatically from shipboard sensors, such as 
speed, position, heading, etc. Further research is required to examine any human error 
issues in the setting up and the interpretation of shipboard sensor information by 
navigators. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter examined accuracy of the AIS information by conducting 3 AIS studies and 
analysed the level of human failures associated with AIS. The chapter further suggested 
remedial actions for reducing such error in order to improve AIS usefulness in enhancing 
safety of navigation operation. 
The first section, after introduction, discussed the role of the human element in marine 
accidents, and the growing concern of human factors as a result of significant implication 
of human error in accidents. 
The second section suggested a hierarchical socio-technical system for management of 
safety and risk in marine navigation. 
The third section discussed human factors in marine navigation. This section covered 
management of different elements in the human factors model, need for research on 
human factors, description, classification, and type of human error and failures, and 
performance shaping factors. 
The next section evaluated human errors and failures associated with ship borne AIS 
applications. It described the 3 AIS data studies performed during this research, and 
finding of the studies for individual AIS fields of information. 
This chapter also analysed the findings of the AIS data studies in the fifth section. The 
results of the analysis led to the development of an accident model for AIS based on 
Reason's (1990,1197) "Swiss Cheese" model of human error. This model summarises 
the human failure associated with AIS. 
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Chapter 5 
AIS Questionnaire 
5.1 Introduction 
AIS was introduced in 2002 and its phased implementation programme completed in 
December 2004. Some problems still exist in its reliable use for anti-collision and other 
navigational activities. In the AIS data studies conducted and discussed in chapter 4, 
some signs of the system's inaccuracy and misalignment were observed such as: 
" Lack of use of AIS. 
" Transmission of ambiguous, incorrect, and in some cases, misleading data, which 
can cause misinterpretation of information that could lead to serious error with 
unpleasant consequences. 
" Navigators' lack of knowledge and skills required to properly use, maintain, and 
interpret the data received by AIS. 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the navigators' view on AlS application for 
navigation, and significance of some of the argued issues in their feedback. It does this by 
analysing the results of a bespoke questionnaire designed to assess the navigators' 
feedback on AIS perception after implementation, under the SOLAS Convention. Firstly, 
the methodology of the questionnaire is covered in section 5.2, and then the questionnaire 
preliminary analysis is covered in section 5.3. The results of analysis for variables 
considered in the questionnaire and impact of demographic factors in terms of differences 
between subsets of population in their responses are given in sections 5.4 and 5.5, 
respectively. Section 5.6 contains the discussion and conclusion for this chapter. 
5.2 Methodology 
This questionnaire survey is carried out to explore and evaluate navigators' views, if and 
how AIS contributes to navigational efficiency and safety, where navigating officers, and 
usage of the AIS technology become objects of the research. This, in turn, will help to 
determine AIS effectiveness, advantages, and disadvantages. 
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5.2.1 The Sample 
The study population was selected from multinational officers of two shipping 
companies, National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) and Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines (IRISL), with more than 100 ocean going tankers and dry cargo ships, 
manned with multinational crews, based in Iran, and some deck officers who attended 
simulation training at Lairdside Maritime Centre of Liverpool John Moores University in 
Liverpool, UK. The total number of the research sample (N) is 116. In order to avoid 
samples of convenience and to represent a fairly suitable study sample, with minimum 
partiality, the respondents were selected from many different nationalities. The way of 
selecting study sample takes into account differences in respondents' educational and 
cultural backgrounds, their different ranks, sea experience, etc. The sample consisted of 
different ranks of deck officers such as master mariners, chief officers, second officers, 
and third officers (see section 5.3.1). Other important information about the population 
sample is also given in section 5.3.1of this chapter. 
5.2.2 The Questionnaire 
A survey questionnaire was prepared to collect perceptions of the navigators about 
important issues that were highlighted in the literature review. The test of questionnaire 
for being clear and understandable and for its usability for the research objectives was 
carried out through expert judgement. Therefore, the survey questionnaire was reviewed 
according to the feedback that was obtained from the experts supervising the research, 
other experts in the maritime department, and experienced simulator instructors at 
Lairdside Maritime Centre of the Liverpool John Moores University. Finally, a total of 47 
items are included in the questionnaire, grouped by the content under 7 subtitles. The 
group of personal information was included to gather demographic data on the 
participants. This will correlate response sets between different groups of navigators that 
could be used for checking consistency of responses across groups. The final 
questionnaire, which is reproduced in appendix B. 1, consists of an introduction about the 
aim of the survey with names and contact details of the researcher and director of study 
for this research, and e-mail and postal addresses to return completed questionnaires. The 
questionnaire also thanked respondents for their cooperation and guaranteed that 
information given by them would remain strictly private and would not be individually 
passed on to third parties. Some of the questionnaires were handed in to deck officers in 
Liverpool-UK, and some of them were sent to the shipping companies mentioned in 
section 5.2.1 in an electronic format in April 2005 with a reminder during July 2005. A 
total of 116 completed questionnaires were received. Some of the responses were 
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received in electronic format via e-mail and some of them were in paper form received 
through the postal mail from April 2005 to May 2006. 
Questions included in the questionnaire are organised in 7 groups. The relevant groups 
are: 
Section A: Personal Information consists of 6 questions. 
Section B: Perceived Usefulness of AIS consists of 13 questions. 
Section C: Perceived Ease of Use of AIS consists of 6 questions. 
Section D: Perception of AIS Information Display consists of 10 questions. 
Section E: AIS Training consists of 5 questions. 
Section F: AIS and Use of VHF consists of 3 questions. 
Section G: Disadvantages of AIS consists of 4 questions. 
5.2.3 The Questionnaire Codebook 
A questionnaire codebook was prepared before entering the questionnaire data into an 
SPSS data table. The codebook is a summary of the instructions that were used to convert 
the information obtained from the questionnaires into SPSS format. A copy of the 
questionnaire codebook that was developed for the survey questionnaire is shown in 
appendix B. 2. 
5.3 Preliminary Analysis 
The data analysis was carried out with the aid of computer software SPSS version 14. The 
data table for AIS questionnaire survey is given in appendix B. 3. 
5.3.1 Breakdown of Respondents Experience 
Figures 5.1 to 5.5 show descriptive statistics on information such as rank, certificate of 
competency held, type(s) of AIS display available, total sea time, and sailing experience 
with AIS for total 116 respondents in the population sample. The figures also show the 
number of missing data for each measure. According to the statistics, the breakdown of 
respondents' ranks is 12.3% for master mariner, 26.3% for chief officer, 25.4% for 
second officer, and 36% for third officer (figure 5.1). Actual certificates of competency 
held by the valid number of participants are 24.8% master mariner, 20.0% chief officer, 
and 55.2% second officer. Of the total number of respondents 10% did not specify their 
certificates of competency (figure 5.2). 
105 
Master 
Mariner 
Chief 
Officer 
Q Second 
Officer 
Third Officer 
Q Missing 
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Figure 5.2 Certificate of competency held (A3) 
According to figure 5.3, valid figures for types of AIS display available to the 
respondents were 21.2% Minimum Keyboard & Display (MKD), 6.2% stand-alone 
graphical display, 15% integrated with radar, 4.4% integrated with ECDIS, and 53.1% 
more than one type. The figures for the available AIS display show that more than half of 
the respondents had the opportunity to compare the way in which the AIS information is 
presented by two different types of display. Of those who have experienced only one type 
of AIS display, the majority of them have been using MKD type. 
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Figure 5.3 Types of AIS display (A6) 
5.3.2 Respondents Seatime 
According to figures 5.4 and 5.5, information from 116 respondents shows that the range 
of total sea time is from 0.3 year to 37 years, with a mean of 8.346 years. The range of 
sailing experience with AIS is from I month to 70 months, with a mean of 16.8 months. 
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Figure 5.4 Participants total sea time 
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5.4 Results of Analysis for Measured Variables 
The measured result of the questionnaire analysis for main variables of B to G is given in 
this section. 
5.4.1 Perceived Usefulness of AIS 
Perceived Usefulness (PU) is the degree to which an individual believes that using a 
particular system will enhance his/her job performance and productivity (Davis, 1986 and 
1989). For the AIS, PU is the reflection of resulted benefits gained from applying the AIS 
technology to the navigation performance and improvement in other aspects such as 
quality and safety of operations. 
According to figure 5.6, in total 87% (56% agrees and 31% strongly agrees) of the 
navigators believe that their situational awareness will be enhanced as a result of a better 
situation display of the marine traffic. This may be due to extra information provided to 
the bridge by the AIS. On the improvement of navigator's performance in anti-collision 
operation by AIS, figure 5.7 shows that about 45.7% of them are agreed and about 19% 
of them are strongly agreed (total of 64.7%). The level of agreement of navigators on the 
AIS ability to improve their efficiency in anti-collision operation is about 65% (42% 
agrees and 24% strongly agrees), which is approximately the same as that of the ability to 
improve their performance in anti-collision, see figure 5.8. 
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In all three of the above cases, the level of disagreements is about 3% (about 2% 
disagrees and 1% strongly disagrees) for improvement of situational awareness, 14% 
(about 13% disagrees and 1 %strongly disagrees) for improvement of performance, and 
11% (11 %disagrees and 0% strongly disagrees) for improvement of efficiency, and 
remaining percentages are neutral and do not yet have a clear image of the AIS in these 
regards. 
Figure 5.9 shows that 64% of navigators (41% agrees and 23% strongly agrees) believe 
that AIS has increased the overall ability of navigators in anti-collision operation. Having 
more information helps in correct decision making and effectiveness of required action. 
Figure 5.9 AIS ability to increase navigator's ability in anti-collision operation 
Figure 5.10 shows that AIS would increase such sense of being in control of operation, as 
a majority of 67% of the navigators were in favour of such belief with a ratio of 49% 
agrees and 18% strongly agrees. 
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Figure 5.10 Navigator feels more in control of anti collision operation 
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Evidence from figure 5.11 shows that 53% of the navigators felt their ship would be safer 
with AIS. 39% of them were agreed and 14% of them were strongly agreed with such a 
statement. 
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Figure 5.11 Ship is safer with AIS 
Distraction and loss of concentration of navigators in carrying out the anti-collision 
operation and dealing with emergencies in navigation will reduce the available time, and 
consequently, the chances for human errors might increase. Therefore, it is very important 
for the AIS to be merged with other navigational aids on the bridge with the minimum 
possible distraction. The result of the questionnaire analysis in figure 5.12 shows that the 
AIS inconvenience of disturbing the normal anti-collision operation is believed to be 
relatively high. Navigators' response to probability of disruption of normal anti-collision 
operation by AIS was 47% agrees, and 10% strongly agrees. Therefore, a total of 57% of 
the navigators thought about AIS as a technology that might disrupt the ship's normal 
anti-collision operation, but with the different degree of emphasis. 
50- 
40- 
0 30- Ey 
20 
10 X04 oar 
0 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strmgly 
Agree 
B7 
Figure S. 12 AIS disrupts the normal anti-collision operation 
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The impact of AIS on the navigators' workload, physically and mentally, is also very 
important in AIS success as a navigational aid. The questionnaire survey included the 
issue of AIS to estimate navigators' perception of possible change in their workload due 
to AIS implementation. The AIS survey result for increase in workload shows 
dissimilarities with the result for disruption. The result shows that 49% of the navigators 
disagreed and 18% strongly disagreed that AIS increases their physical workload (see 
figure 5.13). 
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Figure 5.13 Increase in navigators' physical workload 
Figure 5.14 shows that the majority of navigators generally thought that using AIS did 
not increase mental workload, with 69% disagreement consisting of 51% disagrees and 
18% strong disagrees. 
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Figure 5.14 Increase in navigators' mental workload 
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Figure 5.15 shows that 83% (36% disagrees and 47% strongly disagrees) of the 
navigators do not prefer to use AIS alone rather than radar and only 6% (4% agrees and 
2% strongly agrees) of them would prefer to use AIS independent of the radar. 
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Figure 5.15 Preference to use AIS alone rather than radar 
The survey result shows that 66% (50% agrees and 16% strongly agrees) of navigators 
are in favour of AIS usefulness to improve overall safety of navigation, and only 13% 
(12% disagrees and I% strongly disagrees) are against (figure 5.16). 
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Figure 5.16 AIS improves overall safety of navigation 
In a comparison of AIS information with radar information, 52% (43% agrees and 9% 
strongly agrees) believed that AIS information was clearer and continuous than those 
from radar (see figure 5.17). According to figure 5.18, most of the navigators believe that 
some of the radar blindness in target detection will be removed or reduced by AIS. About 
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68% (42% agrees and 26% strongly agrees) of the navigators were in favour of the 
statement that the detection of target in radar shadow areas is improved with AIS. 
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Figure 5.17 AIS provides clearer and continuous information than radar 
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Figure 5.18 AIS improves detection of targets in radar shadow areas 
5.4.2 Perceived Ease of Use of AIS 
Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) is the degree to which an individual believes that using a 
particular system will be free of effort (Davis, 1986 and 1989). For the AIS, it reveals the 
possible difficulty of using the equipment on the ship. 
In this section the questionnaire analysis for this measure is discussed for each question, 
as was done for PU. 
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On the feasibility of the navigators self-learning to operate AIS, 42% of them disagreed 
and 8% strongly disagreed (half of the total) that it is hard to learn to operate AIS on their 
own (see figure 5.19). Only 18% of them believed that self-learning is hard. It is also 
apparent from figure 5.20 that 60% of navigators perceived that it is easy to become 
skilful at using AIS. 
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Figure 5.19 Self -learning to operate AIS is hard for navigators 
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Figure 5.20 Easy to become skilful at using AIS 
A total of 68% of navigators are positive that the procedure for getting information from 
AIS equipment is clear and understandable, according to figure 5.21. 
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Figure 5.21 Clear and understandable process of obtaining information from AIS 
Further on the AIS ease of use, figure 5.22 shows that 74% of the navigators were either 
agreed or strongly agreed that it is easy to use the technology. 56% percent of them were 
agreed or strongly agreed that it is easy to use the AIS technology for anti-collision 
operation (see figure 5.23). 
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Figure 5.22 AIS is easy to use 
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Figure 5.23 It is easy to use AIS for anti-collision operation 
According to figure 5.24, about 34% of the navigators believed that there is not any 
problem in AIS response time to data input. These are the data that do not need frequent 
updates. A larger majority of them either believed that AIS response to data input is slow 
(16%) or they did not have a specific idea about it (48%). In addition, about 48% 
uncertainties of the navigators were on whether AIS response to data input is slow or not. 
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Figure 5.24 AIS slow response to data input 
5.4.3 Perception of AIS Information Display 
The way in which AIS information is displayed and controlled is investigated in this 
section of the questionnaire survey. 
On the value of the AIS display in navigator's performance, 64% (54% agrees and 7% 
strongly agrees) of the respondents considered it as a valuable factor that could affect 
their performance (see figure 5.25). 
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Figure 5.25 AIS display is valuable in navigator's performance 
The opinion about the AIS symbols in AIS display, as in figure 5.26, shows that 52% of 
the navigators believed the symbols are efficient. However, 42% of them were neutral on 
the efficiency of AIS symbols in their responses. Efficiency of the controls and keyboard 
is an influential factor on the usefulness of any technology. Therefore, the questionnaire 
included user-friendliness of the AIS keyboard to find out views of the navigators in this 
respect. 
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Figure 5.26 AIS display symbols are efficient 
According to figure 5.27 about 54% of the navigators showed their agreement (either 
agree or strongly agree) that the AIS keyboard is user-friendly, but again a relatively big 
percentage (34% neutral) of them were uncertain about this matter. 
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Figure 5.27 AIS keyboard is user-friendly 
The availability of an AIS unit help for the users to solve any problem during operation 
and use was considered to be important. About 47% of the mariners agreed and 7% 
strongly agreed that the AIS unit help and instructions are useful and clear. About 37% 
were still neutral on this respect (see figure 5.28). 
50- 
40- 
c 
30 
a 
,0 
e ae e, ce 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
D4 
Figure 5.28 The AIS unit help and instructions are useful and clear 
Getting the required information from the AIS on the right time by the navigators on the 
ship's bridge can play a major role in taking accurate action in the navigation operation 
especially in a close quarter situation where the time margin is small. Figure 5.29 shows 
that the majority of the navigators thought that it requires a long time to learn to extract 
information from AIS. This assumption is shown by the navigators' 64% agreement 
(agree or strongly agree) that it takes a long time to learn to extract AIS information. Only 
9% of them seem to have no problem in this regard, and the remainder of them (37%) did 
not have a specific view. 
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Figure 5.29 It takes a long time to learn to extract AIS information 
Contrary to the time needed to learn how to extract the AIS information, figure 5.30 
shows that 81 % of the navigators believed that the AIS information is presented in a clear 
and understandable manner. 
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Figure 5.30 AIS information is presented in a clear and understandable way 
On the matter of unnecessary information on the AIS display, figure 5.31 shows that 59% 
of the navigators were negative (disagreed or strongly disagreed) that some of the 
information on the AIS display is unnecessary, and only 15% were positive (agreed or 
strongly disagreed) on this regard. It is relatively easy to move from one AIS menu to 
another one as shown from the navigators' responses in figure 5.32 with a strong support 
of 70% (64% agrees and 6% strongly agrees). 
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Figure 5.31 Some of the AIS display information is unnecessary 
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Figure 5.32 Moving from one menu to another menu is relatively easy 
Seventy one percent of the navigators were in favour of the AIS data input and output 
mechanism as 66% of them were agreed and 5% strongly agreed that getting data in and 
out of the AIS is easy (see figure 5.33). About half of the respondents (51%) did not 
believe that overlay of radar echoes with AIS data may cause confusion (see figure 5.34), 
the remaining 49% were either positive or neutral. 
121 
c d V 
m CL 
to 
20 
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Disagree Agree 
D9 
Figure 5.33 Getting data in and out of AIS is easy 
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Figure 5.34 Confusion due to overlay of radar echoes with AIS data 
5.4.4 AIS Training 
Proper training of navigators on the use of AIS, its capabilities, and limitations is an 
important issue as sufficient familiarity of the navigators with AIS technology is expected 
to increase their confidence level in using the AIS in the navigation operation. Although 
training is considered to be very important in successful implementation of new 
technologies, according to figure 5.35, only a small percentage of 19.1% of the 
respondents have completed a formal training course on the basic operation of AIS, but a 
majority of 80.9% did not have any AIS training. Of those who have completed such 
formal training for AIS, 13.6% of them had theoretical training, 45.5% practical on the 
job training, 13.6% simulation training, and 27.3% combined theoretical and practical 
training (see figure 5.36). 
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Figure 5.36 Type of training 
Figure 5.37 shows that only 40% of the navigators thought their training (if any) is 
adequate to safely perform their tasks in anti-collision operation on the bridge using AIS. 
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Figure 5.37 Adequacy of training to safely perform anti-collision operation 
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The other 60% were either unsure or believed that their training does not fulfil the 
requirement to adequately perform their duties in that respect. When asked if it was a 
necessity for navigators to have formal AIS training for safe operation in a collision 
situation, a large majority of 42% were neutral, 34% were positive, and only 24% 
responded negatively (see figure 5.38). The navigators' view about a need for formal 
training has been reflected in the next question, which is about the ease of learning to 
operate AIS without a proper training course. According to figure 5.39 only about half of 
the navigators (51 %) had a positive view about whether learning to operate AIS without a 
proper training course is easy or not, 11 % regarded it as not being easy, 27% did not have 
a clear view about it, and the remaining 11% failed to answer this question. 
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Figure 5.38 Essentiality of AIS training for safety of anti-collision operation 
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Figure 5.39 Ease of learning to operate AIS without a proper training course 
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5.4.5 AIS and Use of VHF 
The introduction of AIS, in common with any other new technology, might have some 
unforeseen impact on other equipment on the bridge. One potential impact highlighted in 
chapter 2, section 2.3.6, was the impact of AIS on the use of VHF radio. Accordingly, in 
the research questionnaire, there were also some questions on AIS and the use of VHF. In 
figure 5.40 most of the navigators perceived that AIS decreases overall VHF traffic 
congestion as 70% of them were in favour (49% agree and 21% strongly agree), only 
12% were against such belief, and the other 18% were neutral. Even though the survey 
showed a perceived decrease in overall VHF traffic congestion, AIS may cause an 
increase in use of VHF for anti-collision operations (i. e. for agreement for action between 
vessels). 
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Figure 5.40 AIS decreases overall VHF traffic congestion 
Figure 5.41 shows that 40% percent of the navigators do not believe that it has caused an 
increased use of VHF for anti-collision operation due to AIS introduction, but about 34% 
believed that it had caused such an increase in VHF use. 
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Figure 5.41 AIS increases use of VHF for anti-collision operation 
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The concern that increased VHF use may cause increased violation of IRPCS was 
assorted with 42% (disagreed and strongly disagreed) of the navigators against, 26% 
(agreed and strongly agreed) in favour of, and 33% uncertainty (see figure 5.42). 
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Figure 5.42 IRPCS violation resulted from increased use of VHF for anti-collision 
decisions due to AIS 
5.4.6 Disadvantages of AIS 
Disadvantages associated with a technology might influence the application and the 
extent of use of such technology. This section of the questionnaire aimed at finding the 
views of the navigators about some of the important possible disadvantages of AIS 
technology. Reliability of the data received by AIS is an important issue in safety and 
security of marine navigation. Since the AIS stations have little means of assessing the 
reliability of data received, the information received from target ships might not be 
reliable due to spoofing. Figure 5.43 shows the navigators' response on the issue of 
unreliability of AIS information due to spoofing. 44% of the navigators were neutral, 
40% were against, and 17% were concerned about the possible unreliability of data 
received. 
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Figure 5.43 AIS data are not reliable due to spoofing 
On a similar issue, AIS vulnerability due to jamming of the AIS itself or GPS jamming, 
the majority of the navigators (51%) were uncertain, 29% were agreed, and only 20% 
were unconcerned (see figure 5.44). 
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Figure 5.44 AIS is vulnerable due to jamming 
Figure 5.45 shows the results of the questionnaire survey about the increase in the piracy 
risk level in areas of piratical activity. About 58% of the navigators believed in increased 
likelihood of such danger, and only 20% rejected it. The remaining 22% were of no 
specific view. It was observed, in chapter 4, sections 4.10.1,4.10.2, and 4.10.3 that in a 
number of cases data transmitted by AIS was associated with incorrect information. 
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Figure 5.45 Increased danger of piracy in areas of piratical activity 
The possibility of erroneous information displayed by AIS due to wrong data input was 
assessed in figure 5.46. About 66% believed that such risks exist, 18% rejected such 
claim, and the remaining 16% were neutral. 
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Figure 5.46 Risk of displaying erroneous information due to wrong data input 
5.5 Differences Between Subsets of Population 
This section covers the differences between subsets of population in order to assess the 
impacts of demographic factors (identified in Personal Information section of the 
questionnaire) such as navigators' ranks, sea experience, sailing experience with AIS, and 
training, and type of AIS display available on navigators perceptions about different 
aspects of AIS. 
Assessment of significant differences between subsets of population has been carried out 
with the Kruskal-Wallis Test. The Kruskal-Wallis Test, sometimes referred to as the 
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Kruskal-Wallis H Test, allows comparing the scores of continuous variables for 3 or more 
groups. It is a `between groups' analysis, which converts scores into ranks and compares 
the mean rank between groups (Pallant, 2004; and Field, 2005). According to Pallant 
(2004), the highest mean rank for any group corresponds to the highest score on a 
continuous variable for that group. The important parts of information from the Kruskal- 
Wallis Test are Chi-Square value, significance value (both the asymptotic and Monte 
Carlo significance should be investigated, and if they differ we should consider the Monte 
Carlo significance value), and confidence interval for significance. Statistically 
significant differences in continuous variables across groups is indicated by the 
significance values of less than 0.05, and by the boundary of confidence interval for 
significance that does not cross 0.05 (Field, 2005). Since the Kruskal-Wallis Test is for 3 
or more groups, the Mann-Whitney U Test has been done to test for differences between 
2 groups of trained and untrained navigators. 
This section only shows the results of the test for variables, which were statistically 
significant across different groups. The result will refer to the variables according to their 
section named alphabetically and sequence number in the section, shown in the 
questionnaire sample in appendix B. 1 and also in the SPSS codebook in appendix B. 2. 
The findings of this section will be discussed later in section 5.6 of this chapter. 
5.5.1 Training 
The Mann-Whitney U Test (table 5.1) for impact of the training on navigators' responses 
between the two groups of trained and untrained navigators shows following results: 
a) There is a very highly significant difference in scores for item B7 (AIS will 
disrupt the normal anti-collision operation) between the trained and the untrained 
groups of navigators (P < 0.0005). The mean rank of 63.09 for the untrained 
navigators is higher than the mean rank of 36.48 for the trained navigators. 
Therefore, navigators who had an AIS formal training had a higher level of 
confidence in item B7 than the untrained navigators. 
b) The difference in scores for item Cl (self-learning to operate AIS is hard for 
navigators) between the 2 groups of navigators is significant (P < 0.036). The 
mean rank of scores for the untrained navigators is 60.99, which is higher than 
the mean rank of scores of 45.35 for the trained navigators. Since the scores for 
this item have been reversed during initial data manipulation, therefore the mean 
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perception score of the trained navigators about item CI was higher than the 
untrained navigators. 
c) There is a highly significant difference in scores for item C5 (AIS responds 
slowly to data input by navigators) between the 2 groups (P < 0.002). The mean 
rank of scores for the untrained group is 62.35 and for the trained group is 39.59. 
Since the scores for this item were also reversed, therefore the mean score for the 
trained navigators were higher than the mean scores for the untrained navigators. 
This means that the mean score for optimism of the trained navigators about item 
C5 were higher than the untrained group. 
d) The difference in scores for item C6 (it is easy to use AIS for anti-collision 
operation) is also highly significant between the 2 groups (P < 0.007). The mean 
ranks of scores are 74.05 and 54.20 for the trained and the untrained groups, 
respectively. This shows that the mean score for perception of the trained 
navigators in item C6 was higher than the mean score of the untrained ones. 
e) The statistical significance of difference in scores for item D1 (AlS display is 
valuable in navigator's performance) between the 2 groups is also evident as P< 
0.041. A mean rank of 69.77 for the trained group is higher than a mean rank of 
55.22 for the untrained group. Therefore, awareness of the trained navigators 
about statement of item D1 was higher than the untrained navigators. 
fj The statistical difference in scores for item E3 (I think my training on the use of 
AIS is adequate to safely perform anti-collision operation on the bridge using 
AIS) between the 2 groups is very highly significant (P < 0.0005). The mean 
rank of 49.91 for the trained group is higher than the mean rank of 28,90 for the 
untrained group. Therefore, the optimism mean score of the trained navigators in 
the adequacy of their training to safely perform anti-collision operations on the 
bridge using AIS was higher than the untrained navigators. 
g) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item F1 (AIS decreases 
overall VHF traffic congestion) between the 2 groups (P < 0.013). The mean 
rank of 72.73 for the trained group is higher than the mean rank of 54.52 for the 
untrained group. Therefore, mean confidence of the trained navigators in the 
overall decrease of VHF traffic congestion by AIS was higher than the untrained 
navigators. 
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Mean Sum of 
Training N Rank Ranks 
Mann- 
Whitney 
u 
Asymp. 
Sig. (2- 
tailed) 
______ 
B7 Yes 22 36.48 802.50 549.500 . 000 
No 93 63.09 5867.50 
Total 115 
Cl Yes 22 45.36 998.00 745.000 . 036 
No 93 60.99 5672.00 
Total 115 
C5 Yes 22 39.59 871.00 618.000 . 002 
No 93 62.35 5799.00 
Total 115 
C6 Yes 22 74.05 1629.00 670.000 . 007 
No 93 54.20 5041.00 
Total 115 
D1 Yes 22 69.77 1535.00 764.000 . 041 
No 93 55.22 5135.00 
Total 115 
E3 Yes 22 49.91 1098.00 211.000 . 000 
No 48 28.90 1387.00 
Total 70 
F1 Yes 22 72.73 1600.00 699.000 . 013 
No 93 54.52 5070.00 
Total 115 
Table 5.1 Ranks of scores and the Mann-Whitney test for trained and untrained 
groups 
As the importance of basic training for navigators emphasised in section 2.3.9 of the 
chapter 2, there are some significant differences between perception of the mariners who 
had an AIS training and those who did not have such training. It was argued in section 
2.3.3 of chapter 2, the way in which AIS data along with other navigation information is 
presented to a navigator on the bridge is very important in effectiveness of AIS for 
navigation performance. The very highly significant difference between the two groups of 
navigators in their perception about disruption of normal anti-collision operation by AIS 
indicates a weakness in this regard. As it was expected the AIS training is crucial 
according to the higher level of difficulty in self-learning reflected in the trained 
navigators' attitude. Training also improves the level of ease of use of AIS for the anti- 
collision operation. Recognition of the value of the AIS display in the navigator's 
performance was also significant by the trained navigators. It was also observed that with 
AIS training the overall VHF traffic will be reduced, which could be due to realising the 
risk associated with VHF use for anti-collision agreements, and possibly improved use of 
AIS without requirement for VHF use. 
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5.5.2 Type of Training 
The Kruskal-Wallis H Test (table 5.2) for impact of type of training on navigators' 
responses between four groups (theoretical training, practical on the job training, 
simulation training, and theoretical and practical training) shows the following results: 
a) There is only one statistically significant difference in scores for item B6 
(navigators feel their ship is safer with ALS) between 4 groups of navigators with 
aP<0.038 (note that because there is a difference between the Asymp. sig. and 
Monte Carlo sig., therefore, Monte Carlo significance should be taken as the 
probability figure). Theoretical training with a mean rank of 16.0 had the highest 
and practical on the job training with a mean rank of 8.40 had the lowest rank 
between 4 groups of training. Therefore, the results suggest that navigators who 
had the theoretical training think that their ship is safer with AIS more than the 
others, and those who had the practical on the job training had the lower 
optimism about item 86 than the others. 
Type of Training N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi- 
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Monte 
Carlo 
Sig. 
136 Theoretical training 3 16.00 7.776 . 051 . 038 
Practical on the job training 10 8.40 
Simulation training 3 9.00 
Theoretical and practical 6 15.67 
Total 22 
Table 5.2 Ranks of scores the Kruskal-Wallis test for type of training 
The result of this section shows that a theoretical AIS training programme could be the 
most effective type of training. Theoretical AIS training will enhance navigators' 
knowledge and skill on the operation, and understanding of capabilities and limitations of 
AIS more than other 3 types of training under consideration. 
5.5.3 Certificate of Competency 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test (table 5.3) for the impact of navigators' 
certificate of competency on their response scores across 3 groups (master mariner, chief 
officer, and second officer) are as follows: 
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a) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B1 (AlS enhances 
navigator's situational awareness with a better situation display of the traffic) 
across 3 groups of certificate of competency (P < 0.02). The mean rank of 57.14 
for second officer is highest and the mean rank of 39.83 for master mariner is the 
lowest. Therefore, the results suggest that there was a significant difference in 
perception level of navigators holding different certificates of competency. The 
mean ranks for the groups suggest that the junior officers had the highest 
optimism mean score on item B1 than master mariners. 
b) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B3 (using AIS 
would increase navigator's efficiency in anti-collision operation) across the 3 
groups with aP<0.02. Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that the 
second officer had the highest optimism mean score and the master mariner had 
the lowest optimism level about B3. 
c) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B5 (using AIS 
would let the navigators feel more in control of anti-collision operation) across 
the 3 groups with aP<0.01. Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest 
that the second officer had the highest confidence level and the master mariner 
had the lowest confidence level about B5. 
d) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B6 (navigators feel 
their ship is safer with AIS) across the 3 groups with aP<0.04. Therefore, the 
mean ranks for the groups suggest that for item B6 the highest optimism mean 
score belongs to the chief officer but still the master mariner had the lowest 
confidence level. 
e) The difference in scores for item B11 (AIS improves overall safety of navigation) 
across the 3 groups is highly significant with aP<0.009. The chief officer had 
the highest mean rank of 64.45 and the master mariner had the lowest mean rank 
of 39.77. Similar to paragraph d of this section above, the mean ranks for the 
groups suggest that the highest mean score belongs to the chief officer but still 
the master mariner had the lowest confidence level about improvement of overall 
safety of navigation by AIS. 
f) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item CS (AIS responds 
slowly to data inputs by navigators) across the 3 groups with aP<0.029. The 
highest mean rank was for the master mariner with 63.77 and the lowest rank was 
for the chief officer with 42.29. Since the scores for this item were reversed, the 
highest mean rank shows the lowest mean score and vice versa. Therefore, the 
mean ranks for the groups suggest that the chief officer had the highest 
133 
confidence level and the master mariner had the lowest confidence level about 
C5. 
g) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item C6 (it is easy to 
use AIS for anti-collision operation) across the 3 groups with aP<0.015. The 
highest mean rank was for the second officer with 59.15 and the lowest rank was 
for the master mariner with 41.00, Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups 
suggest that the second officer had the highest confidence level and the master 
mariner had the lowest confidence level about ease of use of AIS for anti- 
collision operation. 
h) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item D6 (the way that 
the AIS information is presented is clear and understandable) between the 3 
groups with aP<0.0 15. The highest mean rank was for the second officer with 
58.76 and the lowest rank was for the chief officer with 42,90. Therefore, the 
mean ranks for the groups suggest that the second officer had the highest 
optimism level and the chief officer had the lowest optimism level about D6. 
i) The difference in scores for item D7 (some of the AIS information on the AIS 
display is unnecessary) across the 3 groups is also highly significant with aP< 
0.008. The highest mean rank was 60.34, for the second officer and the lowest 
mean rank was 38.93, for the chief officer. Since the scores for this item were 
reversed, the highest mean rank shows the lowest mean score and vice versa. 
Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that the second officer had the 
lowest level of belief about D7. 
j) There is a highly significant difference in scores for item D9 (getting data in and 
out of AIS is easy) between the 3 groups with aP<0.002. The highest mean 
rank was for the second officer with 60.60 and the lowest mean rank was for the 
chief officer with 40.05. Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that 
the second officer had the highest level of optimism about D9. 
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Chi- Asymp. Monte 
Certificate of Mean Square Sig. Carlo 
Competency N Rank Sig. 
BI Master Mariner 26 39.83 8.071 . 018 . 017 
Chief Officer 21 57.88 
Second Officer 58 57.14 
Total 105 
B3 Master Mariner 26 41.31 7.861 . 020 . 021 
Chief Officer 21 48.76 
Second Officer 58 59.78 
Total 105 
B5 Master Mariner 26 39.17 9.274 . 010 . 008 
Chief Officer 21 51.81 
Second Officer 58 59.63 
Total 105 
B6 Master Mariner 26 40.85 6.419 . 040 . 037 
Chief Officer 21 60.38 
Second Officer 58 55.78 
Total 105 
B11 Master Mariner 26 39.77 9.362 . 009 . 009 Chief Officer 21 64.45 
Second Officer 58 54.78 
Total 105 
C5 Master Mariner 26 63.77 7.065 . 029 . 027 
Chief Officer 21 42.29 
Second Officer 58 52.05 
Total 105 1 1 
C6 Master Mariner 26 41.00 7.491 . 024 . 021 
Chief Officer 21 50.88 
Second Officer 58 59.15 
Total 105 
D6 Master Mariner 26 48.31 8.338 . 015 . 015 
Chief Officer 21 42.90 
Second Officer 58 58.76 
Total 105 
D7 Master Mariner 26 48.00 9.768 . 008 . 007 Chief Officer 21 38.93 
Second Officer 58 60.34 
Total 105 
D9 Master Mariner 26 46.50 12.334 . 002 . 001 Chief Officer 21 40.05 
Second Officer 58 60.60 
Total 105 
Table 5.3 Ranks of scores and the Kruskal-Wallis test for certificate of competency 
It was expected that aspects of usefulness of the AIS for navigation is realised by senior 
officers more than junior officers, but the results of impact of navigators' certificate of 
competency on their perception did not show such optimism level. Master mariners had 
the lowest level belief in some aspects of the usefulness of the AIS, and on the other 
hand, second officers had the highest level of such belief. Nonconformity of the results 
with the expectation is also evident in some aspects of ease of use of the AlS technology. 
5.5.4 Total Sea Service 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis 11 Test (table 5.4) for the impact of navigators' total sea 
service on their response scores across 5 groups (1 year or less, 3 years or less but more 
than 1 year, 5 years or less but more than 3 years, 10 years or less but more than 5 years, 
and above 10 years) areas follows: 
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a) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B8 (AIS increases 
navigator's physical workload) between the 5 groups with aP<0.018. The 
highest mean rank was for the group with 1 year or less sea service with 85.65. 
Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that the navigators with 1 year 
or less sea experience had the lowest level of perception about increase of 
navigator's physical workload by AIS (scores for this item were reversed). 
b) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B9 (AIS increases 
navigator's mental workload) across the 5 groups with aP<0.038. The highest 
mean rank was 85.45, for the group with 1 year or less sea service and the lowest 
mean rank was 51.95, for the group with above 10 years sea service. Since the 
scores for this item were also reversed, the highest mean rank shows the lowest 
mean score and vice versa. Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that 
navigators with 1 year or less sea service had the lowest belief and navigators 
with above 10 years sea service had the highest belief in increase of navigator's 
mental workload by AIS. 
c) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B 10 (Navigators 
prefer to use AIS alone rather than radar) across the 5 groups with aP<0.049. 
The highest mean rank was 70.47, for the group with above 10 years sea service 
and the lowest mean rank was 46.70, for the group with 1 year or less sea service. 
Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that navigators with 1 year or 
less sea service had the lowest optimism and navigators with above 10 years sea 
service had the highest optimism in their preference to use AIS alone rather than 
radar. 
d) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item D3 (AlS keyboard 
is user friendly) across the 5 groups with aP<0.013. The highest mean rank was 
70.15, for the group with 1 year or less sea service and the lowest mean rank was 
42.36, for the group with above 10 years sea service. Therefore, the mean ranks 
for the groups suggest that navigators with 1 year or less sea service had the 
highest mean optimism and navigators with above 10 years sea service had the 
lowest mean optimism in user friendliness of AIS keyboard. 
e) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item D6 (the way that 
the AIS information is presented is clear and understandable) across the 5 groups 
with aP<0.038. The highest mean rank was 66.31, for the group with 10 years 
or less but more than 5 years sea service and the lowest mean rank was 46.95, for 
the group with above 10 years sea service. Therefore, the mean ranks for the 
groups suggest that, despite inconsistency of the highest mean score with 
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previous highest mean scores in this subsection, the navigators %%ith above 10 
years sea service had the lowest optimism level about D6. 
f) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item D9 ((vetting data 
in and out of the AIS is easy) between 5 groups of navigators with aP<0.024. 
The highest mean rank was 64.00, for group with 1 year or less sea service and 
the lowest mean rank was 43.81, for the group with above 10 years sea service. 
Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that navigators vv ith I year or 
less sea service had the highest mean perception and navigators %vith above 10 
years sea service had the lowest mean perception that getting data in and out of 
the AIS is easy. 
g) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item 1.5 (Learning to 
operate AIS without a proper training course is easy) across the 5 groups with aP 
< 0.015. The highest mean rank was 62.50, for the group with 3 years or less but 
more than 1 year sea service and the lowest mean rank was 39.28. for the group 
with above 10 years sea service. Therefore, despite inconsistency of the highest 
mean score with previous highest mean scores in this subsection, the mean ranks 
for the groups suggest that the navigators with above 10 years sea service had the 
lowest confidence level about E5. 
h) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item G1 (since AIS 
stations have no means of assessing the data received, the information received 
from target ships are not reliable due to spoofing) across the 5 groups with aP< 
0.038. The consistency of the result for GI with previous results in this 
subsection was in the lowest mean score in perception of the navigators with I 
year or less sea service. 
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Total Sea service N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi- 
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Monte 
Carlo 
SI . 
B8 1 Year or less 10 85.65 11.885 . 018 . 015 
3 Years or less but >1 Year 27 50.04 
5 Years or less but >3 Years 19 64.05 
10 Years or less but >5 Years 27 59.28 
Above 10 Years 32 51.41 
Total 115 
B9 1 Year or less 10 85.45 10.131 . 038 . 037 
3 Years or less but >1 Year 27 53.89 
5 Years or less but >3 Years 19 54.74 
10 Years or less but >5 Years 27 61.41 
Above 10 Years 32 51.95 
Total 115 
BIO 1 Year or less 10 46.70 9.541 . 049 . 043 
3 Years or less but >1 Year 27 51.72 
5 Years or less but >3 Years 18 50.28 
10 Years or less but >5 Years 26 54.52 
Above 10 Years 32 70.47 
Total 113 
03 1 Year or less 10 70.15 12.588 . 013 . 010 
3 Years or less but >1 Year 27 60.72 
5 Years or less but >3 Years 19 66.08 
10 Years or less but >5 Years 27 63.63 
Above 10 Years 32 42.36 
Total 115 
D6 1 Year or less 10 64.20 10.120 . 036 . 035 3 Years or less but >1 Year 27 61.33 
5 Years or less but >3 Years 19 56.79 
10 Years or less but >5 Years 27 66.31 
Above 10 Years 32 46.95 
Total 115 
D9 1 Year or less 10 64.00 11.236 . 024 . 020 3 Years or less but >1 Year 27 63.67 
5 Years or less but >3 Years 19 63.11 
10 Years or less but >5 Years 27 63.33 
Above 10 Years 32 43.81 
Total 115 
E5 1 Year or less 9 53.44 12.341 . 015 . 011 
3 Years or less but >1 Year 27 62.50 
5 Years or less but >3 Years 15 43.47 
10 Years or less but >5 Years 24 57.17 
Above 10 Years 27 39.28 
Total 102 
GI 1 Year or less 10 42.35 10.098 . 039 . 023 
3 Years or less but >1 Year 27 58.06 
5 Years or less but >3 Years 19 75.55 
10 Years or less but >5 Years 26 56.17 
Above 10 Years 32 52.13 
Total 114 
Table 5.4 Ranks of scores and Kruskal-Wallis test for total sea service 
The result of this section shows some significant differences in perceptions on some 
aspects of AIS between navigators with lower sea service and navigators with higher sea 
service. There may be similar results in this section with those of the previous section for 
the impact of certificate of competency as navigators with higher ranks of certificate of 
competency may be the same as those who have higher duration of sea service. 
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5.5.5 Type(s) of AIS Display 
The results of the Kruskal-Wallis H Test (table 5.5) for the impact of type(s) of AIS 
display available on board ships on navigators response scores between 5 groups of AIS 
display (MKD, stand-alone graphical display, integrated with radar, integrated with 
ECDIS, and more than one type) are as follows: 
a) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B4 (using AIS 
would increase navigator's ability in anti-collision operation) across the 5 groups 
of AIS display type with P<0.018. The highest mean rank was 66.32 for 
integrated with radar, and the lowest mean rank was 15.70 for integrated with 
ECDIS. Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that navigators 
optimism level on different types of AIS display was at highest level for display 
integrated with radar and at it lowest level for display integrated with ECDIS. 
b) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item B13 (Detection of 
targets in radar shadow areas is improved with AIS) across the 5 groups with P< 
0.020. The highest mean rank was 74.38 for display integrated with radar, and 
the lowest mean rank was 32.50 for display integrated with ECDIS. Therefore, 
the mean ranks for the groups suggest that the navigators who have used AIS 
display integrated with radar had a higher level of optimism about improvement 
in detection targets in radar shadow areas with AIS, and those who have used 
AIS display integrated with ECDIS had the lowest level of optimism. 
c) The difference in scores for item D3 (AIS keyboard is user friendly) across the 5 
groups is highly significant with P<0.002. The highest mean rank was 84.93 for 
stand-alone graphical display, and the lowest mean rank was 21.60 for display 
integrated with ECDIS. Therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that the 
navigators who have used a stand-alone graphical display had a higher level of 
optimism about user friendliness of the AIS keyboard, and those who have used 
AIS display integrated with ECDIS had the lowest level of optimism. 
d) There is also a statistically high significant difference in scores for item d7 (some 
of the information on the AIS display is unnecessary) across the 5 groups with P 
< 0.001. The highest mean rank was 67.70 for more than one type, and the lowest 
mean rank was 35.93 for stand-alone graphical display. The scores for this item 
were reversed, therefore, the mean ranks for the groups suggest that the 
navigators who have used more than one type of AIS display had the lowest 
mean score of perception about D7, and those who have a stand-alone graphical 
display had the highest mean score of perception. 
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e) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item F2 (AlS causes 
increased use of VHF for anti-collision operation) across the 5 groups with P< 
0.018. The highest mean rank was 78.20 for display integrated with ECDIS, and 
the lowest mean rank was 47.70 more than one type of display. Therefore, the 
mean ranks for the groups suggest that the navigators who have used a display 
integrated with ECDIS had a higher mean score of belief about increased use of 
VHF for anti-collision operation by AIS, and those who have used more than one 
type of AIS display had the lowest level of belief about such increased use of 
VHF. 
f) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item F3 (the increased 
use of VHF for anti-collision decisions due to AIS violates International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea) across the 5 groups with P<0.041. 
The highest mean rank was 62.03 for display integrated with radar, and the 
lowest mean rank was 29.70 for display integrated with ECDIS. The scores for 
this item were reversed, therefore, the results suggest that the navigators who 
have used display integrated with radar had the lowest level of perception about 
violation of IRPCS due to increased use of VHF by AIS, and those who have 
used display integrated with ECDIS had the highest level of such perception. 
g) The difference in scores for item G2 (AIS is vulnerable due to jamming) across 
the 5 groups is also highly significant with P<0.005. The highest mean rank was 
65.15 more than one type of display, and the lowest mean rank was 37.76 MKD. 
Therefore, the results suggest that the navigators who have used more than one 
type of display had the highest level of confidence, and those who have used 
MKD had the lowest level of such confidence about AIS vulnerability due to 
jamming. 
h) There is a statistically significant difference in scores for item G4 (there is a risk 
of erroneous information displayed through wrong data input associated with 
AIS) across the 5 groups with P<0.035. The highest mean rank was 73.90 for 
display integrated with ECDIS, and the lowest mean rank was 31.14 for stand- 
alone graphical display. The scores for this item were reversed; therefore, the 
results suggest that the navigators who have used stand-alone graphical display 
had the highest mean score about the risk stated in item G4, and those who have 
display integrated with ECDIS had the lowest mean score about such risk. 
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Type(s) of AIS Display N 
Mean 
Rank 
Chi- 
Square 
Asymp. 
Sig. 
Monte 
Carlo 
Sig. 
B4 Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD) 24 60.44 11.960 . 018 . 013 
Stand-Alone Graphical Display 7 43.43 
Integrated with Radar 17 66.32 
Integrated with ECDIS 5 15.70 
More than one type 60 58.01 
Total 113 
B13 Minimum Ke board and Display (MKD) 24 46.48 11.628 . 020 . 016 
Stand-Alone Graphical Display 7 53.79 
integrated with Radar 17 74.38 
Integrated with ECDIS 5 32.50 
More than one type 60, 58.70 
Total 113 
D3 Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD) 24 65.79 17.196 . 002 . 001 
Stand-Alone Graphical Display 7 84.93 
Integrated with Radar 17 60.74 
Integrated with ECDIS 5 21.60 
More than one type 60 52.12 
Total 113 - 
07 Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD) 24 46.00 17.928 . 001 . 001 
Stand-Alone Graphical Display 7 35.93 
Integrated with Radar 17 44.12 
Integrated with ECDIS 5 45.60 
More than one type 59 67.70 
Total 112 
F2 Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD) 23 66.17 11.869 . 018 . 016 
Stand-Alone Graphical Display 7 74.07 
Integrated with Radar 17 60.85 
Integrated with ECDIS 5 78.20 
More than one type 60 47.70 
Total 112 
F3 Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD) 22 43.84 9.943 . 041 . 038 
Stand-Alone Graphical Display 7 51.64 
Integrated with Radar 17 62.03 
Integrated with ECDIS 5 29.70 
More than one type 60 61.45 
Total 111 
G2 Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD) 23 37.76 14.96 . 005 . 003 Stand-Alone Graphical Display 7 51.50 
Integrated with Radar 17 52.21 
Integrated with ECDIS 5 60.50 
More than one type 60 65.15 
Total 112 
G4 Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD) 24 67.44 10.374 . 035 . 031 Stand-Alone Graphical Display 7 31.14 
Integrated with Radar 17 56.76 
Integrated with ECDIS 5 73.90 
More than one type 60 54.50 
Total 113 , 
Table 5.5 Ranks of scores and Kruskal-Wallis test for type of AIS display 
As observed during the literature review, in chapter 2, that MKD had raised the most 
debates and level of criticism among 4 types of AIS display, it was expected that this 
could be reflected in the navigators' feedback. However, this section did not show such 
results for MKD. Further it showed unexpected results for AIS display integrated with 
ECDIS, which could probably be, firstly, due to the small sample size (N =5) for 
respondent exposed to display integrated with ECDIS, and secondly, due to 5% 
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significance results that could be derived by chances in test. In fact, if the total sample 
size is small (N =7 or less), Kruskal-Wallis test will show a probability value of greater 
than 0.05 (not significant) regardless of actual difference between compared groups. 
Further, there will be 5% possibility that significant results (P<0.05) are achieved by 
chance (GraphPad Software inc, 2007). 
5.6 Discussion and conclusion 
This section contains discussion and conclusions of the results of the questionnaires 
completed by navigators for each of the measured variables and assessment of 
demographic factors impacts on navigators' responses. 
9 The analysis results show that AIS is generally perceived to be a useful 
navigational aid as it can enhance situational awareness with better display of 
shipping traffic, and improve performance, efficiency, and the ability of 
navigators in anti-collision operations at sea. It would also enhance the 
confidence level of the navigators in situation control, ship's safety, and overall 
safety of navigation. The increase in the level of navigators' physical and mental 
workload due to the introduction of AIS is not significant, but disruption of the 
normal anti-collision operation by AIS seems to be of concern. It can also be 
inferred that AIS provides clearer and more continuous information than radar 
and is able to overcome most of the radar limitations in detection of targets in 
radar shadow areas such as round the bends and in heavy rain and sea clutters. 
AIS is perceived as complementary to radar technology rather than a competitor. 
" It can also be concluded that most of the navigators' experience about ease of use 
of AIS is generally positive. The process of obtaining information from AIS is 
considered to be clear and understandable by most navigators. The majority of 
them did not see any great difficulty in self-learning and becoming skilful to 
operate and use AIS on board ship. They also more often believed that the use of 
AIS, particularly for anti-collision operation, is easy. The ease of use of AIS is 
reflected by the fact that most of navigators thought that AIS is slow for data 
input (only 36% thought that input is satisfactory). 
" Importance of the display of AIS information was highlighted by a majority of 
the mariners. It can be concluded that most AIS keyboards are user friendly, and 
that symbols used in AIS graphical displays are efficient, AIS unit help and 
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instructions are useful and clear, it is relatively easy to move from one menu to 
another one, and the way that the AIS information is presented is clear and 
understandable. Concern that some of the AIS information shorn on an AlS 
display might be unnecessary and the possibility of overlay of radar echoes with 
AIS data causing confusion is low. Despite the noted AIS slow response time for 
data input, the way of getting data in and out of the AIS seems to be easy. Time 
for learning to extract AIS information is likely to be a problem in this regard. 
" Only 19.1% of the navigators were reported to have completed a formal training 
on basic operation of AIS. Therefore, probably one of the most alarming 
problems in AIS application for navigation could be the training and competency 
of the navigators on basic operations, capabilities and limitation of the AIS 
equipment. Even among the navigators that have completed some type of training 
programme, only 40% of them believed in the adequacy of their training to safely 
perform their duties in anti-collision operations on the bridge using AIS. This 
might be a sign of unsuitability of the training programmes that has been 
available due to a lack of an international standard of training for A(S so far. 
Nearly half of the navigators were uncertain about whether a formal AlS training 
for navigators to safely conduct anti-collision operation is essentially needed or 
not. The navigators' uncertainty was also evident in their response on the degree 
of difficulty of learning to operate AIS without a suitable training course. These 
types of uncertainties could be due to the lack of understanding and insufficient 
use of the AIS technology by navigators for the navigation operation. The recent 
Model Course on AIS recommended by IMO (2006) could assist in improving 
navigators' training and education, if widely adopted. The IMO Model Course is 
intended to introduce, organise, and enhance AIS training taking into account the 
considerable variations in educational systems and cultural backgrounds of 
different trainees in maritime subjects. 
" It was perceived that AIS reduces overall VHF traffic congestion, which could be 
due to the AIS capability to present extra precise information. Despite the 
apparent relief in overall VHF calls, the extent of communication that might be 
affected by the navigators for the specific purpose of anti-collision agreements 
needs further investigation. A result of the questionnaire analysis shows that 34% 
of navigators perceived that VHF traffic increases with AIS. The concern of 
violation of IRPCS by navigators, which might occur due to possible increase in 
VHF use for mutual anti-collision agreements, needs further investigation. 
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" The results of the analysis on possible disadvantages of AIS show that probably 
navigators did not have enough knowledge of the possibility of AIS misuse and 
its vulnerability due to jamming, which can affect the system reliability. It is 
probable that AIS increases the danger of piracy in certain areas with potential 
piratical activity. The possibility of transmitting erroneous information by AIS 
through wrong data input (see chapter 4) is probably an even higher disadvantage 
perceived by a large section of respondents. 
" Assessment of the impact of the training on navigators' responses showed a 
number of statistically significant differences in navigators' responses. 
Navigators who had completed formal training on the basic operation of AIS had 
a higher mean perception score on the possibility of disruption of the anti- 
collision operation by AIS, the difficulty in self-learning to operate AIS, slow 
response of AIS to data input, ease of use of AIS for anti collision operations, the 
importance of AIS display in the navigator's performance, adequacy of their 
training to safely perform anti-collision operations, and the overall decrease of 
VHF traffic congestion with AIS. The higher optimism score of navigators about 
the above mentioned aspects of the AIS could be due to enhancement in 
utilisation of the operation and use of AIS technology, disclosure of covered 
features of the AIS, proper familiarisation with different AIS functions and 
information, exposure of capabilities and limitation of different types of AIS 
display, more efficient use of the AIS, and the need for less VHF 
communications by training, and the higher extent of use of the AIS by the 
trained navigators. 
" Assessment of the impact of the type of the training showed one statistically 
significant difference between 4 types of training. Navigators who had completed 
a theoretical training programme had the highest hopefulness that their ship is 
safer with AIS. This could probably be due to the detailed explanation of the AIS 
capabilities and limitations being given in the theoretical training course. 
" The evaluation of the impact of the certificate of competency of the navigators on 
their responses also showed some significant differences across the 3 classes of 
certificate. These significant differences suggested that the junior navigators 
(second officers) had the highest optimism level about enhancement of situational 
awareness with improved situational display of the traffic, increased efficiency in 
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anti-collision operation, and feeling of being more in control of anti-collision 
operation with AIS, ease of use of AIS for anti-collision operation, clear and 
understandable way of presenting information, non-existence of unnecessary 
information on the AIS display, and ease of getting data in and out of AIS. In 
contrast, the most senior navigators (master mariners) had the lowest confidence 
level about enhancement of situational awareness with improved situational 
display of the traffic, increased efficiency in anti-collision operation, and the 
feeling of being more in control of the anti-collision operation, feeling of safer 
ship, and improvement in overall safety of navigation with AIS, and ease of use 
of AIS for anti-collision operation. The probable reason for these outcomes could 
be the higher presence of second officers on the bridge, compared with the 
masters, and more recent training of second officers that could have been 
included in AIS training. 
0 The assessment of the impact of the navigators' total sea service revealed some 
statistically significant differences across the 5 groups. The differences suggested 
that the group of navigators with the lowest sea service duration (1 year or less) 
had the lowest mean perception about the increased physical and mental 
workload of the navigators with AIS, their preference to use AIS alone rather 
than radar, and unreliability of the information from target ships due to spoofing. 
They also had the highest mean optimism about user friendliness of the AIS 
keyboard and simplicity of getting data in and out of AIS. The group of 
navigators with the highest sea service duration (above 10 years) had the lowest 
mean perception about user friendliness of the AIS keyboard, clear and 
understandable way of presenting information, simplicity of getting data in and 
out of AIS, and the simplicity of leaning to operate AIS without a training course. 
They also had the highest mean perception about the increased mental workload 
of the navigators with AIS and their preference to use AIS alone rather than 
radar. 
" The influence of the type of AIS display available to the navigators on their 
responses was also significantly different for the 5 groups of display. The 
assessment result suggested that navigators who had the AIS display integrated 
with radar had the highest level of optimism about their increased ability in anti- 
collision operations and improved detection of targets in radar shadow areas with 
AIS, and those who had the AIS display integrated with ECDIS had the lowest 
level of optimism about these features of the AIS. Users of the display integrated 
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with radar also perceived the lowest level of IRPCS violation due to increased 
use of VHF by AIS, and users of a display integrated with ECDIS perceived the 
highest level of such violation. The stand-alone graphical display users had the 
highest level of perception about user friendliness of the AIS keyboard and 
unnecessary information on the AIS display, but the lowest level of perception 
about user friendliness of the AIS keyboard was observed for the display 
integrated with ECDIS, and lowest level of perception about unnecessary 
information on the AIS display was observed for more than one type of display. 
The level of perception about the increased use of VHF for anti-collision 
operation was the highest for a display integrated with ECDIS, and the lowest for 
more than one type of. display. The highest level of perception about AIS 
vulnerability due to jamming was for more than one type of display, and the 
lowest level was for MKD. The highest level of belief about the risk of erroneous 
information displayed through wrong data input observed for display integrated 
with ECDIS, and lowest level of such risk observed for stand-alone graphical 
display. It is important to mention that if the total sample size is seven or less, the 
Kruskal-Wallis test will always give a non-significant probability no matter how 
the groups in the total sample differ (GraphPad Software inc, 2007). Therefore, 
the accuracy of the perception measurement for display types integrated with 
ECDIS and stand-alone graphical display might have been suffered due to small 
sample sizes (N =5 for integrated with ECDIS and N=7 for stand-alone 
graphical display). 
Overall, the above results show a trend in lack of knowledge and proper understanding of 
AIS along with insufficient use of the AIS technology for navigation operations. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the data from the AIS questionnaire, which was designed to 
evaluate navigators' perception about some aspects of the newly implemented AIS 
technology. The chapter also analysed the respondents' responses in relation to the 
demographic factors. 
The chapter explained the methodology applied in the AIS questionnaire survey, 
descriptions of the study sample, and the questionnaire measurement construct, in the first 
section. 
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Then it presented results of preliminary data analysis. The preliminary analysis included 
descriptive statistics on demographic factors and sample size, in the second section. 
The third section explained the results of data analysis for measured variables in the 
questionnaire. 
The next section of this chapter considered results of the data analysis on the assessment 
of the impact of demographic factors, identified in the Personal Information section of the 
questionnaire, on responses of navigators. This section showed navigators' attitudes 
towards different aspects of AIS, according to whether they have had completed AlS 
training or not, the type of training they have completed (if any), certificate of 
competency, total sailing experience, and type of AIS display they have used. 
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Chapter 6 
AIS User Satisfaction: A Theoretical Model 
6.1 Introduction 
New technology is introduced in order to enhance efficiency, safety, and work quality. 
The introduction of new technology has resulted in much improvement in work efficiency 
and effectiveness. Nevertheless, sometimes, the introduction of new technology is 
associated with unpredicted side effects and problems. Lack of training and practical 
experience in the use, capabilities, and weaknesses of the new equipment could further 
intensify the problems. To make effective use of new technology, it should be 
implemented with consideration of the contributory factors such as human factors, 
organisational factors, working practices, and social and physical environmental factors. 
Acceptance of the new technology by the user and his/her adjustment with the changes 
brought about by such technology is very important for technology application to be 
successful. User perceptions and feelings are playing major roles in his/her acceptance of 
new technology. Proper implementation planning should take into account such factors, 
since proper implementation of technology can encourage the user to accept it. Different 
measures taken by any industry or organisation prior to implementation can be very 
influential in its mission success. Technology designers must properly understand the 
needs of front-line operators and the environment in which the operator uses the new 
technology during developmental stages. The degree of efficiency improvement and ease 
of use offered by new technology in the workplace will affect the user's tendency towards 
new system acceptance and speed of its implementation. 
Implementation strategy that is being selected for deployment of a new system in any 
industry often has some advantages and disadvantages. To reduce the number of 
disadvantages, the applied implementation strategy should be selected with adequate prior 
study. For example, an implementation programme, which might be suitable for 
deployment of simple systems, may have unfavourable effects and be unsuitable for 
complex systems with higher degrees of integration. Proper investigation using research 
techniques such as interview, observation, pilot testing, etc. on human-machine systems 
could be helpful in understanding the user's needs and requirements in system design. 
Ergonomic design options are an essential element of the technical system development 
process that should be considered by designers and manufactures. Otherwise it leads to 
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development of systems that are not comprehensible and that are difficult to use, 
sometimes leading to tragic events. Needs and performance of the front-line operators in 
the real workplace, along with basic knowledge of the man/machine interface and 
environment, should be considered in manufacturing stages of any new technology in 
order to reduce chances for failure. Knowing the changes in cognitive demands of front- 
line operators, along with changes in working practices, is useful for more precise 
planning of the design and implementation of new technology (Jones and Smith, 2001; 
Cheatham and Douglass, 2006). 
The reliable operation of new systems in the early stages of its introduction, along with a 
correct implementation strategy, Js very important. Such matters can influence the 
development of the users' impressions and attitudes towards the system's acceptance and 
future use. Regular monitoring of feedback and responses from the users will be useful in 
determining the use and efficacy of new technologies. Complex systems might be best 
implemented after the users are familiar and more comfortable with the basic operations, 
abilities, and limitations of the systems through early training and education. This could 
affect the user's satisfaction and their acceptance of new systems. 
Evaluating navigators' perceptions about AIS through the questionnaire considered in the 
previous chapter. This chapter is going to select a suitable theoretical model for assessing 
the satisfaction of the navigators with AlS. This model may be used for measuring the 
user satisfaction with other similar technologies on the ship's bridge. This will be carried 
out through evaluation of some of the common theories and models of human behaviour 
and attitude. Firstly, this chapter covers the subject of technology implementation in 
section 6.2. Secondly, it covers new technology usage behaviour in section 6.3. AIS user 
satisfaction model, and conclusion of this chapter are covered in section 6.4 and 6.5, 
respectively. 
6.2 Technology Implementation 
Klein and Knight (2005) refer to new technology implementation as the switching period 
during which technology users becoming competent, consistent, and committed in their 
use of new technology. Implementation is the crucial access point between adoption and 
actual practical use of new systems. Often new technologies are being adopted by 
organisations and/or individuals but the problem will be failure in implementation 
success. 
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Adoption of new technology is the introductory step in the process of technology 
application but using it regularly in a professionally accepted manner is an important 
point that should be properly planned for in implementation stages. New systems may be 
useable in a workshop or in a laboratory but in real situations and workplaces, with 
varying environmental conditions, things may be different. Operation of a single new 
system alone may not be difficult but when it is being used simultaneously with many 
other types of equipment in a complex system within a limited time gap it may not be 
quite so simple. This is where the implementation process will be negatively affected and 
it may crate some problems. Success of any new system to achieve certain aims and 
objectives will depend on both the effectiveness of the technology itself for such a 
purpose and on the effectiveness, of the implementation strategy. Now technology in 
marine navigation, when properly implemented, has the potential to improve the safety, 
reliability, and quality of marine navigation. Perhaps one of the most important elements 
in new technology success is the human. Therefore, identification and analysis of the 
human issues in implementation of technology is one of the major challenges affecting 
actual technology use. 
6.2.1 Human Issues in Technology Implementation 
The implementation framework of any new technology will consist of different stages. 
Some human issues may influence implementation success in a specific stage, which 
must be analysed during its relevant period. Kenneth (1990) mentioned that, in order to 
successfully deal with the psychological aspects of implementing new technology, three 
distinctive stages must be considered. Three stages are the pre-implementation phase, the 
implementation phase, and the post implementation phase. 
Implementation framework for new technology, introduced by Chung (1996), appear to 
be a more comprehensive structure that consists of the following 4 stages, each with 
associated human issues: 
Conceptual Phase - this is the stage in which the decisions on the reason and place of 
application of technology will be taken. It consists of utilisation of design processes and 
level of complexity. The expected critical human issues that may affect implementation in 
this phase are: a) considerations for human-centred technology, and b) users involvement 
in planning. 
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Planning Phase - the stage in which decisions on the technology acquisition and how it 
is going to be implemented in the workplace will be taken. The expected critical human 
issues that may affect implementation in this phase are: a) considerations for human- 
centred technology, b) users involvement in planning, and c) use of more skill, 
knowledgeable, and competent operators. 
Installation Phase - this stage is the execution of planning for initial operation of new 
technology, which includes physical installation of the technology and functional 
supporting systems. The expected critical human issues that may affect implementation in 
this phase are: a) considerations for human-centred technology, b) use of more skill, 
knowledgeable, and competent operators, and c) use of pilot studies. 
Start-up Phase - this is the stage that execution of planning for large-scale operation of 
new technology begins and most of the planning, design, and installation have already 
been done. The expected critical human issues that may affect implementation in this 
phase are: a) use of more skill, knowledgeable, and competent operators, b) 
reorganisation of the resources, and c) training and education of the operators. 
6.2.2 Implementation Problems 
The implementation of new technology in real workplaces is not straightforward and 
sometimes it is associated with problems. According to Klein and Knight (2005) there are 
six interrelated reasons that might create difficulties in new technology implementation 
and its usage. These reasons are highly likely to affect the users' satisfaction in 
technology usage. The reasons are: 
Unreliability and imperfect design of new technology - new technology may be 
associated with failure and embarrassment in use. 
User's requirement of new technological knowledge and skills - this may increase level 
of stress and boredom in the users. It also might affect the user satisfaction. 
Decision for adoption and implementation not taken by targeted user - little or no user 
input in decision regarding adoption and implementation produces uncertainty on the 
value and advantages of the technology. 
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Change in tasks and practices requirement by individuals - this may affect 
independency of individuals' activities and hierarchical status. 
Time consuming, expensive, and reduced initial performance - large investment in 
time, and money is required for technology implementation that sometimes may be 
doubtful and long-term potential. 
Organisations failures in their role as a stabilising power - this is where organisations 
fail to do the things that would improve performance and confidence. 
A proper utilisation of newly installed systems could positively influence usage of such 
technologies and it can improve organisational efficiencies. Therefore, correct 
understanding of situations under which new technologies are adopted is important in the 
implementation process and needs to be properly investigated. 
6.3 New Technology Usage Behaviour 
Successful use of new technology by the target users requires identifying factors affecting 
the actual usage. It is important to study different issues for predicting and explaining the 
users behaviour in actual situations and different conditions in which such new 
technologies are to be used. According to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), a person's attitude 
toward any object is a function of his beliefs and the implicit evaluative responses 
associated with those beliefs. 
Significant progress has been made recently in explaining and predicting the user 
acceptance of technology at work, especially in information technology (Venkatesh, 
2000). According to Rawstorne, Jayasuriya, and Caputi (2000) a number of socio- 
cognitive models has been presented by different researchers. These models can be 
helpful in studying the adoption and acceptance of new systems by front-line users. Most 
of these theories are based on behavioural intention models and they are suggesting that 
human attitude and behaviour will be best predicted by their intentions. These models are 
mainly used to predict and explain the user behaviour in computer and information 
technologies. In this section some of the most prevalent models will be discussed. A 
suitable model will be selected and later applied to AIS technology in subsequent 
chapters. Some of the widely applied theories of the user behaviour predictions, which are 
discussed in the following sections, are the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), the 
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Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), and the 
Extended Technology Acceptance Model (TAM2). 
6.3.1 Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) 
TRA is a very general intention model for predicting and explaining human behaviour 
and has successfully been used in a broad range of fields. The Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA) proposes that a person's behaviour is determined by his intention to perform the 
behaviour and that this intention is, in turn, a function of his attitude toward the behaviour 
and his subjective norm that is his belief about how other people would view him if he 
performed the behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). This means that intention for action 
will form according to a person's positive or negative feelings about the action and 
subjective norms surrounding the action. Intention for action, in turn. makes up the 
person's action. One of the limitations of this model is that it does not take into account 
the limited freedom to act due to restrictions in ability, time, environmental and 
organisational limitations, and unaware practices. Another limitation is the significant 
risk of confusing between attitudes and norms due to the possibility that attitudes can 
often be remodelled as norms and vice versa (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980: Tailor, 2001). 
In the theory of reasoned action, the person's intention to perform the behaviour is the 
primary determinant of human behaviour. The intention, in turn, is a function of two 
determinants, namely the attitude towards performing the behaviour based on the 
person's beliefs about the outcome of performing such behaviour, and the perception of 
the normative pressure on the person for performing such behaviour (Alcalay and Bell, 
2000). Therefore, individual's beliefs about themselves and the environment surrounding 
them are determining factors related to attitude and subjective norms, which influence 
behaviour. Figure 6.1 shows the theory of reasoned action model. 
Figure 6.1 Theory of Reasoned Action Model (source: Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) 
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The TRA consists of four variables, which are defined in the following sections (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 1975 and 1980; Ajzen, 1991; Ellis and Arieli, 1999; Alcalay and Bell, 2000; 
Taylor, 2001): 
6.3.1.1 Attitude (A) 
Attitude is defined as the person's feeling (positive or negative) about performing the 
behaviour. Attitudes are based on assessment of the individual's beliefs (person's 
knowledge and information about an objects and environment) regarding the outcomes of 
and consequences arising from a defined behaviour and individual's evaluation of the 
desirability of the outcomes and consequences of such behaviour. Beliefs are formed over 
a person's lifetime from direct experience, outside information, and self generated. It is a 
set of salient beliefs (a small number of beliefs that a person can attend to at a given time) 
that determine attitude towards behaviour. Attitudes are determined by salient beliefs 
about advantages and disadvantages of performing behaviour, which are called 
behavioural beliefs. The positive or negative perception of the believed outcome of 
behaviour can be assessed using a Likert scale. The overall attitude is the sum of the 
individual consequence multiplied by desirability assessment for all expected 
consequences of the behaviour. 
6.3.1.2 Subjective Norm (S11) 
Subjective Norm (SN) is an individual's perception about opinions of other important 
people regarding the behaviour to be performed. The contribution of other people's 
opinions is weighted by the motivation or willingness of an individual to comply with 
those people's wishes. Subjective norms are determined by salient beliefs relating to 
social pressure, which are called normative beliefs. The overall subjective norm is the 
sum of the individual perception multiplied by motivation assessments for all other 
important people. 
6.3.1.3 Intention (I) 
Intention (I) is the motivational factor that influence person's behaviour and it shows the 
degree of willingness and amount of effort of the individual to perform behaviour. 
Intentions are the predictors of occurrence of a desired behaviour. Both attitude and 
subjective norm influence individual's intention to perform behaviour. 
6 . 3.1.4 Behaviour (B) 
Behaviour is the transmission of intention into action. Behavioural intention is a linear 
regression function of attitude toward the behaviour and subjective norm. Attitude toward 
behaviour itself is a function of the individual's behavioural beliefs about consequences 
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of the behaviour and the value of those consequences according to the individual's 
opinion. 
The TRA is presented algebraically as follows: 
B= Bi = w, AB + w2SN 
where B is behaviour, BI is behavioural intention, AB is the person's attitude toward 
behaviour, SN is subjective norm, and wl and w2 are weights representing the importance 
of each term. 
The relations between attitude toward the behaviour and behavioural beliefs can be 
expressed algebraically as follows: 
n 
AB =E be, 
f=1 
where b; is the behavioural belief that performing the behaviour leads to some 
consequences, e; is the evaluation of consequence i, and n is the number of salient beliefs. 
The relation between the subjective norm and normative beliefs can be expressed 
algebraically as follows: 
r 
SN = Eblmj 
where bj is the normative beliefs (i. e., subjective probability) that some referent j thinks 
one should perform the behaviour, mj is the motivation to comply with referent j, and r is 
the number of referents. 
6.3.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) 
The theory of planned behaviour is an extension of the theory of reasoned action, a theory 
designed to predict and explain human behaviour in specific contexts. This theory was 
introduced to improve the TRA by adding a general predictor of perceived behavioural 
control (PBC) in predicting human behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). In this model, the same as 
the theory of reasoned action, the individual's intention to perform a specified behaviour 
is a central factor. Intentions are impressions of motivational factors that influence the 
behaviour. Individual's intentions indicate people's degree of willingness and amount of 
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effort they apply, to carry out a given behaviour. This behavioural intention can only 
influence the behaviour if the given behaviour is under volitional control, i. e., the person 
is free to perform or not perform the behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Motivational factors 
correspond to people's actual control over the behaviour. PBC as a factor directly linked 
to a particular behaviour plays an important role in the TPB. PBC refers to people's 
beliefs about his/her ability and the ease or difficulty of performing the behaviour in 
question. In conditions when a person does not have enough information about the 
behaviour, requirement or available resources have changed, or new and unfamiliar 
elements have entered into the situation a measure of PBC may not be a realistic 
behavioural prediction and accurate. TPB refers to three factors of attitude toward the 
behaviour, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural control. Figure 6.2 represents the 
theory of planned behaviour model. People may have many beliefs about a particular 
behaviour, but only some of them that are more relevant to the behaviour and time can be 
attended to - these are called salient beliefs. The TPB hypothesises that salient beliefs are 
the main determinants of a person's intentions and actions. Salient beliefs are of three 
categories: behavioural beliefs, which influence attitude toward the behaviour, normative 
beliefs that represent the control of subjective norms, and control beliefs, which are based 
on perceived behavioural control. This model highlights the significance of assessing the 
level of the information required for an action; the skill, resources and opportunities to 
act; and others support (Ajzen, 1991). 
Figure 6.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour Model (source: Ajzcn, 1991) 
A person's attitude toward behaviour (A) is directly proportional to the sum of the 
products of the strength of each behavioural belief multiplied by subjective evaluation of 
the belief, shown in the following equation. 
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n 
Ac Ebce, 
where b, is the behavioural belief, e, is the subjective evaluation of the belief, and n is the 
number of salient beliefs. 
Subjective norm (SN) is directly proportional to the sum of products of the strength of 
each normative belief multiplied by the person's motivation to comply with referent in 
question, shown in the following equation. 
n 
SN cc yn; m; 
j=1 
where n; is the normative belief, m is the person's motivation to comply, and n is the 
number of referents. 
The relation between the perceived behavioural control and control beliefs is shown in 
equation below. PBC is the sum of the products of each control belief multiplied by the 
perceived power of the particular control factor influencing performance of the 
behaviour. 
n 
PBC = I: p; c; 
J. 1 
where c, is control beliefs, p is perceived power of the particular control factor, and n is 
the number of control beliefs. 
63.3 Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
Technology acceptance model (TAM) was initially developed in the mid-1980s and is 
one of the models widely used for assessing individual acceptance and use of 
technologies (Davis, 1986,1989). TAM, like TPB, is adapted from the TRA (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). TAM (figure 6.3) was designed to explore underlying factors linking 
external variables to technology acceptance and its actual use. In TAM, it is theorised that 
usage behaviour (B) is a direct function of behavioural intention (131) to use technology. 
BI is, in turn, influenced by perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU), 
which, in turn, are influenced via external factors. 
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Figure 6.3 Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (source: Davis, 1986) 
Therefore, the TAM model consists of four variables of behaviour, behavioural intention, 
perceived usefulness, and perceived ease of use. Behaviour and intention are already 
defined in earlier models and perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use are defined 
as follows: 
6 . 3.3.1 Perceived Usefulness (PU) 
Perceived usefulness (PU) is the degree to which an individual believes that using a 
particular system will enhance his/her job performance and productivity (Davis, 1986). 
This measure reflects the probability that applying the new technology will be beneficial 
to the job performance and final outcome. Final outcome benefits may consist of 
improvement in work productivity, enhancement of quality and cost saving. 
6.3.3.2 Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) 
Perceived ease of use is the degree to which an individual believes that using a particular 
system will be free of effort (Davis, 1986). This measure reflects the potential difficulty 
to use the technology. It can also reflect the potential difficulty to learn to use such 
technology for frontline operators. Ease of use of new technology can considerably 
reduce the time and effort required by frontline operators and probably can increase the 
chance of technology success. 
It is the combination of these two factors that will influence the individual's behaviour on 
technology acceptance and actual use in the workplace. It is important to highlight that 
the influence of these two factors on behaviour may be very different. A person may still 
use a new technology even when his/her perception on the ease of use is not very positive 
if he/she believes that it is advantageous and useful, and will help to perform his/her job 
better. The perceived usefulness of the new technology is, to some extent, influenced by 
perceived ease of use. 
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6.3.4 Technology Usage Behaviour in a Mandatory Environment 
Various theories and models discussed different determinants of the acceptance and use 
of new technology based on volitional choices and voluntarily adoption and explain only 
volitional behaviour, but in some cases behaviours related to technology or ,ý stem might 
be mandatory. Mandatory adoption is a situation where adoption and use of a system by 
the operators is directed from higher levels such as top management. In mandatory 
adoption, the users have to perform a specific behaviour even they might not like to do 
so. Therefore, their beliefs and attitude as determinant of such behaviour will be less 
significant. A mandatory use environment is a situation in which the users are obliged to 
perform a particular behaviour (usage) in relation to a specific technology or system in 
order to perform their job (Brown et at, 2002). According to Goodhue (1995), in cases of 
mandatory use of new technology, social norms to use a system are very influential and 
overpower other considerations such as beliefs about expected consequences and 
outcome. It is unlikely that the above-mentioned models can effectively explain the 
determinants of acceptance and usage in mandatory adoption (Ram and Jung, 1991; 
Gallivan, 2001). It was noted (Wynekoop, 1992) that in traditional frameworks for 
implementation of technology innovations the centre of attention is on individual 
adoption and therefore, in mandatory environment, where new technologies are 
implemented in organisations after authoritarian decisions are incomplete and limited. 
However, it is not the technology investment alone that is important in improvement of 
work processes, quality, and productivity in a firm. Other factors like acceptance, 
adoption, and appropriate use are also very important and essential (Sircar et al, 2000). 
Even in mandatory system use, some users may choose not to comply with such a 
mandate if they believe that the new system is not satisfactory in supporting their work 
mission and therefore, such mandatory system implementation may not achieve its 
proposed aims and objectives (Adamson and Shine, 2003). Further, the users may use the 
mandated technology as their only available choice but their job satisfaction can be 
negatively affected: This may further result in unconventional behaviours such as 
resistance to use or lack of use that could lead to reduction in job performance, efficiency, 
and/or quality (Karsh, 2004). Identifying the appropriate functions and characteristics of 
any new system is important in delivering the right system to the end-users. Evaluating 
the acceptability of a system in the design and implementation process will help in 
understanding people's responses and satisfaction levels in using such systems and in 
improving the user acceptance by modifications made to the systems and their 
implementation plan. 
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According to Gallivan (2001), traditional theories and models for innovation adoption 
have been very useful in scenarios where individuals voluntarily decide to use a 
technology for personal use or not, especially in information technology, such as personal 
computers or different computer software. However, they have limitations in their 
application to technologies adopted as a result of authority decisions. Results of 
traditional innovation adoption frameworks may be associated with inconsistent findings, 
particularly in circumstances when (Fichman, 1992): 
" Adoption occurs within an organisation setting where the users are mandated to 
use the innovation. 
" Adoption is subject to heavy coordination requirements or strong 
interdependencies across multiple adopters. 
" Adoption requires extensive, specialised training to learn the principles 
underlying the innovation, in order, to overcome knowledge barriers to use. 
" Adoption and use occurs within an organisational setting, but only a single 
respondent is available to vouch for the innovation use of many other employees 
in the organisation. 
6.3.5 Extended Technology Acceptance Model (TAM2) 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) extended the TAM to measure the user acceptance of 
mandated technologies after it was found out (Hartwick and Barki, 1994) that subjective 
norm has a significant effect on the user intention to use certain technology in a 
mandatory environment. The extended Technology Acceptance Model is referred to as 
TAM2. Venkatesh and Davis (2000) argued, "This model explained perceived usefulness 
and usage intentions in terms of social influence and cognitive instrumental processes". It 
was tested for 4 different systems in different organisations and strongly supported. It was 
noticed that both social influence and cognitive instrumental processes significantly 
influence the user acceptance (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). 
Figure 6.4 shows the proposed TAM2 (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). In this model, 
impacts of two additional theoretical constructs of social influence processes and 
cognitive instrumental processes are added to the original TAM. Social influence 
processes consist of three interrelated social forces including subjective norm, 
voluntariness, and image, and cognitive instrumental processes include job relevance, 
output quality, and result demonstrability, which influence the users' decision to adopt or 
reject a new system (Venkatesh and Davis, 2000). 
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Figure 6.4 Proposed Extension of Technology Acceptance Model - TAM2 (adapted 
from Venkatesh and Davis, 2000) 
The definition of each of these additional constructs is given below according to 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000). 
6.3.5.1 Social Influence Processes 
Social Influence Processes are described as follow: 
a) Subjective Norm 
Subjective norm is the user's perception that important people to him believe he should or 
should not perform a particular behaviour in question, as it was defined earlier in this 
chapter (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). 
b) Voluntariness 
Voluntariness is the user's perception on compliance with a social feature in performing a 
particular behaviour. 
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c) Image 
Image is the user's perception on the degree to which his/her status is enhanced in any 
social system by acceptance and use of a new technology. 
d) Experience 
Experience is the user's increase of knowledge and expertise through involvement in 
activities with the use of new technology. 
6.3.5.2 Cognitive Instrumental Processes 
Cognitive Instrumental Processes are described as follows: 
a) Job Relevance 
Job relevance is the user's perception concerning the new technology's applicability to 
his/her duty and its capabilities in a user's set of tasks. 
b) Output Quality 
Output quality is the user's perception regarding the quality (how well) the tasks are 
performed by new technology. 
c) Result Demonstrability 
Result demonstrability is the user's perception concerning tangible results of using new 
technology. 
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) conducted four case studies regarding different systems, two 
in voluntary, and two in a mandatory environment, to test TAM2. They demonstrated the 
following results in their test: 
Intention and usage 
" Subjective norm did have direct effects on intention and usage only when usage 
was mandatory. These effects were stronger at pre-implementation stage and 
early stages of post-implementation but its effects weakened to the point of non- 
significance by the passage of post-implementation time. 
" Perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEQU), unlike subjective 
norm, remained reliable important deciding factors of intention at all stages of 
implementation. 
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Perceived usefulness 
" Subjective norm had a positive direct effect on perceived usefulness at the pre- 
implementation stage and early stages of post-implementation but its effect 
reduced with increased experience. 
Image 
" Subjective norm had a positive effect on image and image significantly 
influenced perceived usefulness at all stages of implementation. 
Job relevance and output quality 
" Effects of job relevance and output quality on the perceived usefulness were 
positive and significant in all stages of implementation. The effects of these two 
constructs were combined multiplicatively and not additively, due to their two- 
way interaction. 
Result demonstrability and perceived ease of use 
" Result demonstrability and perceived ease of use had positive effects on 
perceived usefulness and were significant at all stages of implementation. 
6.3.6 Simplified Technology Usage Model 
In TAM2, a widely used model for a diverse group of technologies and the users, 
subjective norm was added to the original TAM, as an additional determinant of 
technology acceptance behaviour in mandated environments (Venkatesh and Davis, 
2000). 
It was found (Venkatesh et al, 2003) that the role of social influence appears to be 
important only in the initial stage of introduction of new technology when the user 
experience with the technology is at low levels, but it is eroded over time and finally 
becomes not significant with continued usage. They further, pointed out that increasing 
experience over time provides a more instrumental basis, rather than social, for the user 
behaviour in using the technology. Therefore, the influential effect of social processes as 
an additional construct in TAM2 can be ignored over time, conversely, influence of 
cognitive instrumental processes increases over time. 
Additionally, when technology use is mandatory in an organisation, it is the usage 
behaviour that is variable since the users can vary their extent of use of such technology, 
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and there will be a little variance in technology use (Hartwick and Barki, 1994). This 
usage variability is a function of the degree to which technology is integrated into one's 
job function (Melone, 1990). 
6.3.7 End User Satisfaction Model (EUS) 
The End User Satisfaction model (EUS) was introduced by Adamson and Shine (2003) to 
measure systems satisfaction in mandatory environment. In the next section, the EUS 
model will be reviewed and modified to find out if and how it can be applied to measure 
navigators' satisfaction with ATS technology, which is mandatory implemented by the 
IMO to be used as a navigational aid on ships bridges of SOLAS Convention vessels. 
The user satisfaction is widely recognised to measure a system's success and 
effectiveness, especially success of a computer information system because it is believed 
that satisfied users will be more productive (Gatian, 1994; Gelderman, 1998; Downing, 
1999). The End User Satisfaction Model (EUS) was developed (Adamson and Shine, 
2003) to measure end user satisfaction, since it is likely the satisfaction of the actual users 
of mandated new technology that leads to acceptance, and consequently to increased 
usage. According to Adamson and Shine (2003), the EUS Model, shown in figure 6.5, 
consists of the following three aspects that are sequentially related: 
6 . 3.7.1 Attitudinal Aspect 
Attitudinal aspect measures formation of the users' attitudes towards new technology, It 
consists of subjective norms (SN), system self- efficacy (SS-E), and system quality (SQ) 
constructs. 
6.3.7.2 Perceptual Aspect 
Perceptual aspect measures the users' perception of the new technology. It consists of 
perceived usefulness (PU), and perceived ease of use (PEOU) constructs. 
6.3.7.3 Behavioural Aspect 
Behavioural aspect measures the user's satisfaction with new technology, expectedly, 
leading to technology usage. The related construct of this aspect is end user satisfaction 
(EUS). 
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Figure 6.5 End User Satisfaction Model (source: Adamson and Shine, 2003) 
6.4 AIS User Satisfaction Model 
AIS can play an important role in the safety of marine navigation by improving 
performance of anti-collision activities, provided that it is successfully implemented, and 
used by navigators. The role of navigators as end users of the AIS technology appears to 
be an imperative influence on factors affecting successful application of AIS in 
navigation activities. It is the extent of satisfaction of navigators that can decide on the 
acceptance and use or the rejection of this technology. 
It was found by Venkatesh et al (2003) that the role of social influence such as subjective 
norm appears to be important only in the initial stage of introduction of new technology 
when the user experience with the technology is at low levels but it is eroded over time, 
and finally becomes non-significant with continued usage. They further, pointed out that 
increasing experience over time provides a more instrumental basis, rather than social, for 
the user behaviour to use the technology. Therefore, the influential effect of social 
processes as an additional construct in TAM2 can be ignored over time, conversely, 
influence of cognitive instrumental processes increases over time. 
The AIS Satisfaction Model, shown in figure 6.6, is a model adapted from EUS model 
(Adamson and Shine, 2003); which is based on TAM2 (Venkatesh and Davis, 2003). In 
this model subjective norm has not been taken into account and is dropped from the 
model. This is because AIS is mandatory and has been used on SOLAS Convention ships 
for more than 2 years. It is assumed that, with more than 2 years of experiences' use, the 
effect of social influence is non-significant in this research. The aim of this model is to 
measure navigators' satisfaction with AIS. 
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Figure 6.6 AIS User Satisfaction Model (adapted from Adamson and Shine, 2003) 
In order to assess validity of the AIS user satisfaction model, the model will be applied to 
analyse the AIS questionnaire (previously discussed in chapter 5). This is demonstrated in 
chapter 7. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Implementation stages of new technology is considered as an important and crucial phase 
during which the users adapt themselves with the technology by becoming competent, 
consistent, and committed in their use of such technology. Regular use of technology in a 
professional manner should be planned for in implementation stages. Therefore, proper 
identification of human factors implications during implementation processes, consisting 
of different phases, could have a major impact on achievement of objectives for new 
technology application. Satisfactory use of new technology by the frontline operators may 
be affected due to many reasons but the correct understanding of situations in which new 
technology is used are very important and need to be properly investigated. 
It can be concluded that professionally accepted use of technology is a function of the 
users' perceptions about the technology and satisfaction of the users with technology. 
There are a number of commonly used theories and models for prediction of the user 
behaviour on new technology. Voluntarily or mandatory adoption of new technology is 
an important issue in technology implementations that should be taken into account in 
predicting the user behaviour on new technology. However, most of these commonly 
used theories and models are appropriate in predicting the user behaviour in a voluntarily 
base, and therefore, are not suitable for measuring ATS user satisfaction. ATS adoption is 
mandatory, and therefore, the users have to use it even if they do not like it. However, 
even in the case of mandatory use of AIS, some users may not fully comply with such 
mandates if they believe that the AIS will not satisfactorily support their tasks in the 
navigation operation. 
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In view of mandatory adoption of AIS technology for navigation, the AlS user 
satisfaction model was adopted, which is a modified representation of the End User 
Satisfaction Model introduced by Adamson and Shine (2003). In this model, social 
influence of subjective norm has been ignored because of mandatory use AIS for more 
than 2 years. This model is going to be used, in chapter 7, for reliability and validity 
assessment of the AlS survey questionnaire. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed various models for measuring navigators' satisfaction with AIS 
technology. The models took into account mandatory basis of AIS adoption and amount 
of navigators' experience with AIS. 
The first section of this chapter discussed technology implementation, human issues 
associated with different phases of such implementation, problems in implementation that 
are likely to affect the users' satisfaction in technology usage. 
The next section discussed the new technology usage behaviour and commonly used 
theories and models for predicting the users' behaviour. This section also discussed 
differences in technology usage behaviour between voluntary and mandatory 
environment of technology adoptions. 
The third section considered adoption of the End User Satisfaction model, which is 
thought to be appropriate for evaluation of AIS user satisfaction. 
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Chapter 7 
Extending AIS User Satisfaction Model to Evaluate the AIS 
Questionnaire 
7.1 Introduction 
The reliability and the construct validity of a research tool are very important in assessing 
the efficiency of a research methodology. Reliability shows if a research tool is consistent 
and stable, and validity shows the extent of its ability to measure what it is designed to 
measure (Kumar, 1999). 
A number of the generic models for measuring acceptance of new technology and their 
suitability for this study were discussed in chapter 6. A theoretical model was also 
adopted for measuring satisfaction of the navigators with AIS technology. In this chapter 
the AIS user satisfaction model will be used to assess reliability and validity of the AIS 
questionnaire scale. This chapter will further intend to select a suitable measurement 
construct to improve reliability and accuracy of the results in a future survey of the AIS 
user satisfaction and the user satisfaction with other similar technology implementation in 
a seagoing context. Firstly, the methodology of grouping the questionnaire's items is 
covered in section 7.2, and then preliminary analysis is discussed in section 7.3. Selection 
of the suitable statistical technique for data analysis, and final analysis are covered in 
sections 7.4 and 7.5 respectively. Finally, discussion and conclusion are covered in 
section 7.6. 
7.2 Methodology 
Items included in the original survey questionnaire were not initially designed according 
to the AIS user satisfaction model. Therefore, the items in the original questionnaire are 
shown grouped to fit into the AIS user satisfaction model in table 7.1. They are clustered 
to match the model's groupings as close as possible. The relevant groups are. 
" System Quality (SQ). 
" Self-Efficacy (S-E). 
" Perceived Usefulness (PU). 
" Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU). 
" AIS User Satisfaction (AISUS). 
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The suitability of the questionnaire for measuring the AlS user satisfaction will be 
analysed using the computer software SPSS version 14. The internal consistency of the 
measurement scale will be examined through Cronbach's alpha coefficient (a). Pallant 
(2004) and Field (2005) stated that the alpha coefficient is one of the most commonly 
used indicators of the scale reliability and ranges in value from 0 to 1. They also 
mentioned that values of above 0.7 are acceptable values of alpha, but the higher the 
score, the more reliable the generated scale is. The validity of the measurement scale 
(relationship among variables) will be explored through the statistical technique of 
multiple regression. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2000); Pallant (2004); and Field 
(2005) multiple regression is a popular technique that could be used to deal with variety 
of questions, especially in predicting a dependent variable (DV) from several continuous 
independent variables (N), in many disciplines. 
Rank 
Certificate of competency held 
Total time at sea (year) 
Total sailing experience with AIS (month) 
Type(s) of AIS display available 
Have you completed any formal training on basic operation of AIS? 
If you have completed an AIS training, what kind of training was it? 
System Quality (SQ) 
SQ1- AIS display is valuable in navigator's performance. 
SQ2- Symbols used in AIS display are efficient. 
SQ3- AIS keyboard is user friendly. 
SQ4- The AIS unit help and instructions are useful and clear. 
SQ5- It takes a long time to learn to extract AIS information. 
SQ6- The way that AIS information is presented is clear and understandable. 
SQ7- Some of the information on the AIS display is unnecessary. 
SQ8- It is relatively easy to move from one menu to another menu. 
SQ9- Getting data in and out of AIS is easy. 
SQ10- Overlay of radar echoes with AIS data causes confusion. 
SQ11- Since AIS stations have no means of assessing the data received, the information 
received from target ships is not reliable due to spoofmg. 
SQ12- AIS is vulnerable due to jamming. 
SQ13- There is a risk of erroneous information displayed, through wrong data input associated 
with AIS. 
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Self-Efficacy (SE) 
SEI- I think that my training on the use of AIS (if any) is adequate to safely perform anti- 
collision operation on the bridge using AIS. 
SE2- Formal training for AIS is essential for safe operation in collision situation. 
SE3- It is easy to use AIS for anti-collision operation. 
Perceived Usefulness (PU) 
PU1- AIS enhances navigator's situational awareness with a better situation display of the 
traffic. 
PU2- Using AIS would increase navigator's efficiency in anti-collision operation. 
PU3- Using AIS would let the navigator feel more in control of anti-collision operation. 
PU4- AIS will disrupt the normal anti-collision operation. 
PU5- AIS increases navigator's physical workload. 
PU6- AIS increases navigator's mental workload. 
PU7- AIS provides clearer and continuous information in comparison with radar. 
PU8- Detection of targets in radar shadow areas is improved with AIS. 
PU9- AIS decreases overall VHF traffic congestion. 
PUIO- The increased use of VHF for anti-collision decisions due to AIS violates International 
Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs). 
Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) 
PEOUI- Self-learning to operate AIS is hard for navigators. 
PEOU2- It is easy to become skilful at using AIS. 
PEOU3- The process of obtaining information from AIS is clear and understandable. 
PEOU4- AIS is easy to use. 
AIS User Satisfaction (AISUS) 
AISUSI- Using AIS would improve navigator's performance in anti-collision operation. 
AISUS2- Using AIS would increase navigator's ability in anti-collision operation. 
AISUS3- Navigators feel their ship is safer with AIS. 
AISUS4- AIS improves overall safety of navigation. 
Table 7.1 Questionnaire Grouped According to AIS User Satisfaction Model 
Five of the items with low reliability figures (Cronbach's alpha less than 0.7) were 
dropped from the analysis. These items are shown in table 7.2. 
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Navigators prefer to use AlS alone rather than radar. 
AIS responds slowly to data inputs by navigators. 
Learning to operate ALS without a proper training course is easy. 
AIS causes increased use of VHF for anti-collision operation. 
AIS will increase the danger of piracy in areas of piratical activity. 
Table 7.2 Questions dropped from AIS User Satisfaction Model 
7.2.1 Questionnaire Codebook 
The questionnaire codebook, which was prepared in chapter 5, will be also used in this 
chapter to convert required data into the SPSS format. 
7.3 Preliminary Analysis 
Preliminary analysis of data is carried out to prepare the data for final statistical analysis. 
7.3.1 Manipulating the Data 
Before performing statistical analyses of the data, missing values were defined. Further, 
scores for negatively worded items (high scores indicate low optimism) were reversed. 
The negatively worded items are: SQ7, AQ 10, SQ 13, PU5, PU6, PU 10, and PEOU 1. 
Total scale scores were calculated by adding together scores from all the items that 
comprise each of the five constructs in the model. The total scores are shown as a new 
variable at the end of survey's data set. They are named TSQ, TSE, TPU, TPEOU, and 
TAISUS. The manipulated data table is shown in appendix C. I. 
7.3.2 Distribution of Scores 
Figures 7.3 to 7.7 show histograms of total scores with normal curve for the five variables 
in our adopted AIS User Satisfaction Model. The corresponding statistic and frequency 
tables are shown in appendix C. 2. These histograms show that the scores are normally 
distributed. The distributions of the scores were further examined by calculation of z- 
scores, which showed normal distributions. Field (2005) pointed out that distribution of 
the scores could be further ascertained by the skewness and kurtosis values in descriptive 
table. He further mentioned that these values should be first converted to z-scores in order 
to obtain standardised units for comparison. The table of calculated absolute z-scores is 
shown in appendix C. 3. 
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Figure 7.1 Histogram of total system quality scores with normal curve 
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Figure 7.3 Histogram of total perceived usefulness scores with normal curve 
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Figure 7.4 Histogram of total perceived ease of use scores with normal curve 
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Figure 7.5 Histogram of total AIS user satisfaction scores with normal curve 
Outliers in data were also looked for. An outlier is a score very different from the rest of 
the data, and they can bias the mean and inflate the standard deviation (Field, 2005). 
According to Pallant (2004), if there is a big difference between original mean score and 
the 5% trimmed mean in the descriptive table then there is a chance of outlying cases. 
The 5% trimmed mean is a mean score recalculated after removing the top and bottom 5 
percent of the cases. Descriptive table for our data, given in appendix C. 4, shows that the 
original means and 5% Trimmed means of the cases are very similar. Therefore, extreme 
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scores did not have a strong influence on the mean values. Absence of significant outliers 
in the scores was also revealed by the result of absolute z-scores, given in appendix C. 5. 
Field (2005) argued that the skewness and kurtosis, and histograms do not give sufficient 
information about normality of a distribution, but Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests of 
normality could further clarify the state of distributions more appropriately. In K-S test 
scores in the sample are compared to a normally distributed set of scores with the same 
mean and standard deviation. According to Pallant (2004) and Field 2005, a non- 
significant result (significance value of more than 0.05) indicates normality of 
distribution. 
To crosscheck the distribution of the scores Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is carried out. The 
test showed non-significant results for all variables (TSQ, TSE, TPU, TPEOU, and 
TAISUS), which confirm normality of the distribution of the scores. 
7.3.3 Reliability of Measurement Scales 
It is important for the measurement scale used in the study to be reliable. This reliability 
is concerned with the internal consistency of the measurement scale. The Reliability scale 
is showing whether the items that make up the scale are all measuring the same original 
construct or not. According to Pallant (2004) and Field (2005) Cronbach's alpha 
coefficient is the most important indicator of reliability indicator commonly used for 
internal consistency decisions. It is recommended that the ideal Cronbach's alpha 
coefficient of a scale should be above 0.7 (Tabachnick, and Fidell, 2001). Table 7.3 
shows the Cronbach's alpha coefficient for total items in measurement scale. According 
to table 7.3, the Cronbach's alpha for the total items in AIS User satisfaction Model is 
0.804, which is above 0.7. Therefore, the scale of our sample is considered to be reliable. 
Cronbach's Alpha N of items 
. 804 34 
Table 7.3 Reliability Statistics for Total Scale's Items 
Table 7.3 shows the Cronbach's alpha coefficients for five variables with the entire make 
up items in their underlying constructs in AIS User Satisfaction Model. The Cronbach's 
alphas for TSQ, TSE, TPU, TPEOU, and TAISUS are 0.739,0.711,0.769,0.737, and 
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0.704, respectively. These alpha figures also show that the reliability of scales used to 
measure each of the five variables in the study sample is above 0.7 and within acceptable 
limit. 
Pallant (2004) pointed out that Corrected Item-Total Correlation gives an indication of 
the degree to which each item correlates with the total score. She also mentioned that 
values of less than 0.3 indicate that the item is measuring something different from the 
overall scale, and if the scale's overall Cronbach's alpha is less than 0.7 the items with 
low item-total correlation may need to be removed (Pallant, 2004). This correlation is 
shown as a column marked Corrected Item-Total Correlation, in table 7.4. 
The table shows that some items such as SQ1, SQ7, SQ10, SQ 11, and SQ13 in TSQ, and 
PU7 and PU10 in TPU have Corrected Item-Total Correlation figures of less than 0.3. We 
may need to remove such items if overall Cronbach's alpha is less than 0.7 in order to 
increase the overall reliability and validity of scales. However, since our overall 
Cronbach's alpha value is 0.804, there is no need for removing them. 
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Cronbach's C orrected Item- Cronbach's 
Alpha Total Alpha If Item 
Correlation Deleted 
TSQ . 739 
SQ1 . 252 . 736 
SQ2 . 326 . 727 
SQ3 . 612 . 692 
SQ4 . 583 . 696 
SQ5 . 319 . 728 
SQ6 . 569 . 711 
SQ7 . 276 . 
734 
SQ8 . 365 . 723 SQ9 . 506 . 706 
SQ IO . 257 . 739 
SQ 11 . 267 . 734 
SQ12 . 413 . 718 SQ13 . 141 . 753 
TSE . 711 
SEI . 689 . 
395 
SE2 . 518 . 635 SE3 . 423 . 739 
TPU . 769 
Put . 445 . 750 
PU2 . 670 . 717 PU3 . 594 . 729 PU4 . 401 . 754 
PUS . 502 . 740 
PU6 . 482 . 
743 
PU7 . 155 . 790 PU8 . 529 . 738 PU9 . 426 . 751 
PU10 . 233 . 778 
TPEOU . 737 
PEOU1 . 466 . 719 PEOU2 . 480 . 711 
PEOU3 . 575 . 657 
PEOU4 . 631 . 628 
TAISUS . 704 
AISUSI . 530 . 614 AISUS2 . 553 . 599 AISUS3 
. 
359 
. 718 AISUS4 . 528 . 620 
Table 7.4 Statistics for Reliability of Scales 
7.4 Statistical Technique for Data Analysis 
Choosing the correct statistical technique to analyse the data is an important aspect of any 
research. Statistical technique is dealing with the suitability of the approach, which could 
enable a researcher to address particular research questions. The type of statistical 
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technique depends upon the addressed research question and nature of the available data 
(Field, 2005; Pallant, 2004). 
The purpose of this analysis is to explore relationships and the amount of variance in AIS 
user satisfaction scores that can be explained by perceived usefulness and perceived ease 
of use. It will also look at the amount of variance in perceived usefulness and perceived 
ease of use scores that can be explained by AIS system quality and self-efficacy of the 
AIS operators. According to Pallant (2004) and Field (2005) with multiple regression 
analysis the relationships between one DV and several Ws could appropriately be 
predicted. The goal of regression in this research is to arrive at a set of regression 
coefficients (ß values) for the IVs. Tabachnick and Fidell (2000) also pointed out 
"regression analysis would only reveal the relationships among variables but do not 
indicate causality of the relationships". Therefore, since our data (one sample) are 
normally distributed (normality of the data was already checked in this chapter) multiple 
regression is considered to be the most suitable technique for our analysis. In the AIS 
User Satisfaction Model adapted in chapter 6, system quality and self-efficacy are the two 
continuous independent variables (IV) for continuous dependent variable (DV) of 
perceived usefulness. They are also IVs for total perceived ease of use. Perceived 
usefulness and perceived ease of use are, in turn, IVs for DV of AIS user satisfaction. 
7.5 Final Analysis 
The final data analysis is undertaken in relation to individual sub scales, and the results 
are explained accordingly. 
7.5.1 Perceived Usefulness 
7.5.1.1 Correlations 
Pearson correlation coefficient (R) shows the strength of the relationship between two 
variables. According to Pallant (2004), a positive correlation is an indication of an 
increase in the second variable due to the increase in the first one, and a negative 
correlation is showing opposite relation. Preferably a correlation coefficient should be 
above 0.3 to show some relation of independent variable with dependent variable 
(Pallant, 2004). A correlation coefficient of more than 0.9 is a substantial coefficient that 
shows multicollinearity in the data (Field, 2005). Multicollinearity will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
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According to the value of Pearson correlation coefficient in correlation matrix (table 7.5), 
both of the TSQ and TSE scales correlate positively with TPU (R = 0.504, p<0.001 and 
R=0.3 80, p<0.001, respectively). However, TSQ has a larger positive correlation with 
TPU, than TSE. Thus it is likely that TSQ will best predict TPU. Apparently, there is not 
any correlation between TSQ and TSE (R= -0.049). One-tailed significance values in 
table 7.5, shows that both the positive correlations of TSQ with TPU and TSE with TPU 
are significant asp < 0.001. 
Total Perceived Total System Total Self 
Usefulness Quality Efficacy 
Pearson Correlation Total Perceived Usefulness 1.000 . 504 . 380 Total System Quality . 504 1.000 -. 049 Total Self Efficacy . 380 -. 049 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Total Perceived Usefulness . 000 . 001 Total System Quality . 000 . 348 Total Self Efficacy . 001 . 348 
N Total Perceived Usefulness 114 112 69 
Total System Quality 112 113 67 
Total Self Efficacy 69 67 69 
Table 7.5 Correlation Matrix for Regression Analysis (TPU) 
7.5.1.2 Evaluation 
The model summary indicates the degree of successfulness of the model in predicting the 
dependent variable. The model summary provides some very important information about 
the model, such as R (value of multiple correlation coefficient between the predictors and 
outcome), R2 (amount of variability in the outcome explained by the predictors), and 
adjusted RZ (indicates amount of model generalisation) (Field, 2005). Table 7.6 is the 
model summary for Total Perceived Usefulness of the AIS. It shows that 41.8% (R2 = 
0.418) of the variance in TPU (DV) is explained by the model, which includes the TSQ 
(R2 = 0.254) and TSE (R2 = 0.164). Adjusted R2 is 0.399 and the shrinkage is equal to 
1.9% = (0.418 - 0.399) x 100. The Shrinkage is the reduction of variance in the outcome 
if the model were derived from the population rather than a sample (Field, 2005). 
Therefore, the percentage of the variance explained by the model for TPU is very close to 
that of the corrected estimate of the true population. 
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Adjusted R Std. Error of the 
RR Square Square Estimate 
. 504(a) 
1 
. 254 
1 . 242 1 . 46151 
. 646(b) 
1 
. 418 
1 
. 399 
1 
. 41089 
(a) Predictors: (Constant), Total System Quality 
(b) Predictors: (Constant), Total System Quality, Total Self Efficacy 
Dependent Variable: Total Perceived Usefulness 
Table 7.6 Regression Model Summary (TPU) 
According to Field (2005), to assess the goodness-of-fit of the model (improvement in 
prediction of outcome due to the model) it is important to evaluate the F-ratio. The F- 
ratio measures the amount of the improvement in prediction of the outcome by the model 
compared to the level of inaccuracy of the model. He further added that an F-ratio of 
greater than I shows that the model is reasonable and the improvement due to the 
regression model is greater than the inaccuracy within the model. The result of analysis 
of variance (ANOVA), in table 7.7, shows that the F-ratio for model I is 22.099, and F- 
ratio for model 2 is 22.939, and therefore, the improvement due to the regression models 
is much grater than inaccuracy within the models. Both of the F-ratios are significant asp 
< 0.001 for both the cases, and therefore, it is unlikely to have happened by chance. These 
results show that the model is a significant fit of the data overall and it significantly 
improves our ability to predict the outcome variable because the F-ratio is significant 
(probability less than 0.05). 
Model 
Sum of 
S uares df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 4.707 1 4.707 22.099 . 000(a) 
Residual 13.844 65 . 213 
Total 18.551 66 
Regression 7.746 2 3.873 22.939 . 000(b) 
Residual 10.805 64 
. 169 
Total 18.551 66 
(a) Predictors: (Constant), Total System Quality 
(b) Predictors: (Constant), Total System Quality, Total Self Efficu, y 
Dependent Variable: Total Perceived Usefulness 
Table 7.7 ANOVA (TAU) 
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7.5.1.3 Model Parameters 
Parameters of the regression model are shown in the coefficients table of SPSS output. 
The b-values show the relationship between a dependent variable and each independent 
variable (correspond to the change in dependant variable by a unit change in independent 
variable). Positive or negative values show a positive or negative relationship between IV 
and DV, respectively. The degree of affect of each IV on DV given by b-value is when 
the effects of all other predictors are held constant. Standard error associated with each b- 
value shows the extent of difference in that b-value from sample to sample. The amount 
of contribution of the predictor and its significance to the model will be shown by the 
value of t and p, respectively. The greater contribution of a predictor is shown by the 
larger value of 1, and the smaller, value of p (Field, 2005). From the summary of the 
regression model, in table 7.8, it could be inferred that: 
" The b-value of 0.712 for TSQ indicates that as the TSQ increases by one unit, 
TPU increases by 0.712 units provided that the effect of the TSE is held constant. 
This value would vary across different samples by 0.130 (associated standard 
error with TSQ). 
" The b-value of 0,279 for TSE indicates that as the TSE increases by one unit, 
TPU increases by 0.279 units provided that the effect of the TSQ is held constant. 
This value would vary across different samples by 0.066 (associated standard 
error with TSE). 
" The t-test results for this model indicate that the TSQ (t = 5.48, p< . 001), and 
TSE (t = 4.24, p < . 00 1) are 
both significant predictors of TPU, but the TSQ has a 
greater impact than the TSE. 
More appropriate interpretation of a variable's importance in the model is possible by 
standardised beta (fl) coefficients that are not dependent on the units of measurement of 
variables. They are measured in standard deviation units and are directly comparable. 
Confidence intervals of beta-values show the limits of true b-values for 95% of these 
samples. A good model is the one with small confidence intervals, which do not cross 
zero (Pallant, 2004; Field, 2005). According to table 7.8, the TSQ, with standardised beta 
of 52.3%, makes a stronger unique contribution to explaining TPU, when the variance 
explained by the TSE is controlled. The standardised beta value for TSE is showing a less 
contribution with 40.5%. Further, TSQ and TSE both with sign if icance value of 0.001 are 
making a unique, and statistically significant, contribution to the prediction of the TPU 
scores. This also means no overlap between TSQ and TSE. Pallant (2004) pointed out 
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that a significance value of less than 0.05 for an IV shows a significant unique 
contribution of that IV to the prediction of the DV, and a significance value of greater 
than 0.05 shows no such contribution that may be due to overlap with other l Vs in the 
model. 
The confidence interval for TSQ is between 0.452 and 0.972, and for TSE is between 
0.148 and 0.411, which both are relatively narrow, and do not cross Zero. This indicates 
that the parameters for these variables are significant and they have positive relationships. 
The zero-order correlations are the Pearson correlation coefficients that correspond to the 
same values in correlation table 7.5, and the part correlations indicate the relationship 
between each predictor and the outcome variable, when the effects of the other predictors 
on the outcome are controlled. Square of the value of part correlations shows the unique 
contribution of the variable to the total variance in dependent variable (R2) in the model 
(Field, 2005; and Pallant, 2004). According to table 7.8, the zero-order correlations are 
0.504 for TSQ and 0.380 for TSE. The part correlation coefficients are 0.523 for TSQ and 
0.405 for TSE, indicating that TSQ uniquely explains 27% (0.5232) and TSE uniquely 
explains 16% (0.4052) of the variance in TPU scores. It should be noted that sum of all 
the squared part correlations does not equal the total R2 value, because part correlations 
values do not include overlaps or shared variance but total R2 does (Pal lant, 2004). 
95% 
Unstandardize Standardized Confidence Collinearity 
Model Coefficients Coefficients Interval for B Correlations Statistics 
Std. Lower Upper ero- 
B Error Beta t Sig. Bound Bound l arder Part Tolerance VIF 
I (Constant) 1.345 . 495 2.720 . 008 . 357 2.333 Total 
System . 685 . 146 . 504 . 701 . 000 . 394 . 976 . 504 . 504 1.000 1.000 Quality 
(Constant) 
. 361 . 498 . 725 . 471 -. 633 1.355 Total 
System . 712 . 130 . 523 5.480 . 000 . 452 . 972 . 504 . 523 . 998 1.002 Quality 
Total Self 
Efficacy 279 . 066 . 405 4.243 . 000 . 148 . 411 . 380 . 405 . 998 1.002 
Dep 
Table 7.8 Coefficients of the regression model (TPU) 
7.5.1.4 Multicollinearity Assessment 
Multicol linearity refers to a strong correlation between independent variables. The 
problem of multicollinearity occurs when at least one of the independent variables is 
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highly correlated with other independent variables (correlation coefficient = 0.80 Or 0.99). 
This perfect correlation prevents unique estimation of the regression coefficients in the 
model. Collinearity diagonistics are carried out in SPSS by giving two values of variance 
inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance (Pallant, 2004; Field, 2005). Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2000) mentioned that if Tolerance (1 - R2) is less than 0.10 and VIF (just inverse of 
Tolerance) is more than 10, the possibility of multicollinearity exists. According to table 
7.8, the lowest tolerance value is 0.998, which is not less than 0.10. The highest VIF 
value is 1.002, which is well below the critical value of 10. The tolerance and VIF values 
confirm that collinearity is not a problem for this model, and therefore, the variability of 
TPU is properly explained by the TSQ and TSE. 
Further examination of multicollinearity is possible through eigenvalues given in 
collinearity diagnostics output of SPSS. Eigenvalues shows the distribution of variances 
of the matrix for variables. Large variance proportions on the same small eigenvalues are 
to be checked. The range of variance proportions is between 0 and 1. The variance 
proportions for variables that both have high-variance proportions for the small 
eigenvalues in the bottom few rows of the collinearity diagnostics table should be 
distributed across different dimensions. These values show the accuracy of the regression 
model. The condition indices represent the square root of the largest eigenvalue to the 
eigenvalue of interest. There are not hard and fast rules about the highest limits of 
condition index to indicate collinearity problem, but the final dimention should not have a 
very large condition index (Field, 2005). Table 7.9 shows that the eigenvalues of the 
scales are between 2.95 and 0.006, which are fairly close, and condition index of the final 
dimension is 22.32, which is not very large compared to other dimensions. The variance 
proportions show that for TSQ highest percentage of its variance proportion (92% of the 
variance of the regression coefficient) is associated with eigenvalue number 3, and for 
TSE highest percentage of its variance proportion (89% of the variance of the regression 
coefficient) is associated with eigenvalue number 2. These results indicate that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in this model. 
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Variance Proportions 
Condition Total System Total Self 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Index (Constant) Quality Efficacy 
11 1.993 1.000 . 00 . 00 
2 
. 007 17.488 
1.00 1.00 
21 2.954 1.000 . 00 . 00 . 01 2 
. 040 8.614 . 
02 . 08 . 89 
3 
. 006 22.320 . 97 . 92 . 11 
Dependent Variable: Total Perceived Usefulness 
Table 7.9 Collinearity Diagnostics (TPU) 
7.5.1.5 Casewise Diagnostics 
The error in the regression model will be represented by residuals. It shows the 
differences in the values of the outcomes between the model and that observed in the 
sample. In order to define a universal scale for measuring a large residual, the residuals 
are divided by their standard deviation and they are called standardised residuals. In an 
ordinary sample 95% of the cases should have standardised residuals within about ±2 
(Field, 2005). Thus, it is reasonable to expect about 6 cases (5%) to have standardised 
residuals outside of the limits (± 2). Table 7.10 shows that out of 116 cases only 3 cases 
(about 3%) are with standardised residuals outside the limits. Therefore, there is not a big 
difference between the outcome of the sample and the outcome of the model, and the 
model is reasonably accurate. 
Total Perceived Predicted 
Case Number Std. Residual Usefulness Value Residual 
30 2.111 4.70 3.8327 . 86729 
67 
-2.130 3.10 3.9752 -. 87522 
68 
-2.154 2.80 3.6849 -. 88489 
uepenaent vananie: total rerceivea usetuiness 
Table 7.10 Casewise Diagnostics (TPU) 
7.5.2 Perceived Ease of Use 
7.5.2.1 Correlations 
Pearson correlation coefficient in correlation matrix (table 7.11) shows that TSQ 
correlates substantially with TPEOU (R = 0.360, p<0.001), but TSE has a smaller 
positive correlation with TPEOU (R = 0.132, p<0.14) than TSQ. TSE had a lower 
positive correlation with TPEOU, which is not significant in predicting TPEOU. Bivariate 
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correlation between TSQ and TSE is -0.049. One-tailed significance values indicates that 
the correlations between TSQ and TPEOU is positive and significant, p<O . 001, but the 
correlation between TSE and TPEOU is not significant, P>0.05 (table 7.11). 
Total Perceived Total System 't'otal Self 
Ease of Use Quality Efficacy 
Pearson Correlation Total Perceived Ease of Use 1.000 . 360 . 132 
Total System Quality . 360 1.000 -. 
049 
Total Self Efficacy . 132 -. 049 
1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Total Perceived Ease of Use . 000 . 
140 
Total System Quality . 000 . 348 
Total Self Efficacy . 140 . 348 
Total Perceived Ease of Use 116 113 69 
Total System Quality 113 113 67 
Total Self Efficacy 69 67 69 
Table 7.11 Correlation Matrix for Regression Analysis (TPEOU) 
7.5.2.2 Evaluation 
According to model summary in table 7.12,15.2% (R2 = 0.152) of the variance in 
TPEOU is explained by the model, which includes the TSQ (R2 = 0.129) and TSE (R2 = 
0.023). Adjusted RZ is 0.125 and the shrinkage is equal to 2.7% = (0.152 - 0.125) x 100. 
This shows that the percentage of the variance explained by the model is very close to 
that of the corrected estimate of the true population. 
Model Adjusted R Std Error of the . R R Square Square Estimate 
1 
. 360(a) . 
129 . 116 . 58595 
2 
. 390(b) . 152 . 125 . 58286 
(a) Predictors: (Constant), Total System Quality 
(b) Predictors: (Constant), Total System Quality, Total Self Efficacy 
Dependent Variable: Total Perceived Ease of Use 
Table 7.12 Regression Model Summary (TPEOU) 
According to ANOVA (table 7.13) both the F-ratio values for model I (F = 9.667, p< 
0.003), and for model 2 (F = 5.729, p<0.005) are significant and unlikely to have 
happened by chance. The values of F are greater than I in both the models. This means 
that the improvement due to the regression model is greater than inaccuracy within the 
model. Therefore, the ability to predict the outcome variable will be significantly 
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improved by the model, and the model is a significant fit of the data overall due to the 
significant F-ratio (significance value is less than 0.05). 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.319 1 3.319 9.667 
. 
003(a) 
Residual 22.317 65 . 343 
Total 25.636 66 
Regression 3.893 2 1.946 5.729 . 005(b) 
Residual 21.743 64 . 340 
Total 25.636 66 
(a) Predictors: (Constant), Total System Quality 
(b) Predictors: (Constant), Total System Quality, Total Self Efficacy 
Dependent Variable: Total Perceived Ease of Use 
Table 7.13 ANOVA (TPEOU) 
7.5.2.3 Model Parameters 
According to table 7.14: 
" The b-value for TSQ (0.587) indicates that as TSQ increases by one unit, TPEOU 
increases by 0.587 units provided that the effect of TSE is held constant. The 
associated standard error with TSQ shows that this value would vary across 
different samples by 0.184. 
" The b-value for TSE (0.121) indicates that as TSE increases by one unit, TPEOU 
increases by 0.121 units provided that the effect of TSQ is held constant. The 
associated standard error with TSE shows that this value would vary across 
different samples by 0.093. 
" The t-test results for this model indicate that the TSQ (t = 3.185, p<0.002) is a 
significant predictor of TPEOU, while TSE (t = 1.300, p<0.198) is not a 
significant predictor of TPEOU. Therefore, TSE has no impact on the TPEOU. 
Table 7.14 shows that the TSQ, with ,8 value of 0.367, has 36.7% unique contribution in 
explaining TPEOU, when the variance explained by the TSE is controlled. The TSE with 
ß value of 0.150 has less contribution with 15.0%. Table 7.14 also reveals that TSQ with 
a significance value of 0.002 making a unique, and statistically significant, contribution to 
the prediction of the TPEOU scores, but the contribution of TSE with significance value 
of 0.198 is not significant. This may be due to some degrees of overlap between TSQ and 
TSE. 
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The confidence interval for TSQ is between 0.219 and 0.955, which is relatively narrow 
and does not cross zero. Confidence interval for TSE is between -0.065 and 0.308, which 
is narrow but it does cross zero. This indicates that only the parameters for TSQ are 
significant, and it has a positive relationship, but the parameters for TSE are not 
significant and it has a negative relationship. 
The zero-order correlation for TSQ is 0.360 and for TSE is 0.132. These values 
correspond to the same values of the Pearson correlation coefficients in table 7.11. Table 
7.14 indicates that TSQ (with part correlation coefficients of 0.367), and TSE (with part 
correlation coefficients of 0.150) each uniquely explain 13.5% (0.3672), and 2.3% 
(0.1502) of the variance in TPEOU scores, respectively, when the effects of the other 
predictors on the outcome are controlled. 
Unstandardize Standardize 95% Confidence Collinearity 
Model Coefficients Coefficients t Si Interval for B orrelation Statistics 
Std. Lower Upper Zero- 
B Error Beta Bound Bound order Part olerane VIF 
1 (Constant) 1.698 . 628 . 
70 . 009 . 
444 2.952 
Total System 
. 575 . 185 . 360 . 10 . 003 . 
206 . 945 . 360 360 1.000 1.00 Quality 
(Constant) 1.270 . 706 
1.79 . 077 -. 140 2.681 
Total System 
. 587 . 184 . 367 3.185 . 
002 . 219 . 955 . 360 . 367 . 998 1.002 Quality 
Total Self 
. 121 . 093 . 150 1.30C . 198 -. 
065 . 308 . 132 150 . 998 1.002 Efficacy 
uepenaent vananºe: trotal t'erceºvea base or use 
Table 7.14 Coefficients of the regression model (TPEOU) 
7.5.2.4 Multicollinearity Assessment 
According to table 7.14, the lowest tolerance value is 0.998, which is more than 0.10. The 
highest VIF value is 1.002, which is well below 10, These values of tolerance and VIF 
conf inn that the problem of multicollinearity is not an issue for this model, and therefore, 
the variability of TPEOU is properly explained by the TSQ and TSB. 
In addition, the collinearity diagnostics data, in table 7.15, shows that the eigenvalues of 
the scales are between 2.95 and 0.006, which are fairly close. Condition index of the final 
dimension is 22.32, which is not very large compared to other dimensions. The variance 
proportions show that for TSQ 92% of the variance of the regression coefficient is 
associated with eigenvalue number 3, and for TSE 89% of the variance of the regression 
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coefficient is associated with eigenvalue number 2, which is a sign of no 
multicollinearity. 
Variance Proportions 
Condition Total System Total Self 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Index (Constant) Quality lIlicacy 
11 1.993 1.000 . 
00 . 00 
2 
. 007 
17.488 1.00 1.00 
1 2.954 1.000 . 00 . 00 . 01 
2 
. 040 
8.614 . 02 . 08 . 89 
3 
. 006 
22.320 . 
97 . 92 . 11 
Dependent Variable: Total Perceived Ease of Use 
Table 7.15 Collinearity Diagnostics (TPEOU) 
7.5.2.5 Casewise Diagnostics 
Table 7.16 indicates that out of 116 cases only 2 cases (less than 2%) are with the 
standardised residuals outside the limits of ±2. Therefore, our sample appears to 
conform to the expectation of a reasonably accurate model. 
Total Perceived Predicted 
Case Number Std. Residual Ease of Use Value Residual 
49 
-2.364 2.50 3.8781 -1.37812 
67 
-2.809 2.25 3.8875 -1.63754 
Dependent Variable: Total Perceived Ease of Use 
Table 7.16 Casewise Diagnostics (TPEOU) 
7.5.3 AIS User Satisfaction 
7.5.3.1 Correlations 
The Pearson correlation coefficients in the correlation matrix (table 7.17) for both the 
scales of TPU and TPEOU are above 0.3, (R = 0.543, p<0.001, and R=0.311, p< 
0.001, respectively) which show important correlations with TAISUS. Iiowever, TPU has 
a larger positive correlation with TAISUS, than TPEOU. 13ivariate correlation between 
TPU and TPEOU is 0.407 and bellow maximum limit of 0.9. One-tailed significance 
values indicate that positive correlations are significant (p < 0.001) in both the cases, 
between TPU and TAISUS, and between TPEOU and TAISUS (see table 7.17). The 
number of cases is also given in the same table. 
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Total AIS User Total Perceived Total Perceived 
Satisfaction Usefulness Ease of Use 
Pearson Correlation Total AIS User Satisfaction 1.000 . 543 . 311 
Total Perceived Usefulness 
. 543 1.000 . 407 
Total Perceived Ease of Use . 311 . 407 1.000 
Sig. (I-tailed) Total AIS User Satisfaction . 000 . 000 
Total Perceived Usefulness 
. 000 . 000 
Total Perceived Ease of Use . 000 . 000 
N Total AIS User Satisfaction 116 114 116 
Total Perceived Usefulness 114 114 114 
Total Perceived Ease of Use 116 114 116 
Table 7.17 Correlation Matrix for Regression Analysis (TAISUS) 
7.5.3.2 Evaluation 
Table 7.18 shows that 30.4% (R2 = 0.304) of the variance in TAISUS is explained by the 
model. This includes the TPU (R2 = 0.294), and TPEOU (R2 = 0,010). Adjusted R2 is 
0.292, which shows shrinkage of 1.2% (shrinkage = (. 304-. 292)x I00 ). This means that 
the percentage of the variance explained by the model is not much away from the 
corrected estimate of the true population. TPU causes RZ to change from zero to 0.294. 
This change in the amount of variance explained gives rise to a significant F-ratio of 
46.751 with a probability of less than 0.001. Addition of TPEOU causes R2 to increase by 
0.010. This change in the amount of variance that it can explain gives rise to an F-ratio of 
1.5430, which is not significant with a probability of less than 0,217. 
Model Adjusted R Std. Error of the 
R R Square Square Estimate 
. 543(a) 
. 552 (b) 
. 294 
. 304 
. 288 
. 292 
. 61460 
. 61312 
(a) Predictors: (Constant), Total Perceived Usefulness 
(b) Predictors: (Constant), Total Perceived Usefulness, Total Perceived Ease of Use 
Dependent Variable: Total ATS User Satisfaction 
Table 7.18 Regression Model Summary (TAISUS) 
According to ANOVA (table 7.19), both the F-ratio for model I (F= 46.751), and F-ratio 
for model 2 (F= 24.261) are significant (p <0.001 for both the cases), and therefore, it is 
unlikely to have happened by chance. These results show that both models I (with TPU 
as the IV) and 2 (with addition of TPEOU) are significant fit of the data overall, and they 
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significantly improve our ability to predict the outcome variable, because the F-ratios are 
significant (probability less than 0.05). 
Model Sum of Squares, df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 17.660 1 17.660 46.751 . 000(a) Residual 42.307 112 . 378 Total 59.966 113 
Regression 18.240 2 9.120 24.261 
. 000(b) Residual 41.726 111 . 376 
Total 59.966 113 
(a) Predictors: (Constant), Total Perceived Usefulness 
(b) Predictors: (Constant), Total Perceived Usefulness, Total Perceived Ease of Use 
Dependent Variable: Total AIS User Satisfaction 
Table 7.19 ANOVA (TAISUS) 
7.5.3.3 Model Parameters 
According to table 7.20: 
" The b-value for TPU (0.685) indicates that as TPU increases by one unit, 
TAISUS increases by 0.685 units provided that the effect of TPEOU is held 
constant. This value would vary across different samples by 0.119 (associated 
standard error with TPU). 
" The b-value for TPEOU (0.126) indicates that as TPEOU increases by one unit, 
TPU increases by only 0.126 units provided that the effect of TPU is held 
constant. This value would vary across different samples by 0.101 (associated 
standard error with TSE). 
" The t-test results for this model indicate that the TPU (t = 5.754, p<0.00 1), is a 
significant predictor of TAISUS, but TPEOU (t = 1.242, p<0.217) is not a 
significant predictors of TAISUS. 
The TPU with ft value of 49.9% makes a stronger unique contribution to explaining 
TAISUS, when the variance explained by the TPEOU is controlled. The standardised beta 
value for TPEOU is only showing a contribution of 10.8%. According to table 7.20, TPU 
with a significance value of 0.001 is making a unique significant contribution to predict 
TAISUS scores, but TPEOU with significance value of 0.217 does not make such a 
unique and statistically significant contribution to TAISUS scores prediction. This may 
be due to some overlap between TPU and TPEOU. 
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The confidence interval for TPU is between 0.449 and 0.921, which is relatively narrow 
and does not cross zero. The range of confidence interval for TPEOU is between -0.75 
and 0.325, which despite being narrow, crosses zero. These confidence intervals indicate 
that the parameters for TPU are significant, but the parameters for TPEOU are not 
significant and they do not have positive relationships. 
The zero-order correlations (TPU = 0.543, and TPEOU = 0.311) are again the Pearson 
correlation coefficients that correspond to the same values in correlation table 7.17. The 
part correlation coefficients for TPU (0.456) and for TPEOU (0.098), in table 7.20, 
indicate that TPU uniquely explains about 21% (0.4562) and TPEOU could only uniquely 
explain less than 1% (0.0982) of the variance in TAISUS scores, when the effect from the 
other variable on the outcome is controlled. 
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Unstandardize Standardized Confidence Collinearity 
Model Coefficients Coefficients t Sig. Interval for B Correlations Statistics 
Std. Lower Upper Zero- 
B Error Beta Bound Bound order Part olcrance VIF 
1 (Constant) . 850 . 403 2.110 . 037 . 052 1.648 Total 
Perceived . 746 . 109 . 543 6.837 . 000 . 530 . 962 . 543 . 543 1.000 1.000 Usefulness 
(Constant) . 612 . 445 1.376 . 172 -. 270 1.494 Total 
Perceived . 685 . 119 . 499 5.754 . 000 . 449 . 921 . 543 . 456 . 834 1.199 Usefulness 
Total 
Perceived Ease . 126 . 101 . 108 1.242 . 217 -. 075 . 327 . 311 . 098 . 834 1.199 of Use 
Dependent Variable: Total AlS User Satisfaction 
Table 7.20 Coefficients of the regression model (TA1SUS) 
7.5.3.4 Multicollinearity Assessment 
The lowest tolerance value in table 7.20 is 0.834 (more than 0.10), and the highest VIF 
value is 1.199 (well below 10). These show that multicollinearity is not a problem for this 
model. 
In addition, table 7.21 shows that the eigenvalues of the scales are between 2,974 and 
0.010, which are reasonably close. Condition index of the final dimension is 17.026, 
which in comparison to other dimensions is not very large. The variance proportions 
show that the highest percentage (80%) of TPU variance proportion is associated with 
eigenvalue number 3, and the highest percentage (100%) of TPEOU variance proportion 
is associated with eigenvalue number 2. These data indicate no multicollinearity. 
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Variance Proportions 
Condition Total Perceived Total Perceived 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Index (Constant) Usefulness Ease of Use 
11 1.990 1.000 . 01 . 01 
2 . 010 
13.922 . 
99 . 99 
1 2.974 1.000 . 00 . 00 . 00 
2 . 016 13.726 . 
15 . 20 1.00 
3 . 010 
17.026 . 84 . 80 . 00 
Dependent Variable: 1 otal Ate User satisfaction 
Table 7.21 Collinearity Diagnostics (TAISUS) 
7.5.3.5 Casewise Diagnostics 
Table 7.22 indicates that out of 116 cases only 3 cases (less than 3%) are with 
standardised residuals outside the limits of (± 2). This means that about 97% of the cases 
are with standardised residuals within the limits, and therefore, our sample is reasonably 
accurate. 
Case Number Std. Residual 
Total AIS User 
Satisfaction 
Predicted 
Value Residual 
41 
-2.501 2.25 3.783 -1.5331. 
54 2.25 5.0 3.620 1.3798( 
97 
-2.691 2.75 4.400 -1.64991 
Dependent Variable: Total AlS User Satistaction 
Table 7.22 Casewise Diagnostics (TAISUS) 
7.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
7.6.1 Internal Consistency 
Preliminary data analysis showed that scores of the grouped questionnaire items were 
normally distributed. Five items with low reliability dropped from the analysis. The 
remaining 34 items included in the questionnaire, for the final analysis according to ALS 
user satisfaction model, had a reliable total scale with an overall Cronbach's alpha of 
0.804. Reliability figures for total score for the items included in model variables were 
0.739 for system quality, 0.711 for system self-efficacy, 0.769 for perceived usefulness, 
0.737 for perceived ease of use, and 0.704 for AIS user satisfaction, which are within an 
acceptable limit. 
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7.6.2 Implications of the Model 
Pearson correlation coefficients (R) are used to test the relationship between the 
attitudinal forming Ns of system quality and self-efficacy, and the sample's perceived 
usefulness and ease of use of AIS. The results are as follows: 
SQ: PU (R = 0.504, P<0.001,1-tailed) 
SE: PU (R = 0.380, P<0.001,1-tailed) 
SQ: PEOU (R = 0.3 60, P<0.00 1,1-tailed) 
SE: PEOU (R = 0.132, P<0.140,1-tailed) 
Results show that both the system quality and self-efficacy have a statistically significant 
and positive relationship with perceived usefulness. About perceived ease of use, only 
system quality has a significantly positive relationship with perceived ease of use, but the 
positive relationship of self-efficacy with perceived ease of use is not statistically 
significant (P > 0.05). The strongest relationship is between SQ and PU with R=0.504, 
and the weakest relationship is between SE and PEOU with R=0.132. The relationships 
show that the system quality is strongly related with AIS perceived usefulness and its 
perceived ease of use. 
The results of Pearson correlation coefficients (R) for perceptual variables of perceived 
usefulness, perceived ease of use, and AIS user satisfaction are as follows: 
PEOU: PU (R = 0.407, P<0.001,1-tailed) 
PU: AISUS (R = 0.543, P<0.001,1-tailed) 
PEOU: AISUS (R = 0.311, P<0.001,1-tailed) 
The above correlation coefficients show positive and statistically significant relationships 
between the PU, PEOU and AISUS. It also can be seen that there is a relatively strong 
bivariate relationship between PU and PEOU. The relationship between PU and AISUS is 
stronger than the relationship between PEOU and AISUS. This means that if the AIS 
users perceive that the implemented AIS technology is useful and easy to use then they 
are likely to be satisfied with the system, and therefore, they would prefer to use the AIS 
for navigational activities. 
Path analysis of the model is drawn in figure 7.6 to show the importance of different 
variables in predicting dependent variable in AIS User Satisfaction Model. The diagram 
includes standardised beta coefficients (B), which shows the strength of influence of each 
192 
predictor variable on the criterion variable according to the measurement constructs of the 
model. 
System Quality Beta=523° 
P<0.001 
Beta=36.7%, 
p<0.002 i 
Beta=40.5%, 
p<0.001 
System Beta=15%, 
Self-Efficacy P>0.05 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
Beta. 49.9%, 
P<0.001 
A1S User Beta=40.7%, 
Satisfaction P<0.001 
Beta=10.8%, 
P>0.05 
Perceived 
Ease of Use 
Figure 7.6 Path Analysis of the AIS Satisfaction Model 
The diagram demonstrates that: 
" Unique influence of each one of the independent variables on predicting 
perceived usefulness, when variance explained by the other is controlled, was 
52.3% for AIS system quality and 40.5% for navigators' self-efficacy. This 
unique importance of the variables in predicting ATS perceived usefulness were 
both significant with a probability of 0.001 and without any overlap between 
them. 
" Unique influence of the each one of the independent variables on predicting 
perceived ease of use, when variance explained by other is controlled, was 
36.7% for AIS system quality and 15.0% for navigators' self-efficacy. The 
unique importance of the system quality in predicting AIS perceived ease of use 
was significant with a probability of 0.002, but this unique importance was not 
significant for navigators' self-efficacy (P = 0.195, which is more than 0.05). 
There is a possibility of overlap between system quality and self-efficacy. 
" Unique influence of each one of the independent variables on predicting 
perceived AIS user satisfaction, when variance explained by other is controlled, 
was 49.9% for AIS perceived usefulness and 10.8% for AIS perceived case of 
use. The unique importance of the perceived usefulness in predicting AIS user 
satisfaction was significant with a probability of 0.001, but the unique 
importance of perceived ease of use was not significant (P = 0.217, which is 
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more than 0.05). Some degrees of overlap might exist between perceived 
usefulness and perceived ease of use. 
Confidence intervals show that the parameters for AIS system quality and navigators' 
self-efficacy in predicting perceived usefulness were significant with positive 
relationships. According to part correlation values, AIS system quality uniquely 
explained 27%, and navigators' self-efficacy 16% of the variance in perceived usefulness 
of the AIS for navigation. A shrinkage of 1.9% shows that difference in percentage of the 
variance in AIS perceived usefulness explained by the model and the corrected estimate 
of the true population was very low. The result showed that the model was a good f it and 
it significantly improves prediction of perceived usefulness. 
Parameters for AIS system quality in predicting perceived ease of use was significant 
with positive relationships but parameters for self-efficacy in predicting perceived ease of 
use was not significant and with negative relationships. AIS system quality uniquely 
explained 13.5%, and navigators' self-efficacy 2.3% of the variance in perceived ease of 
use of the AIS for navigation. The difference in percentage of the variance in AIS 
perceived ease of use explained by the model and the corrected estimate of the true 
population was 2.7%. The result also showed that the model was a significant fit of the 
data overall for perceived ease of use. 
Parameters for AIS perceived usefulness in predicting AIS user satisfaction was 
significant with positive relationships but parameters for perceived ease of use in 
predicting AIS user satisfaction was not significant and with negative relationships. AlS 
perceived usefulness uniquely explained 21%, and AIS perceived case of use uniquely 
explained less than 1% of the variance in perceived AIS user satisfaction for marine 
navigation. The difference in percentage of the variance in AIS perceived AIS user 
satisfaction explained by the model and the corrected estimate of the true population was 
1.2%. The result also showed that the model was a significant fit of the data overall for 
perceived ease of use. The model showed significant goodness-of-fit in predicting the 
perceived AIS user satisfaction. 
It was also observed that the problem of multicollinearity due to the fact that perfect or 
strong correlation between independent variables did not exist in the model. Therefore, 
the regression coefficients were uniquely estimated in the model. Casewise diagnostics 
showed that the regression models were reasonably accurate as the maximum percentage 
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of the cases with standardised residuals outside the limits was 3%. Therefore, there was 
not a big difference between the outcome of the sample and the outcome of the model. 
The path analysis (figure 7.6) showed that the there is not a significant unique influence 
of the navigators' AIS self-efficacy on predicting perceived ease of use. It is also revealed 
that the unique influence of perceived ease of use is not significant on the AIS user 
satisfaction. However, a unique influence from navigators' self-efficacy on the perceived 
usefulness was observed in the model, which was not considered in the original model. 
Therefore, the AIS user satisfaction could be modified as shown in figure 7.7, 
System Quality 
Beta=52.3%, 
Beta=36.7%, p <0.00 1 
P<0.002 
01 
Perceived Beta - 40.7%, 
Ease of Use p<0.001 
System Beta=40.5%, 
Self-Efficacy P<0.001 
Perceived Bets-49.9%, A! S User 
Usefulness P<0.001 ý" Saiisfaetlon 
Figure 7.7 Modified AIS User Satisfaction Model 
The findings of the AIS data studies, in chapter 4, showed a number of cases for 
unreliability of AIS data. Therefore, it could not be wholly trusted by navigators, which 
consequently could lead to further deterioration in AIS usage and data quality. The 
improved model for measuring AIS User Satisfaction (figure 7.7) derived in this chapter 
is of benefit in understanding the user perception of AlS technology. This model will help 
the construction of future surveys of AIS User Satisfaction and usage, as it will improve 
reliability and accuracy of the results. 
The research has demonstrated that such models can be implemented in a seagoing 
context. Such research is best carried out before or at an early stage of implementation 
and it is suggested that it is not too late for AlS implementation to benefit from the use of 
such models. This User Satisfaction model may also be of benefit for measuring user 
satisfaction in the implementation of similar technologies in a mandatory environment. 
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Similar models have been successfully used to design implementation plans and strategies 
in other industries, particularly those relating to IT. 
7.7 Summary 
AIS user satisfaction model was used to find out reliability and validity of the AIS 
questionnaire measurement scale. The questionnaire items were clustered to match the 
AIS user satisfaction model. SPSS version 14 was used to carry out data analysis. Internal 
consistency of the measurement scale was examined through Cronbach's alpha 
coefficient. As the scores were normally distributed, Multiple Regression was used to 
explore the relationships between different constructed variables. After dropping five 
items with low Cronbach's alpha from the AIS questionnaire, the reliability coefficients 
for the remaining items showed that the measurement scale for items in total 
questionnaire and measurement for five variables were reliable. 
The results for the variables' relationship and amount of variance in scores for AIS users 
satisfaction that can be explained by the measurement constructs showed that each of the 
AIS system quality and navigator's self efficacy had a significantly unique influence on 
predicting perceived usefulness of AIS, when variance explained by other one is 
controlled. However, in predicting perceived ease of use of AIS there was possibility of 
overlap between predictors as it was only AIS system quality that had such a significantly 
unique influence, and unique influence of navigator's self-efficacy was not significant. 
The results also showed that only the unique influence of perceived usefulness of the AIS 
on predicting AIS user satisfaction was significant, but not the influence of perceived 
ease of use of the AIS. 
Importantly, it was found that there was a significantly unique influence of 40.5%, 
(P<0.001) from navigators' self-efficacy on predicting perceived usefulness, which was 
not included in the original model. Therefore, a modified AIS user satisfaction model was 
suggested. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has evaluated the impact of AIS technology on the safety of marine 
navigation. The main objectives of this research were to examine the accuracy of AIS 
data fields that are inputted manually, and to measure the extent of use of AIS by 
navigators. The objectives were addressed by summarising failures at different levels of 
the AIS structure, and suggesting remedial actions in order to reduce the likelihood of 
errors and thus minimise accident opportunities. Further, the objectives were addressed 
by adopting a theoretical model of human behaviour for measuring AIS user satisfaction 
and modification of the model for evaluation of the AIS questionnaire survey. 
A system's approach of human error qualitative analysis, based on an application of 
Reason's (1990,1997) "Swiss Cheese" model, showed a number of problems and human 
errors associated with AIS information. These problems are indications of failures (active 
or latent) at different system levels. Further, the results of the questionnaire survey 
showed that some aspects of the AIS and competency level of its users require more 
attention and improvement. These issues have major implications for the success of AIS 
in improving and enhancing the safety of marine navigation. The modified AIS user 
satisfaction model demonstrates how it could be used to measure the satisfaction of 
navigators using AIS technology for anti-collision and other navigation operations, in a 
mandatory environment. 
This chapter considers the contribution of this research to the application and use of AMS 
technology and improvement of safety of marine navigation. It reviews the research 
objectives stated in chapter 1, and the way in which these objectives have been addressed 
in section 8.2. The main conclusions of this research will be discussed in section 8.3. 
Section 8.4 discusses limitations and areas for further research. Section 8.5 will state final 
remarks of this research. 
8.2 Reviewing the Objectives 
This research has examined how AIS technology as a navigational aid has affected the 
safety of marine navigation. It has identified ways in which such safety can be enhanced. 
The research included the following stages: 
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" Overview of AIS technology. 
The current situation of AIS, satisfaction of navigators with AIS and 111t1, the actual 
extent of use of the technology in the navigation operation was examined. A detailed 
overview of AIS technology and its application in marine navigation. to further 
expand reader's practical understanding of the AIS technology and what it does, was 
also presented. 
" Accuracy of AIS information. 
Examination of the performance and accuracy of the information transmitted by AIS 
to identify the major issues associated with its application in navigation operations 
especially for anti-collision activities was carried out. This was done Ibilowing an 
extensive literature review, which identified the safety issues involved in AIS 
implementation for marine navigation. The literature review examined the reasons 
underlying the use of new technology in the marine industry with a particular 
consideration given to the application of AIS as an anti-collision aid. the review also 
identified many issues regarding important aspects of AIS application for its intended 
purposes, and included findings of some of the pre-implementation pilot studies. The 
safety of marine navigation and human aspects of new technology were also 
investigated during the review in order to examine their possible constitution to 
marine accidents. The review adopted a systems approach to the issues of human 
performance and error in regard to the AIS that can have an impact on safety of 
marine navigation. The extent of such failures was explored and examined through 
the AIS data studies in chapter 4. 
Navigator's views and satisfaction with , 41S. 
Evaluation of navigators' performance in AIS usage for anti-collision operation on- 
board ships was carried out to identify and validate end user problems and required 
improvement actions. This was addressed through the analysis of questionnaire data 
concerning navigators' views about different features and aspects of AIS. The impact 
of demographic factors between subsets of population, including navigator's training, 
type of training, certificate of competency, total sea experience, and typo of AIS 
display available, was considered in chapter 5. 
"A model of user satisfaction with AIS 
Adapting a suitable model for identifying a reliable and valid scale for measurement 
of satisfaction that can be used as a framework for examining end user performance 
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and usage of AIS, and possibly other similar technologies in future. This was carried 
out through discussing a number of commonly used theories and models of human 
attitude and behaviour, and adopting the AIS User Satisfaction Model as the basis for 
assessing navigators' satisfaction with AIS, in chapter 6 of this thesis. Reliability and 
validity of the measurement scale of the questionnaire survey along with application 
of the model for the study of human usage behaviour in relation to AIS are shown in 
chapter 7 of this research. Chapter 7 also suggested some modification to the model 
and showed that the modified model has implications for studying human acceptance 
of similar new technologies in mandatory environments. 
8.3 Discussion of the Main Conclusions 
The conclusions of this research have been broken down into the following 4 subsections. 
" Navigation Safety and risk management. 
" AIS and levels of human failures. 
" Navigators' views of the AIS as an anti-collision aid. 
" Reliability and validity of the AlSsurvey. 
8.3.1 Navigation Safety and Risk Management 
Accident investigation results have indicated that the contribution of human error to 
maritime accidents has increased over a ten-year period from 1991 to 2001 (Baker and 
Seah, 2004). Most of these accidents resulted from avoidable human errors. Safety is an 
important aspect of a navigation system with many persons involved, individually or 
jointly as an organisation, at different levels. Official control and management of marine 
safety is carried out by different actions of these stakeholders. The actions include 
navigation activities performed by frontline operators, rules and regulations, and 
procedures and instructions. The socio-technical system of safety and risk management 
in marine navigation, adapted from Rasmussen (1997,2000), is a hierarchical framework 
showing various elements at different levels that can contribute to safety of the system 
and risk management in marine navigation. The framework comprises at least 8 layers, 
depicting the involvement of individuals and organisations in marine navigation. They 
include the following: 
I. At the lowest level- behaviours associated with the navigation process, 
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2. At second level- activities of the individual mariners directly engaged in the 
navigation operation. 
3. At third level- activities of senior officers that supervise junior officers. 
4. At forth level- activities of shipping companies. 
5. At fifth level- activities of designers in designing equipment, interfaces, and 
operational procedures. 
6. At sixth level- activities of maritime associations and organisalions (i. e., 
classification societies, etc. ) responsible for setting up industrial and professional 
rules and regulations. 
7. At seventh level- national regulators responsible for setting up local regulations, 
supervision and enforcement of rules and regulations. 
8. At the highest level- International regulators (i. e., IMO, ILO, etc. ) setting up 
regulations, and monitoring of navigation at international levels. 
Many challenges from dynamic, technical, socio-political, financial and physical 
environment, technological changes, organisational structures and communications, and 
public opinion imposed upon the above constituents to influence the safety of the system. 
Such forces may impose additional pressure on the mariner's responsibilities and 
workloads (physically and/or mentally). They may lead to a deterioration of system 
defences at different levels due to errors and violations of regulations and procedures. 
The proper interaction of the system elements with each other and with forces external to 
the system will play an important role in safety and risk management in marine 
navigation. Proper human factors research could improve detection and control of 
undesirable variability in human performance and, consequently, reduce chances of errors 
that could lead to unexpected and unwanted disasters. 
8.3.2 AIS and Levels of Human Failures 
Using a system's approach, possible failures (active or latent) at different levels of the 
AIS utilisation system were explored in this thesis. The failures are based on application 
of the "Swiss Cheese" model (Reason, 1990,1997) of human error. The original model 
was adopted to indicate how failures at various stages of the AIS utilisation system might 
allow a problem to pass through the weaknesses in the system's various defence layers 
that jeopardise safety of navigation with potentially serious consequences. The model 
highlighted human failures that can happen at different levels. The main defence layers 
that are considered important in the AIS system include the following: 
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" Correct data input and updating data by AIS operators. 
" AIS operator's competency and management of operation. 
" Worldwide defined standards for AIS design. 
" Sufficient regulations on supervision of AIS information and training. 
Problems identified in the AIS data studies, in the course of this research, showed human 
failures at different levels. The failures include: 
" Frontline operator failures. 
" Installation failures. 
" Training and management failures. 
" Regulatory failures. 
" Violations. 
The findings of the AIS data studies show that the data provided by AIS are not reliable 
in many cases due to inaccuracies highlighted in this thesis. Therefore, navigators cannot 
wholly trust the AIS equipment. Such distrust could lead to further deterioration of AIS 
use. 
Currently, there are some differences in the format and terminology expected for data 
options in AIS equipment made by different manufacturers. The list of options available 
should be standardised according to different types and navigational status of the ships (as 
defined in the IRPCS). 
Some peculiarities were found for some categories of vessels, similar to some of those for 
use of lights and shapes. AIS training similar to those for understanding the use of lights 
and shapes needs to be introduced. This training, in addition to reducing confusion in AlS 
use, would encourage the use of the narrow definition of the expression of `sailing' in the 
context of the AIS message and in the IRPSC. 
There is a need for clarification of the regulations about the use of safety text messaging, 
available in AIS equipment, for anti-collision by IMO. At present, there is not a clear 
guideline about whether such a facility in AIS equipment could, or should be used for 
anti-collision communication between vessels. In the case of endorsement of this method 
of collision avoidance, inclusion of an effective audio-visual warning signal to notify the 
receipt of safety text messages would be helpful. There is a need for further training for 
navigators on these subjects. 
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Many of the input errors in the field of ship's navigational status, observed during this 
research, were due to memory slips or omissions in the execution of actions by 
navigators. Self-checking mechanisms and links to other navigational equipment could 
easily be added to the AIS equipment to detect such obvious inconsistencies. For 
example, an interlink mechanism between speed and navigational status of the ship. 
Errors of this type could be prevented or minimised by alerting navigators to erroneous 
conditions in the early stages of their development. Extension of the use of warning 
signals is also suggested to include a link with the ship's navigational light system. Such 
a link could initiate a signal to warn the navigator in case of any conflict between the 
actual navigational status of the ship and status shown in AIS data. 
The integrity of the AIS autonomous data transmission and reception depends upon many 
manual inputs, and the current critical unreliability of the AIS data could mitigate use of 
the AIS as a trustworthy navigational aid in anti-collision operation. Therefore, proper 
supervision, surveillance of information accuracy, and regulations enforcing such 
activities by competent authorities are needed to improve AIS effectiveness in navigation 
operation, and thus enhance the safety of navigation. 
There is lack of knowledge and skill on the use, and appreciation of capabilities and 
limitations of AIS by navigators and AIS operators ashore. This is expected to reduce the 
level of confidence of the navigators in use of AIS equipment in normal anti-collision 
performance. Therefore, an international mandatory regime for immediate application of 
viable training course, such as the Model Course 1.34, recommended by IMO in 2006, is 
suggested. 
The failure to update some optional fields of AIS information, such as destination and 
ETA in most cases, shows that they are not considered important by the mariners. 
Therefore, more encouragement of the mariners to maintain the data showing on their 
equipment will improve the data accuracy and also give them more confidence in data 
broadcasted from other ships. 
8.3.3 Navigators Views of the AIS as an Anti-Collision Aid 
This section discusses some points of interest identified through the evaluation of 
navigators' perception during this research. 
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The AIS is generally perceived to be a useful navigational aid in improving o%crall safety 
of navigation by enhancing the navigators' capability and confidence in navigation 
operations. It also provides clearer and more continuous information than radar, which 
could overcome most of the radar limitations in shadow areas when used as a 
navigational aid in addition to radar technology. However, a possibility of disruption of 
the normal anti-collision operation that was perceived by navigators should he removed 
through appropriate bridge team training and management. 
In general, the AIS equipment was considered to be easy to use for navigation operation, 
particularly for anti-collision purposes. The process of obtaining information from the 
equipment was considered to be clear and understandable. One observed dill iculty in ease 
of use of AIS was the slow response of the equipment in data input, which should be 
solved through design improvement. 
The display of AIS information is considered to be an important issue for A! S to achieve 
its implementation objectives. Most of the features and characteristics of the ways of 
displaying AIS information were felt to be satisfactory, except the required time for 
familiarisation with the way of extracting AIS information. This problem could be 
resolved by implementation of a proper training programme. A higher level of navigators' 
confidence was shown for the AIS display integrated with radar, in most of the cases, and 
a lower level of such confidence was shown for the display integrated with ECDIS. 
One of the most worrying problems in AIS implementation that could have an adverse 
effect of the impact of AIS on safety of marine navigation is the level of training of 
navigators in the basic operation of the equipment. Only 19.1% of the navigators have 
completed such formal training. The problem of navigators' competency is even evident 
in perception of those who have had some training, since, 40% of them believed that they 
are sufficiently competent to safely use AIS in anti-collision operation. In addition, high 
uncertainty of the navigators about the need for AIS training, degree of difficulty of 
learning to operate ATS without such training, and uncertainty about many other aspects 
of AIS are worrying signs in use of AIS. This lack of confidence may be a symptom of 
insufficient use of the technology by navigators for navigation. A widely adopted training 
and education programme could improve navigators' competency and confidence levels 
in the use of AIS for navigation, and therefore, it would enhance the safety of navigation. 
Some anomalies in AIS use may still be seen in coming years, until universal execution 
of such recommended trainings. 
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The statistically significant differences between the mean response scores for navigators 
who had AIS training and those who did not have AIS training indicate the importance of 
training in success of AIS implementation. Those who experienced AIS training have a 
higher belief about the possibility of disruption of their responsibilities in anti-collision 
operation by AIS, and about difficulty in self-learning to operate AIS. This higher degree 
of belief was also significant in the perceived ease of use of AIS for anti-collision 
operation, the value of the AIS display in the navigators' performance, sufficiency of 
their AIS training for safe conduct of anti-collision tasks, and the perceived overall 
decrease in VHF traffic congestion. These significant differences between the trained and 
the untrained navigators show the impact of AIS training on enhanced utilisation of the 
technology. They further indicate disclosure of some hidden features of the technology, 
appropriate familiarisation with different information, functions and features of the 
equipment and different types of display, and higher efficiency and extent of use by 
navigators as a result of training. 
Theoretical training was shown to have the highest, and practical on the job training the 
lowest, potential for improving safety of navigation by AIS. 
Significant differences were observed in the attitude of navigators dependent upon the 
certificate of competency held by them. These differences suggest that, in most cases, the 
second officer (as the most junior officer) had the highest, and master mariner (as the 
most senior officer) had the lowest optimism level about many aspects of the use of AIS 
for navigation. For example, junior officers had the highest level of belief about 
enhancement of situational awareness, increased efficiency, extent of control, case of use, 
clarity and understandable presentation of information, lack of unnecessary information 
on display, and ease of getting data in and out of the AIS. On the contrary, senior officers 
had the lowest level of such belief about enhancement of situational awareness, increased 
efficiency, extent of control, ease of use, improvement of safety of ship and overall safety 
of navigation by AIS. This could be due to the more recent training of the second officer, 
which could have included AIS training and a higher extent of use of AIS due to his more 
frequent presence on the bridge than the master mariner. 
AIS seems to reduce overall VHF calls at sea, but the extent of such calls for anti- 
collision agreements between ships and possible violation of IRPCS that may arise as a 
result of such agreements needs further investigation. 
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The possibility of misuse of AIS and its vulnerability due to jamming was argued to be 
security disadvantages that could affect the reliability of AIS use. The results of the 
questionnaire survey showed a lack of navigators' knowledge in this respect, which could 
be due to inadequate training of navigators. In addition, increased risk of piracy in certain 
areas, and transmitting erroneous information by AlS, are observed to be fundamental 
disadvantages. 
8.3.4 Reliability and Validity of the AIS Survey 
The adapted AIS user satisfaction model was used to evaluate reliability and validity of 
the measurement scale. Apart from five items with low reliability, which were dropped 
from the analysis, the remaining 34 items included in the questionnaire survey were 
reliable in their total scale and their grouped items scale. 
The test of relationship between variables in the AIS User Satisfaction Model showed that 
both the system quality and self-efficacy are significantly correlated with AiS perceived 
usefulness. The system quality has a stronger correlation than the self-efficacy. Ilowever, 
in the case of AIS perceived ease of use, only the system quality is positively correlated, 
and not the self-efficacy. In other words, System quality is strongly correlated with both 
the perceived usefulness and ease of use of AIS technology, while self-efficacy is only 
correlated with perceived usefulness of the AIS technology and not with its perceived 
ease of use. 
The results also showed that both the perceived usefulness and ease of use are correlated 
with AIS user satisfaction. However, the correlation of perceived usefulness with AIS 
user satisfaction is higher than perceived ease of use. There is also a significant positive 
correlation between perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness of the AIS. 
It was observed that system quality uniquely predicts 52.3% of the variance in predicting 
perceived usefulness of AIS, when variance explained by self-efficacy is controlled. Self. 
efficacy alone will predicts 40.5% of perceived usefulness, when variance explained by 
system quality is controlled (this relation was not shown in the original model). These 
predicting abilities are both significant and without overlaps between them. Therefore, 
both the system quality and self-efficacy are influencing factors and should be considered 
in predicting the perceived usefulness of AIS. 
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In predicting the perceived ease of use of AIS, system quality uniquely predicts 36.7% of 
its variance, when variance explained by self-efficacy is controlled. Self-efficacy predicts 
15% of such variance, when variance explained by system quality is controlled. The 
unique prediction of perceived ease of use of AIS by system quality is statistically 
significance but such unique predicting ability of self-efficacy is not significant. This 
insignificance predicting ability of self-efficacy suggests some degree of overlap between 
the two predictors. Therefore, only system quality is the influencing factor and should be 
considered in prediction of perceived ease of use of AIS. 
In measurement of AIS user satisfaction, perceived usefulness uniquely predicts 49.9% of 
its variance, when variance by perceived ease of use is controlled. Perceived ease of use 
predicts only 10.8% of such variance, when variance explained by perceived usefulness is 
controlled. This unique predicting ability of perceived usefulness in measuring AlS user 
satisfaction is statistically significant but such predicting ability by perceived ease of use 
is not statistically significant. Despite the non-significant ability of perceived ease of use 
in predicting AIS user satisfaction, it significantly predicts 40.7% of the variance in 
perceived usefulness. Therefore, perceived usefulness of AIS is considered as the direct 
influencing factor, but perceived ease of use of AIS is considered as the indirect 
influencing factor in predicting AIS user satisfaction. 
Parameters considered for both the system quality and the self-efficacy, in prediction of 
perceived usefulness, were significant with positive relationships. The variance in AIS 
perceived usefulness measured by the model has a small difference of 1.9% with the 
variance that could be explained by the corrected estimate of the true population. 
Therefore, the model is a significantly good fit and improves prediction of perceived 
usefulness of the AIS. 
Parameters considered for system quality in prediction of perceived ease of use were 
significant with a positive relationship, but parameters selected for self-efficacy in such 
prediction were not significant. The small difference of 2.7% in measuring variance in 
ease of use between the model and the corrected estimate of the true population indicates 
that the model is also a significantly good fit for improved prediction of perceived case of 
use of the AIS. 
Parameters for perceived usefulness in prediction of AIS user satisfaction were also 
significant with a positive relationship, but parameters selected for perceived ease of use 
in such prediction were not significant. The difference in measurement of variance of AIS 
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user satisfaction by perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use between the model 
and the corrected estimate of the true population is small (1.2%), therefore, it indicates 
that the model is also a significantly good fit for improved prediction of AlS user 
satisfaction. 
The study also confirms that the outcome of the sample and outcome of the modcl are 
very close to each other, as the maximum percentage of the cases with standardised 
residuals outside the limits was 3%. 
8.3.5 Modification to AIS User Satisfaction Model 
According to the results from this research (shown in figure 8.1), the initial AlS user 
satisfaction model should be modified as follows: 
1. System quality is considered as a predictor of both the perceived usefulness and 
perceived ease of use. This is same as the relationships that were considered In 
the original model. 
2. Self-efficacy is considered only as a predictor of the perceived usefulness and not 
as a predictor of the perceived ease of use. This is different from the relationship 
that was considered in the original model. In the original model, self-efficacy 
has been considered as a predictor of perceived ease of use but not as a predictor 
of perceived usefulness. 
3. Perceived ease of use is considered only as an influencing factor in prediction of 
perceived usefulness and not as a predictor of AlS user satisfaction. TIiis is 
different from the relationships that were considered In the original model, in 
the original model, not only perceived ease of use was considered as an 
influencing factor in prediction of perceived usefulness but also it has been 
considered as a predictor of AIS user satisfaction. 
4. Perceived usefulness is alone to be considered as the main predictor of the AlS 
user satisfaction. This is different with the relationships that were considered In 
the original model. In the original model, both the perceived usefulness and case 
of use were considered as main predictors of the A[S user satisfaction. 
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Figure 8.1 Final relationships between variables in the AIS User Satisfaction Model 
8.3.6 Recommendations for Improving AIS Success 
The findings of both the AIS data studies and questionnaire analysis revealed that some 
improvements should be made to AIS equipment as well as the navigators training. An 
international mandatory training requirement for navigators is required to improve their 
level of knowledge and competency. This could enhance the safety of marine navigation 
by improving the quality of the navigators to perform in anti-collision operation and 
emergencies. 
Moreover, the AIS could not be wholly trusted by navigators, because of unreliability of 
the AIS data, in many cases shown in this research, which consequently could lead to 
further deterioration in AIS reliance and usage. The improved model for measuring AIS 
User Satisfaction (figure 7.7) derived in chapter 7 is of benefit in understanding the user 
perception of AIS technology. This model will help the construction of future surveys of 
AIS User Satisfaction and usage, as it will improve reliability and accuracy of the results. 
The research has demonstrated that such models can be implemented in a seagoing 
context. Such research is best carried out before or at an early stage of implementation 
and it is suggested that it is not too late for AlS implementation to benefit from the use of 
such models. This User Satisfaction model may also be of benefit for measuring user 
satisfaction in the implementation of similar technologies in a mandatory environment. 
Similar models have been successfully used to design implementation plans and strategies 
in other industries, particularly those relating to information technology. 
8.4 Final Remarks 
This thesis demonstrated a human factors approach to the mandatory implementation of 
AIS technology in marine navigation. The thesis mainly focused on the application of 
AIS to the ship's bridge, and studied the accuracy of the AIS information to detect the 
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extent and level of human failures with suggestions made for remedial actions. It further 
examined navigators' perception about some of the main and important aspects of AIS in 
order to assess the extent of use of the technology on board. The thesis also evaluated the 
reliability and validity of the questionnaire items, clustered according to the adopted AlS 
user satisfaction model, in order to propose a suitable framework for measuring end user 
satisfaction with AIS and other similar navigation technologies. The human factors 
aspects of new technology, and in particular the AIS technology is an area that is 
relatively under-explored but it is becoming more important. 
Advancement and innovation in electronics and computer technologies have resulted in a 
higher pace of technological change and advances in marine operations such as ships' 
navigation. The introduction of AIS, integrated bridge system, voyage data recorder, new 
generation of marine radars, ECDIS, etc. are examples of new technologies facilitating 
marine navigation. A probable impact of such technological changes and advances is that 
the scope for vigilance and information management by humans increases as a result of 
the complexity of the technologies and changes to working practices on the bridge. The 
safety of shipping and marine navigation relies on correct understanding and successful 
use of such new technologies by navigators. Therefore, human factors aspects of new 
technology are increasingly important and remain a pressing area for research. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
The aims of this research were to assess the impact of AIS in terms of how the technology 
has been accepted by navigators, and suggest further development in the use of AIS in 
order to improve the safety of marine navigation. The main conclusions are summarised 
in this chapter. 
" AIS technology was introduced onto the ships' bridges with little prior 
consideration of the navigator's needs, especially human factors issues. This 
research has incorporated a variety of models to identify some of the key 
concerns. 
" The project has derived an AIS User Satisfaction Model, which shows an 
understanding of the navigators' perception about different aspects of AIS. This 
model has been refined for AIS at sea from existing IT based models in the 
literature. The understanding of the navigator's perception of the ALS will aid 
improvements to design, training needs and future regulation amendments, 
" The AIS User Satisfaction Model has potential for adaptation to other bridge 
technologies. 
" In the questionnaires completed by navigators, AIS is generally perceived to be a 
useful technology by the navigators. It is beneficial in enhancing the safety of 
marine navigation by improvement of navigators' ability, performance, quality 
and safety of anti-collision operations. 
" Generally navigators had a high level of confidence in AlS as a navigational aid. 
It has improved situational awareness, decision-making, and ship's safety in 
navigational operations as a result of its potential to provide extra precise 
information to the ship's bridge. 
" Knowledgeable navigators also perceived that AIS complemented the radar 
technology by its abilities to detect other targets in radar shadow areas and in 
heavy rain and sea. They were confident in the AIS ability to provide fast, clear 
and continuous information. This improves understanding of targets' intensions 
and actions in anti-collision operations. Navigators also believed in the ability of 
AIS to reduce the overall VHF traf is congestion as a result of its automatic 
transmission of ship's information, thus relieving the OOW from some verbal 
reporting on VHF. 
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" The training of navigators on the use of AIS is at a very low level, and should be 
improved. The project has shown that navigators with theoretical as well as 
practical training on AIS have a higher level of confidence in the system. A 
standardised and mandatory training programme on the use, capabilities, and 
limitations of AIS should ideally be implemented in order to enable navigators to 
use the equipment in a professionally accepted manner for anti-collision and 
other navigational operations. 
" The data provided by AIS are not reliable, in many cases, due to inaccuracies on 
part of the user. This should be an obvious area for improvement. 
1. Training would improve accuracy of the manual data input as it will 
remove misunderstandings and increase the confidence level and 
motivation of the navigators in the use of AIS in navigational operations. 
2. There are currently some peculiarities in the AIS field of ship status and 
some differences in system design between different manufacturers. This 
has resulted in slightly different lists of options available for different 
ship's types and navigational status. This can be addressed by 
incorporating into navigator training and/or a standardised design of the 
AIS according to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea. 
3. Currently there is no self-checking mechanism of data from links with 
other equipment on board to detect inconsistencies in AIS information. 
For example, a link with the ship's navigational light system would be 
very useful in improving accuracy of AIS messages. 
" Users with AIS displays integrated with radar had the highest level of confidence 
and satisfaction with the AIS data. Such integration will be compulsory for new 
radar equipment on SOLAS ships from 2008. The phasing out of existing non- 
AIS radar equipment should be encouraged. 
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Chapter 10 
Recommendations for Further AIS Research 
This research has shown many aspects of AIS technology for future research, not only to 
further develop the impact of AIS on the safety of marine navigation by its 
implementation to the ship's bridge but also to evaluate its impact on marine safety by its 
application in other areas related to marine navigation. 
The limitations of this research and areas for further research, highlighted during the 
project are: 
" New AIS questionnaire survey with variables' constructs based on AIS User 
Satisfaction Model. Following the development of the AIS User Satisfaction 
model in this project, it is now possible to develop an improved questionnaire 
survey based on this model. This will expand understanding of the perceptions 
and changes to perceptions of navigators about AIS and the usage of AIS for 
navigation. A new questionnaire based on the AIS User Satisfaction Model will 
also monitor changes of navigators' perceptions about AlS with time. 
" Assessment of AIS information, which are relayed automatically from other 
shipboard navigational equipment, particularly position, course and speed over 
ground, heading etc. This project did not assess the accuracy of the information 
automatically inputted from other navigational equipment on board due to the 
unavailability of research facilities. Therefore, proper assessment of the 
information automatically inputted into AlS will reveal the degree of reliability 
and accuracy and how navigators use the AIS information. 
" Investigation into the degree of conformity of actions within anti-collision 
regulations as a result of the implementation of AIS There was some indication 
in our survey that the more precise identification of ships available by AIS 
technology has resulted in anti-collision action agreements between vessels over 
the VHF. These agreements are sometimes contravene the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. This project did not examine this 
issue in detail. Further investigations on anti-collision agreements over the VIIF 
could be beneficial for safety of marine navigation. Firstly, such investigations 
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should assess the extent of use of VHF for such agreements as a result of 
introduction of AIS. Secondly, since use of VIIF communication for anti- 
collision agreements between vessels is not authorised by the organisations in 
charge, this will help the authorities to decide on the regulation/advice for use of 
VHF for anti-collision agreements due to the AIS precise identification of ships. 
Thirdly, it may assist the debate of future changes to regulations. 
" Assessment of the integration of the AIS information with information from 
radar and ECDIS. Integration of AIS with other navigational aids such as radar 
or ECDIS can reduce the chances of navigator's information overload by 
reducing the number of stand-alone pieces of equipment on the bridge. However, 
the association of the AIS and radar, or ECDIS information is an important issue, 
which has not been examined by this project. For example, the possibility of 
duplication of target information such as course, speed, bearing, CPA, and 
TCPA, due to difference in measurement accuracies between ALS and radar, 
could negatively affect performance of the navigators in anti-collision operations. 
Duplication of information could result in information overload, with increased 
chances of confusion and error in assessment, for the navigators. Combination of 
the AIS and radar data into one target is a better option for displaying 
navigational information, which can reduce the clutter on the display and 
provides a common track of radar and AIS data. The radar and AIS signals are 
based on two different principles with different accuracy and timing. Therefore, 
study of the combination of AIS and other information is an important issue, 
which can improve the data integration system between AIS and radar. Further, 
research on AIS data integration assists in developing suitable filtering strategies 
required, could resolve target discrimination errors associated with AIS display 
integrated with radar, and can improve target tracking ability. 
" Investigation into the impacts of AIS application ashore on monitoring and 
management of marine navigation, and its overall impact on maritime security. 
Shore-based application of AIS such as in VTS operations, apart from traffic 
monitoring and management, could be helpful in proper enforcement of 
regulations regarding acceptable use of the AIS technology and maintenance of 
its information at sea. Therefore, further investigations on the impacts of AIS 
ashore will be helpful in discovering AIS associated issues and could further 
improve the use for AIS ashore as a complementary to the overall safety of 
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marine navigation. This includes issues such as remote pilotage as well as the 
management of traffic, security and environment. 
" Investigation into the application of the AIS user satisfaction model for 
evaluation of navigators' perceptions about other navigational equipment, such 
as ECDIS, integrated bridge system, eta The research has developed a user 
satisfaction model for AIS, which is a starting point for consideration in the way 
in which other navigational technologies are currently applied on the ship's 
bridge. Further, research on the application of AIS User Satisfaction model for 
other navigational equipment would highlight system issues associated with such 
equipment. It would further assist in improving the usefulness of such equipment 
for navigation by resolving problems related to the quality of systems and their 
users. 
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Appendix B 
B. 1 AIS Survey Questionnaire 
ATS Questionnaire 
Impact of Automatic Identification System (AIS) on the Safety 
of Navigation 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) has been on the ships bridges for up to 2 
years. This survey questionnaire is part of a research project looking at the 
practical experience with AIS operation and its use for navigational purposes. 
The research is being carried out at the Marine Technology Group, School of 
Engineering, Liverpool John Moores University, UK. If you have any other 
comments on AIS, or questions regarding this questionnaire please contact Mr 
Abbas Harati-Mokhtari, the researcher, Tel: +44(0)1512312359, 
ENRAHARA a()livim. ac. uk or Dr. Alan Wall, director of study for this research, 
Tel: +44(0)1512312493, A. D. Wa1lC )1ivim. ac. uk . 
The allocation of some of your precious time in filling in this questionnaire will 
add to the accuracy of this research and is intended to contribute to safety at sea. 
Your responses will be greatly appreciated. 
Please answer questions in respect to the type of AIS used on board vessels you 
have sailed on. 
NOTE: YOUR INFORMATION WILL REMAIN STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
AND WILL NOT BE INDIVIDUIALLY PASSED ON TO THIRD PARTIES. 
Please return completed questionnaires: 
1) By email attachment to ENRAI{ARA a, liviimac. uk or 
2) By post to Abbas Harati-Mokhtari, Room 1.28, School of Engineering, 
Liverpool John Moores University, Byrom Street, Liverpool L3 3AF, England 
Section A: Personal Information 
1. Name (optional) ------- 
2. Rank -----------» ......................................... ».. 
3. Certificate of Competency held ----------------------------------------------».... _. -. _. 
4. Total time at sea ............... "-------------. -. -. »....,.. _»..... Years 
5. Total sailing experience with AIS -------------------Years Months 
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6. What type(s) of AIS system display was available on board ships you have 
sailed with (If you have used more than 1 type, please tick more than 1 
choices) 
1. Minimum keyboard and Display (MKD) Q 
2. Stand-alone Graphical Display Q 
3. Integrated with Radar Q 
4. Integrated with ECDIS Q 
For the following sections, please tick your choice in the relevant option box provided. 
Strongly Disagree [T] Disagree E] Neutral 3ý Agree 4 Strongly Agree äJ 
Section B: Perceived Usefulness of AIS 
1. AIS enhances navigator's situational awareness with a better situation display of the trat'iic. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
2. Using AIS would improve navigator's performance in anti-collision operation. 
1 2 3 4 
Q Q Q Q 
3. Using AIS would increase navigator's efficiency in anti-col lision operation. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
4. Using AIS would increase navigator's ability in anti-collision operat ion. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5. Using AIS would let the navigator feel more in control of anti-collision operation, 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
6. Navigators feel their ship is safer with AIS. 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
7. AIS will disrupt the normal anti-collision operation. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
8. AIS increases navigator's physical workload. 
S 
S 
5 
13 
5 
5 
Q 
S 
5 
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1 
9. ALS increases navigator's mental workload. 
El 
2 
0 
3 
0 
4 
Q 
5 
Li 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
10. Navigators prefer to use AlS alone rather than radar. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
11. AIS improves overall safety of navigation. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
12. AIS provides clearer and continuous information in comparison with radar. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
S 
Q 
13. Detection of targets in radar shadow areas is improved wi th AlS. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
13 
5 
Q 
Section C: Perceived Ease of Use of AIS 
1. Self-learning to operate AIS is hard for navigators. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q Q Q Q Q 
2. It is easy to become skilful at using AIS. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
3. The process of obtaining information from AIS is clear and understandable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q Q Q Q Q 
4. AIS is easy to use. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
S 
Q 
5. AIS responds slowly to data inputs by navigators. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
6. It is easy to use AIS for anti-collision operation. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
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Section D: Perception of AIS Information Display 
i. ATS display is valuable in navigator's performance. 
1234s 
QQQQ [ý 
2. Symbols used in AIS display are efficient. 
12345 
QQQQQ 
3. AIS keyboard is user friendly. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q Q Q Q Q 
4. The ATS unit help and instructions are useful and clear. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q Q Q Q Q 
5. It takes a long time to learn to extract AIS information. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
6. The way that the AIS information is presented is clear and understan dable. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q Q Q Q Q 
7. Some of the information on the AIS display is unnecessary. 
1 2 3 4 S 
Q Q Q Q Q 
8. It is relatively easy to move from one menu to another menu. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
9. Getting data in and out of the ATS is easy. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q Q Q Q Q 
10. Overlay of radar echoes with AlS data causes confusion. 
1 
Q 
2 
Q 
3 
Q 
4 
Q 
5 
Q 
Section E: AIS Training 
1. Have you completed any formal training on basic operation of AIS? 
a. Yes 
b. No o 
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2. If you have completed an AIS training, what kind of training was it? 
a. Theoretical training 0 
b. Practical on the job training o 
c. Simulation training o 
d. Theoretical and practical o 
3.1 think that my training on the use of AIS (if any) is adequate to safely perform anti-collision 
operation on the bridge using AIS. 
12 3 4 5 
QQ Q Q Q 
4. Formal training for AIS is essential for safe operation in collision situation. 
12 3 4 5 
QQ Q Q Q 
5. Learning to operate ATS without a proper training course is easy. 
12 3 4 5 
QQ Q Q Q 
Section F: AIS and Use of VIIF 
1. AIS decreases overall VHF traffic congestion. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q Q Q Q Q 
2. AIS causes increased use of VHF for anti-collision operation. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q Q Q Q Q 
3. The increased use of VHF for anti-collision decisions due to AIS violates International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs). 
1 2 3 4 5 
Section G: Disadvantages of AIS 
1. Since AIS stations have no means of assessing the data received, the information received 
from target ships is not reliable due to spoofing. 
2. AIS is vulnerable due to jamming. 
1 2 3 d 5 
D D Cl 0 0 
2 3 ä ä 
0 
CJ 
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3. AIS will increase the danger of piracy in areas of piratical activity. 
12345 
QQQQQ 
4. There is a risk of erroneous information displayed, through wrong data input associated with 
AIS. 
1234S 
QQQQQ 
Dr Alan Wall 
Reader in Maritime Studies 
School of Engineering 
Liverpool John Moores University 
Abbas Harati-Mokhtari 
Post-graduate researcher 
School of Engineering 
Liverpool John Moores University 
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B. 2 Questionnaire Codebook (Initial Questionnaire) 
Coding instructions 
Rank A2 - Rank I-Master Mariner. 2-'Chief Officer, 3-Second Officer, 
4=Third Officer 
Certificate of competency held A3 - 1-Master Mariner. 2-'Cbiet 
CertificateOfCompetency Officer, 3-Second (nicer, 
4-Third Officer 
Total time at sea (year) A4 - TotalSeatime In years 
Total sailing experience with AIS (month) A5 - TotalSail ingWithAlS In months 
Type(s) of AIS display available A6 - TypesOfAlSdisplay 1=Minimum Keyboard & Display (MKD). 2-Stand- 
Atone Graphical Display, 
3=Integrated with Radar, 
4=Integrated with WINS, 
5"More than one type 
AIS enhances navigator's situational awareness B 1- SituationalAwareness I-Strongly Disagree, 
with a better situation display of the traffic. 2-Disagree. 3=Neutral, 4-Agrcc, S'Strongly Agree 
Using ALS would improve navigator's performance B2 - I-Strongly Disagree, 
in anti-collision operation. AnticollisionPerformance 2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 4-Agrce, $-Strongly Agree 
Using AIS would increase navigator's efficiency in B3 - AnticollisionEfficiency 1-Strongly Disagree, 
anti-collision operation. 2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 4-Agree, S*Strongly Agee 
Using AIS would increase navigator's ability in B4 - AnticollisionAbility 1=Strongly Disagree, 
anti-collision operation. 2-Disafree, 3-Neutral, 4-Agree, S-Strongly Agree 
Using ALS would let the navigator feel more in 135 - MorelnControl 1-Strongly Disagree, 
control of anti-collision operation. 2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 4' Agrec, $ Strongly Agree 
Navigators feel their ship is safer with ALS. B6 - FeelingSafership 1-Strongly Disagree, 
2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 
4'Agrce, 3-Strongly Agree 
AIS will disrupt the normal anti-collision B7 - DisruptAnticollision 1"Strongly Disagree, 
operation. 2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 
4-Agree, S=Strongly Agree 
AIS increases navigator's physical workload. 138 - PhysicalWorkload I-Strongly Disagree. 
2-Disagree, 3-Ncutrnl, 
4-Agree. S"Strongly Agree 
AIS increases navigator's mental workload. B9 - MentalWorkload 1-Strongly Disagree, 
2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 
4-Agree, SmStrongly Agree 
Navigators prefer to use AIS alone rather than B10 - PreferAlSalonc 1-Strongly Disagree, 
radar. 2-Disagrce, 3-Neutral, 
4-Agree, S'Strongly Agree 
AIS improves overall safety of navigation. B1 I- ImprovcOverallSafcty IStrongly Disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3'Ncutral, 
4*Agrce, S-Strongly Agree 
AlS provides clearer and continuous information B12 - 1-Strongly Disagree, 
in comparison with radar. ProvideClearln formation 2=Disagree, 3`Ncutral, 
4-Agree, 5-Strongly Agree 
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Variable 
Detection of targets in radar shadow areas 
improved with AlS. 
SPSS variable name 
B13- 
ImprovedDetectionInRadarS 
hadow 
cl- 
HardScltLearningOpcration 
Coding Instructions 
I Self-learning to operate AIS is hard for navigators. 
It is easy to become skilful at using ALS. 
The process of obtaining information from AIS is 
clear and understandable. 
I ALS is easy to use. 
I AIS responds slowly to data inputs by navigators. 
I It is easy to use AIS for anti-collision operation. 
2-Disagrcc, 3-Neutral, 
4-Agree, SaStrongly Agree 
I -Stmngly Disagree, 
2=Disagree, 3-Neutra!, 
4-Agree, S*Strongly Agrcc 
C2 - EasyToßecomcSkififul I-Smongly Disegrro. 
2-Disagrcc, 3-Ncutr®1, 
4-Agree, 3*Strongly Agree 
C3 - 1-Strongly Disagree, 
ProcOtObtaininglnfolsClear 2' Disagcc, 3-Ncutrol, 
AndUndcrstandablc 4-Agree, 5*Stmngly Agrcc 
C4 - EasyToUso I -Strongly Disagrcc, 
2=Disagree, 3-Ncutral, 
4-Agrc0.5 -Strongly Ag 
C5 
StowResponceToDatalnput 
C6- 
EasyToUseForAnticollision 
I-Strongly Disagree, 
2=Disagree. 3=Neutral. 
4-Agree. S-Strongly Agree 
1=Strongly Disagree, 
2-Disagree. 3=Neutral, 
4*Agrce, 3=Strongly Agra 
AlS display is valuable in navigator's performance. Dl - 1=Strongly Disagree, 
DisplaylsValuablclnPcrform 2-Disagree, 3'=Neutral, 
ance 4-Agree, S-Strongly Agree 
Symbols used in AlS display are efficient. D2 - EfficientSymbol l-Strongly Disagree. 
2=Disagree, 3=Neutral, 
4-Agrce, S=Strongly Agree 
AIS keyboard is user friendly. D3 - UseFriendlyKcyboard I -Strongly Disagree, 
2-Disagme, 3-Neutral, 
4-Agree, S-Strongly Agree 
The ATS unit help and instructions are useful and D4 - [-Strongly Disagree, 
clear. UscfulUnitl lclpAndlnstructi 2-Disagree, 3-Ncutral, 
on 4-AM 5-Strongly Agree 
It takes a long time to ]cam to extract AIS DS - 
information. LongTimeToLcarnToExtract 
Info 
The way that ALS information is presented is clear D6 - 
and understandable. PresentinglnfoClcarAndUnd 
erstandablo 
Some of the information on the AIS display is D7 - 
unnecessary, SomcUnnecessarylnfotmatio 
n 
It is relatively easy to move from one menu to D8- 
another menu. EasyMoveMenuToMenu 
Getting data in and out of AIS is easy. D9 - EasyDatalnAndOut 
Overlay of radar echoes with AIS data causes D10- 
confusion. ConfusionDucToRadarOverl 
ay 
Have you completed any formal training on basic El - Training 
operation of AIS? 
14Strongly Disagrcc, 
2-Disagree, 3-NcuUal, 
4-Agrce, SoStrongly Agree 
I `Strongly Disagree, 
2-D sagrcc, 3-Neutral, 
4-Agrcc, 5-Strongly Agree 
I &Strongly Disagree, 
2-Disagrcc, 3 4lcutrai, 
4-Agree, 3-Strongly Agree 
I-Strongly Disagree, 
2"Disagmc, 3-Neutral, 
4*Agnx, 3 Str ugly Agree 
1-Strongly Disagree, 
2-Disagree, 3-Neutral. 
4"Agree, 5 -Strongly Agree 
I Swngly Disu . 2wDisugrac, 3*Nautrat, 
4=Agree, S-Strc ngty Agra 
1-Yes, 2-No 
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Variable I SPSS variable name I Coding Instructions 
If you have completed an AIS 
of training it was. 
I think that my training on the use of AIS (if any) 
is adequate to safely perform anti-collision 
operation on the bridge using AIS. 
Formal training for AIS is essential for safe 
operation in collision situation. 
E3 " AdcquatcTraining 
E4- 
TrainEssentialrorSafcOpcrat 
ion 
2=Practical on the job training, 
3-Simulation training, 
4-Theoretical and practical 
t=Strongly Disagrcc, 
2-Disagcc, 3-Ncutral, 
4=Agree, S-Strongty Agtcc 
I Strongly Disagree, 
2-Disagree. 3-Neutral, 
4-Agrcc. 5-Strongly Agra 
Learning to operate AIS without a proper training ES -I `Strongly Disagree, 
course is easy. LearingToOperateWithoutTr 2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 
aining 4-Agrec, 5-Strongly Agra 
ATS decreases overall VHF traffic congestion. F1- t-Strongly Disagree, 
DccreaseOverallVNFTraffic 2-Disagrce. 3*Ncutral, 
4-Agree. 5-Strongly Agra 
AIS causes increased use of VI IF for anti-collision F2 - I-Strongly Disoy , 
operation. Increase Vi lFUscForAnticolli 2-Disagree, 3-Neutral, 
sion 4MAgrce, 5-Strongly Agree 
The increased use of VHF for anti-collision F3 - 1=Strongly Disagree, 
decisions due to AIS violates International RegViolationDucToVllFUse 2-Disagree 3-Ncutrat, 
Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea 4vAgrcc, 5 -Strongly Agree 
(CoiRegs). 
Since AlS stations have no means of assessing the GI - I-Strongly Disagree, 
data received, the information received from target NoReliableDataDucToSpoof 2=Disagree, 3-Neutral, 
ships are not reliable due to spoofing. ing 4-Agree, 5-Strongly Agree 
AIS is vulnerable due to jamming, G2 - 1 LStrongly Disagree. 
VulncrableDucToJamming 2=Disagree, 3-Neutral, 
4-Agree, S"Strongly Agree 
AIS will increase the danger of piracy in areas of 03 - IncreasePiracy I"Strongly Disagree, 
piratical activity. 2-Disagnec, 3-NcuUal, 
4-Agree, S-Strongly Agree 
There is a risk of erroneous information displayed, 04- I-Strongly Disagree. 
through wrong data input associated with AIS. ErroneoustnfoDueToWrong 2-Disagrcc, 3-Neutral, 
Datainput 4-Agree. S-Strongly Agree 
99»Missing, 
M»Not Applicable 
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B. 3 AIS Survey Data (Initial Questionnaire) 
ID A2 A3 A4 AS A6 ßi ß2 83 84 85 ß6 ß7 ß8 ß9 B10 Bil B12 Rl3 Cl C2 ['1 Ct CS 
1 2 1 12.0 27 2 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 1 2 1 
2 1 1 14.0 12 5 5 3 4 3 3 2 4 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 4 2 1 1 
3 4 3 5.5 24 5 4 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 3 
4 3 99 6.0 30 5 4 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 2 2 4 3 99 
5 4 3 3.0 3 3 5 4 5 4 5 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 5 1 4 4 3 
6 2 2 12.0 28 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 4 6 2 2 
7 4 3 .3 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 
3 4 2 2 2 4 4 2 3 3 7 4 3 
8 4 3 7.0 7 3 3 3 5 5 4 2 4 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 8 4 3 
9 3 3 3.5 16 5 4 3 4 31 41 2 4 3 3 1 4 2 5 2 3 9 3 3 
10 2 1 27.0 27 5 4 3 5 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 3 4 4 2 4 10 2 1 
11 4 3 2.0 11 5 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 3 4 2 3 11 4 3 
12 2 99 99.0 36 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 3 3 3 2 12 2 99 
13 4 99 1.0 12 5 3 2 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 1 4 2 4 3 2 13 4 99 
14 4 99 1.0 12 5 3 2 2 2 3 4 4 1 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 14 4 99 
15 4 3 .4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 2 4 3 4 15 4 3 
16 1 1 33.0 24 5 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 16 1 1 
17 4 3 .7 8 5 4 3 4 4 4 2 2 
2 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 17 4 3 
18 2 2 12.0 16 5 4 4 3 3 14 14 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 4 18 2 2 
19 3 3 13.0 11 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 3 3 3 4 19 3 3 
20 1 1 19.0 15 5 4 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 4 4 3 3 4 20 1 1 
21 4 3 2.0 12 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 5 2 4 21 4 3 
22 4 3 3.0 31 1 5 2 5 2 4 2 2 5 5 3 2 3 4 4 3 22 4 3 
23 3 3 4.5 12 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 2 5 5 3 4 3 4 2 4 23 3 3 
24 4 3 7.0 18 5 4 2 4 4 4 2 5 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 3 24 4 3 
25 2 1 18.0 14 5 3 4 3 3 2 1 4 2 1 3 4 4 4 3 2 25 2 1 
26 3 3 4.5 13 2 4 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 4 4 3 2 4 26 3 3 
27 4 3 3.0 113 12 4 4 3 2, 3 3 4: 2 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 271 4 .1 
28 4 3 2.0 14 2 4 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 4 4 3 2 4 28 4 3 
29 4 3 1.0 12 5 5 4 5 3 5 4 5 1 1 1 2 5 5 4 4 29 -4- -3 
30 4 3 2.0 10 5 5 3 5 3 5 2' 5 1 1 1 5 5 5 2 4 30 4 3 
31 3 3 8.0 10 15 4 5 5 5 4' 3 4 2 1" 1 5' 4' `, 5 3 
.4 
31` 3 3 
32 2 2 14.0 24 1 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 1 2 1 5 4 4 3 5 32 2 2 
33 1 1 18.0 24 1 3 2 4 3 3 4 3 2 2 1 3 4 4 1 4 33 1 1 
34 1 1 20.0 7 1 4 2 3 4 4 3 2 3 4 1 4 4 3 2 4 34 1 I 
35 4 2 1.0 12 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 35 4 2 
36 2 1 14.0 18 41 4 2 2 2 4 3 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 5 4 36 2 1 
37 3 99 8.0 12 5 4 4 4 2 4 3 4 2 2 2 3 4 5 2 4 37 3 99 
38 1 1 37.0 24 1 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 5 3 5 5 4 2 38 1 1 
39 2 1 18.0 12 5 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 4 3 4 4 4 5 39 2 1 
40 2 1 26.0 24 1 4 2 21 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 40 2 1 
41 4 3 2.0 20 4 5 4 4 1 2 2 4 2 2 1 2 5 3 1 5 41 4 3 
42 99 2 1.2 6 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 3 4 4 2 4 42 99 2 
43 1 1 26.0 7 1 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 3 2 4 43 1 1 
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Iß AZ A3 4 A5 A6 ßi R2 R3 R4 RS R6 R7 R8 R9 1 110 RI1 R12 1 113 Cl C2 C3 C :4 CS 
44 2 1 10.0 12 1 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 1 2 1 3 2 4 44 2 1 
45 3 1 4.5 10 1 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 45 3 1 
46 3 3 2.5 14 1 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 3 4 4 3 4 46 3 3 
47 1 1 15.0 18 99 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 47 1 1 
48 3 3 5.0 4 99 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 48 3 3 
49 3 3 2.5 9 1 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 2 49 3 3 
50 2 2 4.5 8 99 1 1 2 1 1 5 4 1 1 1 4 5 2 4 3 50 2 2 
51 2 1 14.0 7 5 3 4 4 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 4 5 4 3 4 51 2 I 
52 2 2 4.0 12 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 4 4 2 2 4 52 2 2 
53 3 2 6.0 9 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 99 1 1 99 5 5 5 1 4 53 3 2 
54 2 2 5.0 11 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 2 2 1 5 2 4 2 4 54 2 2 
55 2 2 5.0 8 1 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 1 1 1 5 2 5 1 5 55 2 2 
56 2 2 4.5 12 1 4 4 3 3,1 4 4 3 2 2 1 4 2 2 3 3 56 2 2 
57 2 2 4.5 15 3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 3 57 2 2 
58 2 2 5.0 12 5 5 2 5 4 5 2 4 1 2 1 3 2 4 4 3 58 2 2 
59 2 2 12.0 18 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 4 59 2 2 
60 2 2 5.0 20 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 4 4 4 3 3 60 2 2 
61 2 2 10.0 30 1 4 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 1 4 1 4 2 4 61 2 2 
62 2 2 5.0 16 1 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 99 4 4 3 4 3 62 2 2 
63 2 2 10.0 24 2 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 2 1 1 5 4 5 1 5 63 2 2 
64 2 1 6.5 18 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 1 1 1 5 4 5 3 5 64 2 1 
65 2 2 5.0 24 1 2 3 2 3 4 4 3 4 2 3 4 3 3 3 4 65 2 2 
66 2 1 30.0 1 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 2 5 3 66 2 1 
67 1 1 22.0 18 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 4 4 2 67 1 1 
68 2 2 22.0 15 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 4 5 4 4 3 1 4 68 2 2 
69 1 1 33.0 36 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 4 2 2 2 2 4 3 69 1 1 
70 1 1 15.0 6 5 4 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 4 70 1 1 
71 2 2 11.0 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 1 3 3 5 4 4 71 2 2 
72 3 3 7.0 24 5 3 4 3 3 4 2 4 2 4 1 1 4 3 2 4 72 3 3 
73 4 3 6.0 24 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 73 4 3 
74 99 99 5.0 6 1 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 3 3 3 2 74 99 99 
75 2 1 20.0 12 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4 5 4 2 75 2 
76 4 3 2.0 12 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 76 4 3 
77 4 3 2.0 16 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4 5 1 4 77 4 3 
78 3 3 8.0 12 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4 5 3 3 78 3 3 
79 1 1 25.0 12 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 4 4 5 2 5 79 1 1 
80 3 3 4.0 36 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 4 2 3 3 3 80 3 3 
81 4 3 2.0 12 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 2 3 4 3 81 4 3 
82 4 3 1.5 12 5 4 4 4 4 3 5 3 5 2 1 4 2 3 4 4 82 4 3 
83 4 3 2.0 7 5 5 4 3 4 3 5 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 3 3 83 4 3 
84 3 3 11.0 70 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 2 5 5 5 2 5 84 3 3 
85 4 3 1.0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 2 5 5 5 2 5 85 4 3 
86 4 3 1.0 12 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 2 5 5 5 2 5 86 4 3 
87 3 3 10.0 24 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 4 3 2 87 3 3 
88 1 1 20.0 36 15 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 88 1 1 
89 4 3 2.0 14 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 4 3 4 2 2 89 4 3 
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ID A2 A3 A4 AS A6 B1 B2 03 B4 85 B6 87 138 139 010 811 812 013 Cl C2 ('3 C4 C"S 
90 3 3 6.0 30 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 2 1 4 4 5 2 4 90 3 3 
91 4 3 2.0 5 3 4 4 4 3 2 2 5 1 1 2 4 2 5 2 5 91 4 3 
92 4 3 5.0 30 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 2 1 3 4 4 2 4 92 4 3 
93 I T 1 21.0 60 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 2 93 1 1 
94 3 3 12.0 24 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 4 3 2 94 3 3 
95 3 3 8.0 32 1 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 2 2 1 4 3 4 3 4 95 3 3 
96 3 3 6.0 24 3 4 2 4 4 5 5 4 2 1 1 5 3 5 2 4 96 3 3 
97 4 3 1.0 11 2 5 2 5 4 5 3 5 1 1 1 2 3 5 2 3 97 4 3 
98 3 3 6.0 24 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 2 1 1 S 3 5 1 5 98 3 3 
99 3 3 5.0 19 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 4 2 4 3 4 99 3 3 
100 3 3 10.0 3 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 1 3 3 4 2 4 100 3 3 
101 4 3 2.5 14 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 1 3 3 4 3 2 101 4 3 
102 4 3 1.2 2 5 3 4 4 2 4 5 4 3 2 1 4 4 4 3 4 102 4 3 
103 4 3 1.5 5 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 1 2 4 2 4 2 2 103 4 3 
104 4 3 1.5 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 5 3 3 104 4 3 
105 3 3 8.0 32 1 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 2 2 1 4 3 4 3 4 105 3 3 
106 4 3 2.0 7 5 5 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 2 4 106 4 3 
107 3 3 4.0 36 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 4 2 3 2 4 107 3 3 
108 4 3 2.0 12 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 2 3 2 4 108 4 3 
109 4 3 1.5 12 5 4 4 4 4 3 5 3 5 2 1 4 2 3 4 4 109 4 3 
110 3 3 5.0 24 15 5 9 5 5 5 3 4 2 2 2 3 5 4 2 4 110 3 3 
111 3 3 6.0 33 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 1 2 2 3 3 4 2 3 111 3 3 
112 4 99 1.5 11 15 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 1 2 1 3 4 5 2 5 112 4 99 
113 4 99 5.5 20 15 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 2 2 1 4 4 4 2 4 113 4 99 
114 4 99 2.0 13 5 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 1 4 4 5 2 5 114 4 99 
115 4 99 5.0 24 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 2 1 1 1 5 4 5 4 4 115 4 99 
116 3 99 8.0 24 5 4 4 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 4 4 116 3 99 
ID C6 Dl D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 El E2 E3 E4 ES EI F2 F3 Cl C2 C, 3 tC4 
1 12.0 27 2 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 2 2 1 2 1 12.0 27 
2 14.0 12 5 5 3 4 3 3 2 4 2 2 3 4 2 4 3 4 2 1 1 14.0 12 
3 5.5 24 5 4 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 3 5.5 24 
4 6.0 30 5 4 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 4 3 2 2 4 3 99 6.0 30 
5 3.0 3 3 5 4 5 4 5 2 3 3 3 1 2 2 5 1 4 5 4 3 3.0 3 
6 12.0 28 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 4 6 2 2 12.0 28 
7 .3 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 4 
2 2 2 4 4 2 3 3 7 4 3 .3 4 
8 7.0 7 3 3 3 5 5 4 2 4 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 8 4 3 7.0 7 
9 3.5 16 5 4 3 4 3 4 2 4 3 3 1 4 2 5 2 3 9 3 3 3,5 16 
10 27.0 27 5 4 3 5 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 3 4 4 2 4 10 2 1 27.0 27 
11 2.0 11 5 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 3 4 2 3 11 4 3 2,0 11 
12 99.0 36 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 3 3 3 2 12 2 99 99.0 36 
13 1.0 12 5 3 2 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 1 4 2 4 3 2 13 4 99 1,0 12 
14 1.0 12 5 3 2 2 2 3 4 4 1 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 14 4 99 1.0 112 
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ID C6 Dl D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 DS D9 D10 E lE 2E 3 E4 E5 F 1 F2 F3 C C i C3 Cd 
15 .4 5 5 5 5 
5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 524 34 15 4 3 .45 
16 33.0 24 5 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 2 2 2 334 34 16 1 13 3.0 44 
17 .7 8 5 4 3 4 4 4 
2 2 2 2 2 344 33 17 4 3 .78 
18 12.0 16 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 444 34 18 2 2 12.016 
19 13.0 11 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 533 34 19 3 3 13.011 
20 19.0 15 5 4 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 443 34 20 1 1 19.0 15 
21 2.0 12 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 3 4 2 4 415 2 4 21 4 3 2.0 12 
22 3.0 31 1 5 2 5 2 4 2 2 5 5 3 234 4 3 22 4 3 3.0 31 
23 4.5 12 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 2 5 5 3 434 2 4 23 3 3 4.5 12 
24 7.0 18 5 4 2 4 4 4 2 5 2 21 2 444 3 3 24 4 3 7.0 18 
25 18.0 14 5 3 4 3 3 2 1 4 2 1 3 444 3 2 25 2 1 18.0 14 
26 4.5 13 2 4 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 443 2 4 26 3 3 4.5 13 
27 3.0 13 2 4 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 443 3 3 27 4 3 3.0 13 
28 2.0 14 2 4 4 3 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 443 2 4 28 4 3 2.0 14 
29 1.0 12 5 5 4 5 3 5 4 5 1 1 1 255 4 4 29 4 3 1.0 12 
30 2.0 10 5 5 3 5 3 5 2 5 1 1 1 555 2 4 30 4 3 2.0 10 
31 8.0 10 5 4 5 5 5 4 3 4 2 1 1 545 3 4 31 3 3 8.0 10 
32 14.0 24 1 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 1 2 1 544 3 5 32 2 2 14.0 24 
33 18.0 24 1 3 2 4 3 3 4 3 2 2 1 344 1 4 33 1 1 18.0 24 
34 20.0 7 1 4 2 3 4 4 3 2 3 4 1 443 2 4 34 1 1 20.0 7 
35 1.0 12 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 333 4 3 35 4 2 1.0 12 
36 14.0 
118 
4 4 2 2 2 4 3 4 4 4 2 244 5 4 36 2 I 14.0 18 
37 8.0 12 5 4 4 4 2 4 3 4 2 2 2 345 2 4 37 3 99 8.0 12 
38 37.0 24 1 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 3 3 5 355 4 2 38 1 1 37.0 24 
39 18,0 112 5 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 4 344 4 5 39 2 1 18.0 12 
40 26.0 24 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 333 4 3 40 2 1 26.0 24 
41 2.0 20 4 5 4 4 1 2 2 4 2 2 1 253 1 5 41 4 3 2.0 20 
42 1.2 6 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 344 2 4 42 99 2 1.2 6 
43 26.0 7 1 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 1 21 3 2 4 43 1 1 26.0 7 
44 10.0 12 1 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 1 21 3 2 4 44 2 1 10.0 12 
45 4.5 10 1 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 2 44 4 2 4 45 3 1 4.5 10 
46 2.5 14 1 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 34 4 3 4 46 3 3 2.5 14 
47 15.0 118 99 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 2 43 3 2 3 47 1 1 15,0 18 
48 5.0 4 99 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 33 3 2 3 48 3 3 5.0 4 
49 2.5 9 1 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 2 24 4 3 2 49 3 3 2.5 9 
50 4.5 8 99 1 1 2 1 1 5 4 1 1 1 45 2 4 3 50 2 2 4.5 8 
51 114.0 17 5 3 4 4 2 4 3 3 3 2 3 45 4 3 4 51 2 1 14.0 7 
52 4.0 12 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 44 2 2 4 52 2 2 4.5-112 
53 6.0 9 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 99 1 1 99 55 5 1 4 53 3 2 6.0 9 
54 5.0 11 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 2 2 1 52 4 2 4 54 2 2 5.0 11 
55 5.0 8 1 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 1 1 1 52 5 1 5 55 2 2 5.0 8 
56 4.5 12 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 1 42 2 3 3 56 2 2 4.5 12 
57 4.5 15 3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 2 4 2 42 4 2 3 57 2 2 4.5 15 
58 5.0 12 5 5 2 5 4 5 2 4 1 2 1 32 4 4 3 58 2 2 5.0 12 
59 12.0 18 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 42 4 2 4 59 2 2 12.0118 
60 5.0 20 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 
f 
2 44 4 3 3 60 2 2 5.0 20 
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C6 D1 D2 D3 D4 DS D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 E1 E2 E 3 E4 E S F1 F2 F3 C l C. 21 C3 C 4 
10.0 30 1 4 2 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 11 411 424 61 22 10.0 3 0 
F 
5.0 1 1 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 99 4 4 3 413 62 225.0 16 
63 10.0 24 2 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 2 1 1 5 4 5 115 63 22 10.0 24 
64 6.5 18 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 1 1 1 5 4 535 64 216.5 18 
65 5.0 24 1 2 3 2 31 41 41 3 4 2 3 4 3 334 65 225.0 24 
66 30.0 1 4 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 253 66 21 30.0 1 
67 22.0 18 4 41 41 4 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 442 67 11 22.0 18 
68 22.0 15 4 4 3 3 3 31 41 2 4 4 5 4 4 314 68 22 22.0 Is- 
69 33.0 36 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 4 2 2 2 243 69 11 33.0 36 
70 15.0 6 5 4 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 2 1 2 2 224 70 11 15.0 6 
71 11.0 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 1 3 3 544 71 22 11.0 3 
72 7.0 24 5 3 4 3 3 4 2 4 2 4 1 1 4 324 72 337.0 24 
73 6.0 24 1 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 4 4 443 73 436.0 24 
74 5.0 6 1 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 3 332 74 99 99 5.0 6 
75 20.0 12 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4 542 75 21 20.0 12 
76 2.0 12 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 4 434 76 432.0 12 
77 2.0 16 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4 514 77 432.0 16 
78 8.0 12 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4 533 78 338.0 12 
79 25.0 12 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 4 4 525 79 11 25.0 12 
80 4.0 36 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 4 2 333 80 334.0 36 
81 2.0 12 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 2 343 81 432.0 12 
82 1.5 12 5 4 4 4 4 3 5 3 5 2 1 4 2 344 82 431.5 12 
83 2.0 7 5 5 4 3 4 3 5 3 2 2 1 3 2 333 83 432.0 7 
84 11.0 70 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 2 5 5 525 84 33 11.0 70 
85 1.0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 2 5 5 525 85 43 1.0 5 
86 1.0 12 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 1 1 2 5 5 525 86 43 1.0 12 
87 10.0 24 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 43 2 87 33 10.0 24 
88 20.0 36 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 42 2 88 11 20.0 36 
89 2.0 14 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 4 3 42 2 89 43 2.0 14 4 
90 6.0 30 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 2 1 4 4 52 4 90 33 6.0 30 
91 2.0 5 3 4 14 14 3 2 2 5 1 1 12 14 2 5 21 5- 91 43 2.0 5 
92 5,0 30 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 2 1 3 4 42 4 92 43 5.0 30 
93 21.0 160 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 42 2 93 11 21.0 60 
94 12.0 24 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 43 2 94 33 12,0 24 
95 8.0 32 1 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 2 2 1 4 3 43 4 95 33 8.0 32 
96 6.0 24 3 4 2 4 4 5 5 4 2 1 1 5 3 52 4 96 33 6.0 24 
97 1.0 11 2 5 2 5 4 5 3 5 1 1 1 2 3 52 S 97 43 1.0 11 
98 6.0 24 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 2 1 1 5 3 51 5 98 33 6.0 24 
99 5.0 19 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 1 4 2 43 4 99 33 5.0 19 
100 10.0 3 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 1 3 3 42 14 100 33 10.0 3 
101 2.5 14 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 1 3 3 43 12 101 43 2.5 14 
102 1.2 2 5 3 4 4 2 4 5 4 3 2 1 4 4 43 4 102 43 1.2 2 
103 1.5 5 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 1 2 4 2 42 2 103 43 1.5 5 
104 1.5 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 4 4 53 3 104 43 1.5 5 
105 8.0 32 1 4 4 4 
1 
4 5 3 4 2 2 1 4 3 43 4 -10-5 33 8.0 32 
106 2.0 7 5 5 4 13 4 3 4 3 2 2 1 3 2 32 4 106 43 2.0 7 
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ID C6 D1 D2 D3 D4 DS D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 F1 F2 F3 G1 C2 (: 3 G4 
107 4.0 36 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 2 2 1 4 2 3 2 4 107 3 3 4.0 36 
108 2.0 12 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 4 2 3 2 4 108 4 3 2.0 12 
109 1.5 12 5 4 4 4 4 3 5 3 5 2 1 4 2 3 4 4 109 4 3 1.5 12 
110 5.0 24 5 5 9 5 5 5 3 4 2 2 2 3 5 4 2 4 110 3 3 5.0 24 
111 6.0 33 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 5 1 2 2 3 3 4 2 3 111 3 3 6.0 33 
112 1.5 11 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 1 2 1 3 4 5 2 5 112 4 99 1.5 11 
113 5.5 20 5 4 4 14 3 4 3 4 2 2 1 4 14 4 2 4 113 4 99 5.5 20 
114 2.0 13 5 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 1 4 4 5 2 5 114 4 99 2.0 13 
115 5.0 24 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 2 1 1 1 5 4 5 4 4 115 4 99 5.0 24 
116 8.0 24 5 4 4 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 12 4 4 5 4 4 ll6 3 99 8.0 24 
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Appendix C 
C. 1 AIS Survey Data (Questionnaire Grouped According to AIS User 
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1 2 1 12 27 2 2 999 4 4 4 4 5 4 1 4 4 4 3 3 4 99 2 4 
2 1 1 14 12 5 2 999 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 4 3 3 2 3 4 4 
3 4 31 5.5 24 5 2 999 3 4 2 2 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 
4 3 99 6 30 5 2 999 3 4 2 2 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 3 3 2 3 3 
5 4 3 3 3 3 2 999 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 
6 2 2 12 28 5 1 4 3 3 2 3 4 3 4 2 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 4 
7 4 3 0.3 4 3 1 2 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 
8 4 3 7 7 3 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 
9 3 3 3.5 16 5 2 999 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 4 3 2 99 4 4 
10 2 1 27 27 5 1 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
11 4 3 2 11 5 2 999 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 3 3 
12 2 99 99 36 5 1 1 3 3 4 4 3 4 99 4 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 3 
13 41 99, 1 12 5 2 999 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 99 1 1 
14 4 99 1 12 5 2 999 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 99 99 2 
15 4 3 0.4 5 5 2 999 4 5 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 
16 1 1 33 24 5 2 999 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 2 2 2 99 99 4 
17 4 3 0.7 8 5 1 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 4 2 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 
18 2 2 12 16 5 1 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 4 2 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 4 
19 3 3 13 11 1 2 999 5 5 4 5 2 4 3 4 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 4 
20 1 1 19 15 5 2 999 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 
21 4 3 2 12 5 1 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 2 3 2 4 
22 4 3 3 31 1 1 2 4 4 3 99 2 4 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 
23 3 3 4.5 12 5 1 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 2 4 4 5 
24 4 3 7 18 5 2 999 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 2 4 3 4 
25 2 1 18 14 5 2 999 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 5 2 
26 3 3 4.5 13 2 2 999 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 
27 4 3 3 13 2 2 999 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 
28 4 3 2 14 2 2 999 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 
29 4 3 1 12 5 2 999 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 
30 4 3 2 10 5 2 999 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 
31 3 3 8 10 5 2 999 5 11 3 3 3 4 4 4 34 3 2 3 2 9 92 4 
32 2 2 14 24 1 1 1 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 5 55 5 
33 1 1 18 24 12 999 43 3 4 4 4 44 3 3 1 9 94 2 
34 7 22 99 9 43 23 4 4 
g 
33 2 9 9 
35 4 2 11 2 5 2 99 9 33 12 3 3 23 2 33 3 
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36 2 1 14 18 4 2 999 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 3 2 3 2 99 99 3 
37 3 99 8 12 5 2 999 4 3 1 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 2 99 3 4 
38 1 1 37 24 1 2 999 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 1 1 4 3 5 3 
39 2 1 18 12 5 2 999 3 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 3 3 4 3 2 1 4 3 
40 2 1 26 24 1 2 999 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 
41 4 3 2 20 4 2 999 2 3 3 2 5 5 2 3 4 3 3 3 1 99 3 3 
42 99 21 1.2 6 3 2 999 2 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 2 99 3 2 
43 1 1 26 7 1 2 999 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 99 99 2 
44 2 1 10 12 1 2 999 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 1 99 99 2 
45 3 1 4.5 10 1 2 999 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 99 99 3 
46 3 3 2.5 14 1 2 999 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 99 99 3 
47 1 1 15 18 99 2 999 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 99 3 4 
48 3 3 5 41 991 2 999 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 2 99 3 4 
49 3 3 2.5 9 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 4 4 4 
50 2 21 4.5 81 991 2 999 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 5 4 2 2 99 99 4 
51 2 11 14 7 5 2 999 3 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 1 2 1 99 4 4 
52 2 2 4 12 1 2 999 3 2 3 4 4 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 2 99 4 2 
53 3 2 6 9 1 99 99 3 4 4 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 99 99 4 99 99 1 
54 2 2 5 11 3 2 999 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 2 99 99 4 
55 2 2 5 8 1 2 999 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 3 4 2 99 99 2 
56 2 2 4.5 12 1 2 999 4 5 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 99 3 4 
57 2 2 4.5 15 3 2 999 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 4 2 4 4 3 4 2 2 3 
58 2 2 5 12 5 2 999 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 99 5 4 
59 2 2 12 18 5 2 999 4 3 4 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 99 4 3 
60 2 2 5 20 1 2 999 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 3 3 99 9 94 
61 2 2 10 30 1 2 999 3 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 1 12 
62 2 2 5 16 1 1 4 4 3 1 
1- 4 3 2 3 2 3 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 
63 2 2 10 24 2 2 999 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 3 2 99 2 5 
64 2 1 6.5 18 5 2 999 4 3 4 5 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 3 99 5 3 
65 2 2 5 124 11 1 2 4 4 4 4 1 4 2 5 4 2 2 1 1 4 4 4 
66 2 1 30 1 4 2 999 2 3 1 1 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 1 9 9 99 3 
67 1 I 22 18 4 2 999 4 3 3 5 3 4 3 4 4 53 4 4 34 3 
68 2 2 22 15 4 2 999 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 3 33 3 2 4 3 4 
69 1 1 33 36 5 2 999 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 33 3 3 2 99 3 
70 1 1 15 6 5 2 999 2 3 4 4 4 4 44 4 44 4 4 11 2 
71 2 2 11 3 5 1 3 4 4 2 1 3 3 12 2 43 3 3 55 4 
72 3 3 7 24 5 2 999 4 4 5 5 45 44 4 43 3 1 9 9 99 3 
73 4 3 6 24 1 2 999 4 4 4 4 44 44 4 43 4 2 42 4 
74 99 199 15 6 1 2 99 9 3 43 4 44 44 5 33 4 2 43 3 
75 2 1 20 12 3 2 99 9 4 33 4 34 44 4 22 3 2 33 4 
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76 4 3 2 12 2 1 2 4 3 4 4 3 41 
_2 
4 4 3 3 3 2 4 4 4 
77 4 3 2 16 3 2 999 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 
78 3 3 8 12 3 2 999 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 
79 1 1 25 12 5 2 999 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 1 2 3 2 99 3 4 
80 3 3 4 36 5 2 999 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 2 4 3 3 4 3 1 2 4 
81 4 3 2 12 5 2 999 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 1 2 4 
82 4 3 1.5 12 5 2 999 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 2 4 3 3 4 3 1 2 2 
83 4 3 2 7 5 2 999 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 2 4 1 3 4 2 1 2 4 
84 3 3 11 70 5 2 999 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 2 4 4 99 3 5 
85 4 3 1 5 5 2 999 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 2 4 4 99 3 5 
86 4 3 1 12 5 2 999 3 4 4 4 3 5 4 3 5 4 2 4 4 99 3 5 
87 3 3 10 24 5 2 999 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 
88 1 1 20 36 5 2 999 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 4 
89 4 3 2 14 5 2 999 3 2 4 3 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 2 2 99 2 3 
90 3 3 6 30 3 2 999 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 99 4 4 
91 4 3 2 5 3 2 999 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 3 2 99 3 4 
92 4 3 5 30, 3 2 999 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 2 3 3 4 
93 1 1 21 60 5 2 999 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 
94 3 3 12 24 5 2 999 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
95 3 3 8 32 1 2 999 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 2 3 2 99 5 4 
96 ,3 3 6 24 3 2 999 4 4 4 4 4 
4 3 4 4 3 3 3 2 99 4 5 
97 4 3 1 11 2 2 999 4 2 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 99 3 5 
98 3 3 6 24 3 2 999 4 2 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 99 3 5 
99 3 3 5 19 5 1 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 2 2 2 1 
100 3 3 10 3 5 2 999 3 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 
101 4 3 12.5 14 5 2 999 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 3 2 99 3 3 
102 4 3 11.2 2 5 2 999 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 
103 4 3 11.5 5 3 2 999 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 3 99 2 4 
104 4 3 11.5 5 3 2 999 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 
105 3 3 8 32 ,1 2 999 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 2 3 2 99 , 5 4 
106 4 3 2 7 5 2 999 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 2 4 1 3 4 2 1 2 4 
107 3 3 4 36 5 2 999 4 4 3 3 4 4 5 2 4 3 3 4 3 1 2 4 
108 4 3 2 12 5 2 999 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 12 4 
109 4 3 1.5 12 5 2 999 4 4 3 3 4 4 52 4 3 3 4 3 12 2 
110 3 3 5 24 5 2 999 4 4 4 4 2 4 44 4 4 3 43 44 4 
111 3 3 6 33 3 2 999 3 3 3 4 3 4 24 4 1 2 22 33 4 
112 4 99 1.5 11 5 1 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 44 3 4 4 41 43 5 
113 4 199 15.5 20 5 1 2 3 3 4 43 4 44 4 4 3 32 44 5 
114 4 199 2 13 5 1 3 44 4 32 4 44 3 4 4 41 43 4 
115 4 99 5 24 5 1 4 54 4 44 4 44 4 4 1_ 3 42 43 4 
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1 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 2 3 3.69. 3.9 3.5 3 
2 5 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 2 4 3 3.67 3.6 3.5 3 
3 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 3 5 2.69 4 3.4 3.5 3.5 
4 4 3 2 3 3 2 4 3 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 2 3 5 2.69 2.67 3 3.5 3.5 
5 5 5 5 3 3 3 2 5 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 3.85 3.67 3.8 4.25 3 
6 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 2.85 3.67 3.7 3.5 3.75 
7 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3.08 2.67 3.9 3.5 3.75 
8 3 5 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 2 3 3 5 2 31 3.85 2.67 3.7 2.75 3 225 
9 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 5 4 2 4 3 3 4 3 3 2 4 3.15. 3.5 3.5 3 
10 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3.85 41 4.1 4 3.25 
11 41 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 4 3.33 4 3.25 3.25 
12 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 . 3.67 3.5 3.25 3.75 
13 3 2 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 , 3.46 . 3.4 3.25 3 
14 3 2 3 4 5 5 2 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 2 3.62 . 3.5 3.5 2.5 
15 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 3.62 3 4.4 3.25 5 
16 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3.15 . 3.9 3.75 3 
17 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 2 3 3.08 3.67 3.8 3.25 3 
18 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 2.85 3.67 3.7 3.5 3.75 
19 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 3.46 3 4.3 3.75 5 
20 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 4 13.46 3 3.3 3.5 3.25 
21 4 5 5 4 3 2 4 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 3.46 3 4.1 3.75 4.25 
22 5 5 4 2 1 1 3 4 4 2 2 3 3 4 2 2 2 2 . 4.33 3.1 3 2 
23 5 5 2 1 1 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 3.54 4.3 3 3.3 4.25 4.5 
24 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 3.54 3.6 7 4.1 3 3 
25 3 3 2 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 2 2 2 4 3 1 4 2.38 3.33 3.8 2.25 13 
26 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3.46 3 3.3 4 3.25 
27 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 42 3 4 3.46 3 3.3 3 3.25 
28 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 42 3 4 3.46 3 3.3 4 3.25 
29 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 2 4 3 3 4 3 4 2 4 4 4, 7 3 3.25 
30 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 25 3.3 14 4. 7 4 3.25 
31 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 5 5 35 3.3 1. 4. 4 3.7 5 4,5 
32 55 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 3 54 5 5 5 45 3.3 15 4. 5 4.2 5 4.75 
33 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 45 4 2 3 43 3.2 3. 3. 6 4. 53 
34 43 4 2 3 2 4 3 2 2 4 43 4 2 4 34 3.1 5. 2. 93.7 53.25 
35 4 22 3 3 3 3 33 2 2 31 
_4 
3 3 2 23 2.4 63 2. 8 3 2.5 
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36 4 4 4 2 2 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 4 2 2 3 21 3.08. 2.8 3.25 2.25 
37 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 3. 3.7 4 3 
38 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 5 3 2.54 3.67 3.4 2.5 3.5 
39 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 5 4 4 3 3 4 3 3.23 2.67 3.5 3.75 3.25 
40 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 5 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2.46 2.67 2.9 2.5 2.25 
41 5 4 2 4 4 4 5 3 4 3 5 5 3 5 4 1 2 2 3. 3.8 4.5 2.25 
42 4 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 2 2 3 2.85 . 3.1 3.75 2.5 
43 4 3 4 3 3 4 1 3 4 2 4 4 4 5 3 3 4 2 3.31 . 3.1 4.25 3 
44 4 3 4 3 4 4 1 3 4 2 4 4 4 5 3 3 4 21 3.31 . 3.2 4.25 3 
45 4 3 3 3 3 2 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 3.31 . 3.1 3.75 3.75 
46 4 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 99 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3.31 . 3.75 3,5 
47 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 3.15 . 3 3.5 3.75 
48 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 3.23 . 3 3.5 3.75 
49 4 4 3 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 2 3.62 4 3.4 2.5 3 
50 1 2 1 4 5 5 5 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 1 1 5 4 3.54 . 2.8 2.75 2.75 
51 31 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 . 3.7 3.75 3.25 
52 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 41 3.15 . 3.7 4 3.75 
53 5 5 5 99 5 5 5 5 199 
199 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 . 4.5 4.5 
54 5 5 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 3 4 4 4 3 5 5 5 5 3.46 . 3.7 3.75 5 
55 5 5 4 4 5 5 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4.31 . 4.5 5 5 
56 3 4 3 4 4 2 2 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 3.54 . 3.3 3.5 3.75 
57 5 5 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 3 3 2 5 5 4 4 3.08 2.33 3.4 13 4.5 
58 ,5 5 5 4 5 4 2 4 5 5 2 3 2 4 2 4 2 3 3.69 . 4.4 2.75 2.75 
59 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 . 3.8 3.75 4 
60 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 3.46 . 4.1 3,25 4 
61 2 3 4 3 2 1 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 3 4 3.15 1.33 2.9 4 2.75 
62 , 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 2.92 3 3.2 3 3.5 
63 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4.23 . 4.7 5 4.5 
64 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4.15 . 4.7 4.5 4,75 
65 2 2 4 3 2 4 3 3 4 1 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 2.92 4 12,8 3.25 3.5 
66 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 1 3 3 3 2 2 1 2 2.54 . 2.5 2.5 1.75 
67 4 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 3 2 4 2 2 2 3.77 3.33 3.1 2.25 2.5 
68 ,4 3 3 2 2 2 4 3 2 3 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3.23 3.67 2.8 4.25 3.5 
69 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 1 2 2.92 , 2.2 2.75 1.75 
70 4 2 2 3 4 4 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 2 3.77 1.33 3 4 2. S 
71 5 4 3 3 2 2 3 5 5 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2.69 4.67 3,5 +3.5 3.5 
72 3 3 4 4 4 2 4 3 1 3 4 4 5 5 4 3 2 1 3.85 . 3.1 4.5 2.5 
73 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.77 3.33 3. 8 2.7 54 
74 5 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 1_4 4 3 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 3.6 23.33 3. 82.7 53.75 
75 5 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 3 2 2 3 4 5 4 3 4 3.2 3 3.33 3. 9 2,7 54 
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76 4 4 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 31 3.311 41 3.51 3.75 3.75 
77 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 3 5 4 4 4 5 4 3 4 3.23 3.33 3.9 4.25 4 
78 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 3 
1 3 3 3 4 5 4 3 4 3.23 3.33 3.9 3.25 4 
79 5 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 4 3.15 . 4.1 4.25 4 
80 5 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 5 41 3.54 2.33 3.6 3.25 4.25 
81 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3.69 2.33 3.6 2.75 4 
82 4 4 3 3 1 4 2 3 3 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 5 4 3.54 1.67 3.1 3 4.25 
83 5 31 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 3 3.31 2.33 3.4 3.25 4 
84 5 5 
_ 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 51 3.77 . 4.6 4.75 4.75 
85 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 51 4.54 . 4.6 4.75 4.75 
86 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 1 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3.77 . 4.6 4.75 4.75 
87 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 5 3 
_3 
2 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.15 3 3.2 3.25 4 
88 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 5 4 4 4 3.31 3 14.1 3.5 4.25 
89 4 4 3 4 2 2 3 4 3 3 4 2 5 5 4 3 4 4 3.08 . 3.2 4 3.75 
90 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3.62 . 4 4.25 4 
91 4 4 2 5 5 5 2 5 4 2 4 5 4 4 4 3 2 4 3.46 . 3.8 4.25 3.25 
92 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 3 4 3 3.38 3.33 4 4.25 3.5 
93 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 5 4 4 4 3.31 2.67 4.1 3.5 4.25 
94 4 4 2 2 2 2 4 5 3 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.15 2.67 13.2 3.25 4 
95 4 14 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.38 , 3.9 3.75 4 
96 4 4 5 4 4 5 3 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 2 4 5 5 3.54 . 4.3 4.2 5 4 
97 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 2 4 3 2 3.54 . 4.7 4. 5 2,7 5 
98 5 5 5 4 4 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 3.54. 4.5 4. 5 4.5 
99 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.46 1.67 3.6 3.75 4 
10 4 2 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 2 4 3 3.31 2.67 3.3 4 3 
101 5 4 4 3 2 2 3 4 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 4 3 3 3.38 . 3.4 3 3.5 
102 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 2 4 2 5 4 3.31 3.33 3. 83 3.75 
103 4 34 3 4 5 2 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 3.31 . 3. 73 3.5 
IOA 4 1 44 3 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 34 3.46 3 3. 8 3.5 3.25 
105 4 45 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 34 3.38 
. 3. 9 3.75 3.75 
10 5 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 43 3.31 2.33 3. 4 4 3.75 
107 5 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 44 5 4 3.54 2.33 3.6 4 4.25 
10 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 44 4 4 3.69 2.33 3.6 4 4 
10 4 4 3 3 1 4 2 3 3 4 2 4 2 4 11 44 3.54 1.67 3.1 3 4.25 
11 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 95 3 
fl 
3 3.69 4 4.3 4 5 
11 14 3 3 5 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 33 3 3 2.85 3.33 3.9 3.75 3 
11 24 4 4 3 5 4 4 54 2 4 5 5 5 44 3 3 3.62 4 13.9 4.75 3,5 
11 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 43 4 4 4 5 43 3 4 3.46 4.33 3.9 4.25 3.5 
11 4 4 4 34 44 5 2 t 4 5 5 5 44 2 4 3.46 3.67 3.8 4.75 3.5 
11 4 25 54 5 4 4- 2 4 4 4 54 5 5 3.85 3.67 4.1 3.5 4,7S 
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C. 2 Statistics and Frequency Tables for Total Scores (TSQ, TSE, TPU, 
TPEOU, and TAISUS) 
Freauencv Percent Valid Percent C. 'umulalive 
Valid 2.38 1 .9 .9 .9 
2.46 2 1.7 1.8 2.7 
2.54 2 1.7 1.8 4.4 
2.69 3 2.6 2.7 7.1 
2.85 4 3.4 3.5 10.6 
2.92 3 2.6 2.7 13.3 
3.00 4 3.4 3.5 16.8 
3.08 5 4.3 4.4 21.2 
3.15 9 7.8 8.0 29.2 
3.23 7 6.0 6.2 35.4 
3.31 15 12.9 13.3 48.7 
3.38 4 3.4 3.5 52.2 
3.46 14 12.1 12.4 64.6 
3.54 11 9.5 9.7 74.3 
3.62 6 5.2 5.3 79.6 
3.69 5 4.3 4.4 84.1 
3.77 5 4.3 4.4 88.5 
3.85 5 4.3 4.4 92.9 
3.92 1 .9 .9 93.8 
4.00 3 2.6 2.7 96.5 
4.15 1 .9 .9 97.3 
4.23 1 .9 .9 98.2 
4.31 1 .9 .9 
99.1 
4.54 1 .9 .9 100.0 
Total 113 97.4 100.0 
Missing system 3 2.6 
Total 116 100.0 
Frequencies (Total System Quality) 
N Valid 69 
Missing "17 
Mean 3.2029 
Median 3.3333 
Std. Deviation . 76955 Skewness . 346 Std. Error of Skewness 289 
Kurtosis 082 
Std. Error of Kurtosis . 570 Minimum 1.33 
Maximum 5.00 
Statistics (Total Self Efficacy) 
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Statistics (Total System Quality) 
Freauencv Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1.33 2 1.7 2.9 2.9 
1.67 3 2.6 4.3 7,2 
2.33 7 6.0 10.1 17.4 
2.67 8 6.9 11.6 29,0 
3.00 12 10.3 17.4 46.4 
3.33 11 9.5 15.9 62.3 
3.67 11 9.5 15.9 78.3 
4.00 10 8.6 14.5 92.8 
4.33 3 2.6 4.3 97,1 
4.67 1 .91.4 
98.6 
5.00 1 .91.4 
100.0 
Total 69 59.5 100.0 
Missing S stem 47 40.5 
Total 116 100.0 
Frequencies (iotai ben euicacy) 
N Valid 114 
Missing 2 
Mean 3.6553 
Median 3.7000 
Std. Deviation . 53017 
Skewness . 040 
Std. Error of Skewness . 226 
Kurtosis -. 304 
Std. Error of Kurtosis . 449 
Minimum 2.20 
Maximum 4.70 
Statistics (Total Yerceivea usetumess) 
Freauencv Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 2.20 1 .9 .9 .9 
2.50 1 .9 .9 1.8 
2.80 5 4.3 4.4 6.1 
2.90 3 2.6 2.6 8.8 
3.00 4 3,4 3.5 12.3 
3.10 8 6.9 7.0 19.3 
3.20 5 4.3 4.4 23.7 
3.30 7 6.0 6.1 29.8 
3.40 8 6.9 7.0 36.8 
3.50 6 5.2 5.3 42.1 
3.60 7 6.0 6.1 48.2 
3.70 8 6.9 7.0 SS-3 
3.80 11 9.5 9.6 64,9 
3.90 11 9.5 9,6 74.6 
4.00 4 3.4 3.5 78.1 
4.10 8 6.9 7.0 85.1 
4.30 3 2.6 2.6 87.7 
4.40 3 2.6 2,6 90.4 
4.50 3 2.6 2,6 93.0 
4.60 3 2,6 2.6 95.6 
4.70 5 4.3 4.4 100.0 
Total 114 98.3 100.0 
Missin System 2 1.7 
Total 116 100.0 
Frequencies (Total Perceived Usefulness) 
UVER4POOL 
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3.6379 
3.7500 
Deviation 
Std Error of Skewness 1.225 
Error of Kurtosis 
Maximum 
Statistics (Total Perceived Ease of Use) 
Freauencv Percent Velid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 2.25 2 1.7 1.7 1,7 
2.50 4, 3.4 3.4 5,2 
2.75 8 6.9 6.9 12.1 
3.00 12 10.3 10.3 22.4 
3.25 13 11.2 11.2 33.6 
3.50 18 15.5 15.5 49.1 
3.75 17 14.7 14.7 63.8 
4.00 15 12.9 12.9 76.7 
4.25 13 11.2 11.2 87.9 
4.50 7 6.0 6.0 94.0 
4.75 5 4.3 4.3 98.3 
5.00 2 1.7 1.7 100.0 
Total 116 100.0 100.0 
Frequencies (i otai rerceivea rase of used 
N Valid 116 
I Missing 0 
Mean 3.5754 
Median 3.5000 
Std. Deviation . 
72847 
Skewness -. 090 
Std. Error of Skewness . 225 
Kurtosis -. 224 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 446 
Minimum 1.75 
Maximum 5.00 
Statistics (Total Als User Satisfaction) 
Freauencv Percent Velid Percent ('emulative Percent 
Valid 1.75 2 1.7 1.7 1.7 
2.00 1 .9 .9 2.6 
2.25 3 2.6 2.6 5,2 
2.50 6 5.2 S. 2 10.3 
2.75 4 3.4 3.4 13.8 
3.00 16 13.8 13.8 27.6 
3.25 14 12.1 12.1 39.7 
3.50 15 12.9 12.9 52.6 
3.75 15 12.9 12.9 65.5 
4.00 16 13.8 13.8 79.3 
4.25 7 6.0 6.0 85.3 
4.50 6 5.2 5.2 90.5 
4.75 6 5.2 5,2 95,7 
5.00 5 4.3 4.3 100.0 
Total 116 100.0 100.0 
Frequencies (Total AIS User Satisfaction) 
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C. 3 Table of Z-Scores for Each Variable (TSQ, TSE, TPU, TPEOU, 
and TAISUS) 
ID TS TSE TPU Z TPEOU Z TAISUS 
1 . 07332 . 
46162 0.07988 ) . 35464 
. 1.28938 -0 . 10424 0.44457 . 35464 
2.33947 0 . 
48148 0.44457 0.31857 
2.33947 1 . 23595 
0.44457 0.31857 
51 . 59837 ) . 
273 128481 
1.81443 0.25206 , 08438 0.44457 . 01803 
- 1.02686 2.10046 . 46162 
0.44457 ) . 01803 
81 . 59837 . 
36408 . 08438 
0,07988 1 , 36445 
0.76434 0.29286 0.44457 
10 1 . 59837 . 
36408 0 . 83886 
1.53864 1 . 36445 
11 . 12341 . 
65024 . 28481 0.65518 
12 0.25206 0.29286 0.80926 . 01803 
13 ). 28575 0.48148 1.53864 0.99178 
14 ). 8108 0.29286 1.90333 1.66499 
15 18108 1 . 
40472 1,17395 1 . 70105 
16 0.76434 . 46162 1,53864 . 35464 
17 1.02686 0.25206 0 . 273 0,80926 . 35464 
18 1.81443 0.25206 . 08438 0.44457 ). 01803 
9 . 
28575 1 . 2161 . 28481 1.70105 
0 . 28575 
0.6701 . 28481 0.65518 
1 . 28575 -1.48432 . 
83886 0.07988 
. 69124 
2 . 98021 
1.04733 . 6495 . 35464 
3 . 54828 0.98021 
0.6701 1.01419 1.02785 
4 . 54828 . 
83886 
. 
6495 0.31837 
S 0.50181 . 273 1.53864 . 99178 
6 . 28575 
0.6701 
. 
28481 0.65518 
7 . 28575 
0.6701 . 28481 0,65518 
8 . 28575 
0.6701 . 
28481 0.65518 
9 . 02323 
1.97058 . 6495 1.36445 
0 0.23929 1.97058 0.44457 1.36445 
1 0.23929 1.40472 . 6495 1.02785 
2 0.23929 . 21248" 
1.59334 1.37888 1.36445 
3 0.50181 0.10424 1.37888 0.31857 
4 0.76434 1.42457 0.07988 0.65518 
5 1.02686 1.61319 1.53864 1.66499 
6 . 28575 
1.61319 2.00159 
7 1.28938 ). 08438 1.6495 . 0,31857- 
38 . 02323 
0.48148 1.90333 0.31857 
9 . 50181 
0.29286 
. 28481 0.65518 
0 0.23929 1.42457 1.53864 2,00159 
1 1.28938 . 
273 1.74357 2.00159 
2 1.81443 1.04733 1.17395 1.66499 
3 0.23929 1.04733 0.99178 
4 0.23929 0.85871 0.99178 
S 0.23929 1.04733 ). 01803 
6 0.23929 1,01419 0.65518 
7 0.76434 1.23595 0.44457 0.65518 
8 0.50181 1.23595 0.44457 0.65518 
9 . 
8108 
. 36408 0.48148 . 28481 1.32838 
50 . 54828 1.61319 1.32838 
51 1.28938 . 08438 0.07988 0,65518 
2 0.76434 . 08438 . 28481 . 01803 53 1.02785 
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ID TS Z TSE Z TPU Z TPEOU Z TAISUS 
54 . 28575 
0. 08438 1 . 70105 
55 1.07332 1 . 59334 1 . 
74357 1 . 70105 
56 . 54828 
0 . 6701 
0.44457 0 . 01803 
57 1.02686 0.48148 1.53864 1 . 02785 
58 1.07332 1 . 40472 . 
6495 1 . 70105 
9 . 
02323 0 . 273 
0.07988 
. 
35464 
0 . 28575 . 
83886 0.31857 
1 0.76434 1.42457 - 1.90333 1.32838 
2 1.5519 - 1.48432 0.85871 1.17395 0.31857 
i31.33585 1 . 97058 1.74357 1.02785 
4 1.59837 1 . 97058 1.74357 1.36445 
S 1.5519 . 
36408 1.61319 0.07988 0.31857 
6 0.76434 2.17905 
7 0.23929 1.04733 1.53864 1.66499 
8 0.50181 1.61319 0.07988 
9 1.5519 2.74491 2.6748 
70 1.33585 1.23595 0.07988 1.66499 
1 2.33947 1 . 59635 
0.29286 0.80926 0.31857 
72 1.59837 1.04733 1.66499 
3 1.33585 . 
273 . 6495 . 35464 
4 10.8108 . 
273 1.01419 
. 01803 
5 0.50181 . 46162 
1.17395 
. 35464 
6 0.23929 0.36408 0.29286 . 28481 . 01803 
7 -0.50181 . 46162 . 6495 . 35464 
8 0.50181 ). 46162 1.17395 . 35464 
9 0.76434 . 83886 . 
6495 
. 
01803 
0 . 54828 
0.10424 0.80926 
. 69124 
1 1.07332 0.10424 . 
6495 135464 
82 . 54828 
1.04733 0.80926 ). 69124 
3 0.23929 0.48148 . 6495 . 35464 
84 1.86089 1.78196 1.74357 1.36445 
85 1.86089 1.78196 1.74357 1.36445 
86 1.86089 1.78196 1.74357 1.36445 
87 0.76434 0.85871 1.17395 0.31857 
88 0.23929 . 83886 0.44457 ). 69124 
9 1.02686 0.85871 0.07988 0.65518 
0 . 8108 . 
65024 1.01419 ). 35464 
1 . 28575 . 
273 1.53864 0.65518 
2 ). 02323 ). 65024 . 6495 0.31857 
3 0.23929 ). 83886 0.44457 . 69124 
4 0.76434 0.85871 1.17395 0.65518 
S . 02323 
0.46162 0.44457 
. 
35464 
6 . 54828 
1.2161 0.07988 0.31857 
7 ). 54828 1.97058 , 10826 1.70105 
8 ). 54828 1.59334 2.1.02785 
9 ). 28575 0.25206 0.10424 0.07988 ). 35464 
100 . 0.23929 0.6701 . 
28481 0.99178 
101 . 02323 
0.48148 
. 6495 0.31857 
102 0.23929 . 
273 1.17395 ). 01803 
103 0.23929 . 08438 . 6495 0.31857 
104 . 28575 . 
273 0.07988 -0,65518 
105 . 02323 . 46162 0.44457 0.65518 
106 -0.23929 0.48148 . 6495 . 35464 
107 . 54828 0.10424 0.44457 169124 
108 1.07332 . 0.10424 ). 6495 1.32838 
109 . 
54828 1.04733 0.80926 ). 69124 
110 1.07332 1.2161 . 
6495 1.70105 
111 1.81443 . 
46162 
. 
28481 O. 9917ß 
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ID TS TSE ZTPU TPEOU ZTAISUS 
112 ). 8108 ). 36408 . 46162 
1.74357 
. 35464 
113 ). 28575 0.86819 . 46162 
1.01419 ). 35464 
114 ). 28575 . 0.86819 0.273 1.74357 . 35464 
115 1.59837 0.25206 . 83886 
0.07988 1.36445 
116 1.86089 . 36408 . 
65024 0.44457 1.70105 
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C. 4 Descriptive Table for Total Scores of Each Variable 
Statistic S td Frrnr 
Total System Oualitv Mean 3.3710 . 03666 95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 3.2984 
Upper Bound 3.4436 
5% Trimmed Mean 3.3722 
Median 3.3846 
Variance . 152 
Std. Deviation . 38970 
Minimum 2.38 
Maximum 4.54 
Range 2.15 
Interquartile Range . 46 
Skewness -. 037 . 
227 
Kurtosis . 614 . 451 
Total Self Efficacy Mean 3.2029 . 09264 95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 3.0180 
Upper Bound 3.3878 
5% Trimmed Mean 3.2201 
Median 3.3333 
Variance . 592 
Std. Deviation . 76955 
Minimum 1.33 
Maximum 5.00 
Range 3.67 
Interquartile Range 1.00 
Skewness -. 346 . 289 Kurtosis . 082 . 570 
Total Perceived Usefulness Mean 3.6553 . 04965 
95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 3.5569 
Upper Bound 3.7536 
5% Trimmed Mean 3.6542 
Median 3.7000 
Variance . 281 
Std. Deviation . 53017 
Minimum 2.20 
Maximum 4.70 
Range 2.50 
Interquartile Range . 70 
Skewness . 040 . 226 Kurtosis -. 304 . 449 
Total Perceived Ease of Use Mean 3.6379 . 05787 95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 3.5233 
Upper Bound 3.7526 
5% Trimmed Mean 3.6394 
Median 3.7500 
Variance . 388 Std. Deviation . 62323 
Minimum 2.25 
Maximum 5.00 
Range 2.75 
Interquartile Range . 75 Skewness -. 023 . 225 Kurtosis -. 537 . 446 Total ALS User Satisfaction Mean 3.5754 
. 06764 95% Confidence Interval Lower Bound 3.4415 
Upper Bound 3.7094 
5% Trimmed Mean 3.5838 
Median 3.5000 
Variance . 531 Std. Deviation 
. 72847 
Minimum 1.75 
Maximum 5.00 
Range 3.25 
Interquartiile Range 1.00 
Skewness -. 090 . 225 Kurtosis -. 224 . 446 
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C. 5 Table for Frequencies of Absolute Z-Scores for Each Variable 
(TSQ, TSE, TPU, TPEOU, and TAISUS) 
Total System Quality 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Absolute z-score less than 2 104 89.7 92.0 92.0 
Absolute z-score grater than 1.96 8 6.9 7.1 99.1 
Absolute z-score greater than 2.58 1 .9 .9 100.0 Total 113 97.4 100.0 
Issing System 3 2.6 
Total 116 100.0 
Total Sel Efficacy 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Absolute z-score less than 2 63 54.3 91.3 91.3 
Absolute z-score grater than 1.96 6 5.2 8.7 100.0 
Total 69 59.5 100.0 
Issing System 47 40.5 
Total 116 100.0 
Total Perceived Usefulness 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Absolute z-score less than 2 107 92.2 93.9 93.9 
Absolute z-score grater than 1.96 6 5.2 5.3 99.1 
Absolute z-score greater than 2.58 1 .9 .9 100.0 
Total 114 98.3 100.0 
Issing System 2 1.7 
Total ll 100. 
Total Perceived Ease of Use 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Absolute z-score less than 2 112 96.6 96.6 96.6 
Absolute z-score grater than 1.96 4 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Total 116 100.0 100.0 
Total AIS User Satisfaction 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Absolute z-score less than 2 113 97.4 97.4 97.4 
Absolute z-score grater than 1.96 3 2.6 2.6 100,0 
Total 116 100.0 100.0 
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